6-11-1976

A Model of Decisions and Diego Garcia or Halperin and the Navy's Baby

Edward Gregory Langer

At its meeting on June 11, 1976, the Faculty of Lawrence University awarded Honors in Independent Study, *cum laude*, to Edward Gregory Langer for his thesis *A Model of Decisions and Diego Garcia, or Halperin and the Navy's Baby*. The members of the examining committee were:

Minoo D. Adenwalla
Professor of Government

Mojmir Povolny
Professor of Government

Jules LaRocque
Associate Professor of Economics

Michael Hayes
Instructor of Government

Accepted on behalf of the Committee on Honors by:

Harriet Tippet
Member, Committee on Honors

A MODEL OF DECISIONS AND DIEGO GARCIA

or

HALPERIN AND THE NAVY'S BABY

by

EDWARD GREGORY LANGER

A Thesis Submitted in Candidacy for Honors

at Graduation from Lawrence University

June, 1976

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE HALPERIN MODEL

Development and Description of the Model

The first scholar to set up a well-developed bureaucratic model of foreign policy decision-making was Graham T. Allison. The model was first outlined in the article "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis"[1] and later refined in his book Essence of Decision.[1] Allison set up three models for analyzing foreign policy decision-making and then applied them to the Cuban missile crisis.[1] Allison contends that most analysts view the behavior of nations as if it were the result of the decision of a unified decision-maker. Allison believes that the two alternate models he developed provide a better basis for explaining and predicting the actions of governments.

The first model that Allison discusses is what he calls the rational actor model (Model I). This model views the government as a unified actor. The actor is able to specify goals, values and objectives. The actor examines various courses of action and chooses the course that will maximize his objectives. Therefore, given any particular action the government took, some objective was maximized. In order

to determine what the objective was, the analyst puts himself in the place of the nation or government and attempts to reconstruct the event. Allison, however, pointedly attacks this type of analysis in his "Rationality Theorem" : "There exists no pattern of activity for which an imaginative analyst cannot write a large number of objective functions such that the pattern of activity maximizes each function."[2]

The second model is the organizational process model (Model II). This model views the policy or action as being the result of organizational output. The actors analyzed in this model are not monolithic governments but the organizations that comprise the government. Especially important to understanding the action of organizations are the existence of routines, programs, repertoires and standard operating procedures (SOP) which govern the day to day operation of the organization. These routines are slow to change and, therefore, these organizations are marked by inertia. The best explanation of the behavior of the organization at time T is to look at behavior at T-1. The best prediction of behavior at T+1 is behavior at time T.

The third model is the governmental politics model (Model III). According to this model, governmental action is the result of bargaining. The actors are a number of players in a bargaining process. The position of these players decide what they can and cannot do. Each player

brings with him to the bargaining game certain interests, stakes and power. The action of the nation is the outcome of the bargaining game. The best explanation of the government's action is to look at the interaction of the players in the bargaining process.

These models are altered in an article by Allison and Morton H. Halperin entitled "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications."[3] In this article an important change is made in the models that Allison developed. In this article, the organizational process was not developed as a separate model. Rather, the organizational process model was viewed as being a constraint on the bargaining game of the governmental politics model. The authors said that "the game among players (and organizations considered as players) proceeds within a context. A large part of that context is the existing configurations of large organizations, their established programs and standard operating procedures for performing various functions."[4] Organizations affect the bargaining game in three important ways: through their control of information, their creation of options and their implementation of policies. Most of the information available to the players is gathered by large organizations whose own interests and methods may color the information that is given to the players in the bargaining game. Most of the options that are considered

are created by organizations and these options are usually the result of the standard operating procedures of the organization. The options that are presented to the players in the bargaining game are usually the options that protect the interests of the organizations. The decision that is reached by the players in the bargaining game is usually implemented by organizations and this implementation is often altered by the standard operating procedures of the organizations and the organizations' perception of its interests. In this way the organizations of the government are able to have an important effect on the creation of policy and its implementation.

Morton Halperin in his book Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy[5] deals in detail with the elements involved in the creation of foreign policy. His aim in writing the book was "to illustrate through elements of the historical record certain propositions about how politics within a government [his emphasis] influence decisions and actions ostensibly directed outward ."[6] There are two important parts to Halperin's model. One part deals with the decision-making process itself. It is important to determine who is involved in the decision and how the participants stand on the issue is related to their interests. These participants in the decision-making process are part of a bargaining game which results in a decision. The other

part of the model deals with the effect the bureaucracy can have on the creation of options and in the implementation of policy.

In order to determine who can be involved in an issue it is necessary to find out the bureaucratic channel (or action-channel) a decision takes. Not all issues are handled in the same way and in some cases it is possible that several different action-channels could be utilized. Which channel is used is important because it determines who can participate in the decision. For example, some aspects of the U.S. military policy could be handled through the National Security Council system or internally within the Pentagon. In the former instance, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency can participate in the formulation of policy while it could not in the latter channel. The inclusion of the arms control agency may change the policy that is finally agreed upon.

Within an action-channel, it is important to find out who took an active part in the decision-making process. People in the action-channel may decide that they do not want to take part in the process. A person may decide that the issue is not important enough to warrant his attention or the person may decide not to participate because participation may have costs that he does not wish to bear. Often, a department head leaves decisions to his deputy

because he does not have the time to participate in the process. A person may not participate because he realizes that he would be advocating a minority position and his advocacy of that position may affect his future relations with the other players. The participants weigh the possible costs and benefits of participation and opt in or out of the decision.

Those people who decide to take part in the decision-making have to take a stand on the issue. In order to determine what stand they should take, they look at the interests they feel are involved. The central interests they look at in a foreign policy decision are the national security interests. Sometimes the national security interests are clear cut and and it is easy to determine the stand on the issue that will best fulfill the national security objective. In other instances, it is not clear what the national security requires and so the players look elsewhere for clues about the national security interests involved. Often, the organization to which the player belongs has its own idea of what the national security requires and the player uses the organization's estimation of the interests involved in determining his stand. The player also may look to see what the President feels are the national security interests involved and use the President's estimation of the interests in determining his own stand.

The player's evaluation of the national security interests involved is only one set of interests he looks at in determining his stand on the issue. Also a factor in determining his stand is his evaluation of the personal, Presidential and organizational interests involved. A certain stand on a policy issue may enhance the well-being of the organization of which the player is a part. If the player identifies his personal well-being with the well-being of his organization, he will take a stand that protects or promotes the interests of his organization. A certain stand on an issue may promote the interests of the President such as aiding in his re-election. The player may have an interest in promoting the President's interests, perhaps because he is an important Presidential adviser, and therefore his estimation of the President's interests will influence the stand he takes. A certain stand on an issue may also promote the personal interest of a player. A certain stand may affect the future chances of a bureaucrat being elected to Congress. It is important to realize that decisions on national security issues take into account both the national security interests and the domesic interests involved in the issue as they are perceived by the player.

Central to Halperin's model is that a player's place in the bureaucracy has a great effect in determining his

stand on the issue. Halperin writes that "in general a person's position in the bureaucracy will determine what face of an issue he sees and what seems important."[7] Hence the aphorism--where you stand depends on where you sit. A person's perception of an issue is affected by his position. A decision to sell jets to Turkey is seen by the State Department as a way of maintaining good relations, by the Treasury as affecting the balance of payments, and by the Air Force as the sale of equipment it badly needs. The way a player looks at an issue affects his perception of the interests involved and thus the stand he takes.

These players all interact on the issue. In the bargaining game some players have more influence than others. Measuring influence is difficult but influence on an issue can be based on legal authority, staff skill, standing with the President, and willingness to use resources and authority. Influence can be increased through the use of strategies. Influence on a decision varies from decision to decision. The interaction of these players often results in compromises because no one has enough influence in the bargaining game to get approval for his preferred plan. The resulting compromise usually leaves the objectives of the key players only partially met. Since the decision resulted from a compromise among the players and not from the selection of the best plan to secure an

objective, one cannot use a rational actor model to try to determine why the plan was picked. Only by seeing how the players interacted in the bargaining game can one explain why one plan was chosen over another plan.

In making their decision, the decision-makers cannot deal with an infinite number of alternatives because of the cost in time and manpower. Rather, they deal with only a limited number of alternatives. Often the decision-makers do not systematically compare a limited number of alternatives but rather, only search for a plan that will secure the consent of enough players to get the plan approved. The resulting decision usually does not maximize the person's interests but only satisfices; satisficing, rather than maximizing an interest, means that the player finds a solution that satisfies and suffices, but is not the best (maximizing) solution. In making their decision, the decision-makers rely heavily on the options that are presented by the bureaucracy. This is especially true of programs that require a considerable amount of expertise such as in the procurement of sophisticated military equipment. An organization is unlikely to propose an option that is at odds with its organizational interests. The options considered by the decision-makers are often options that are designed to secure the interest of the organization that prepared the option. In this way, the bureaucracy has an

important effect on the decision that is reached.

The bureaucracy is also able to affect the policy through its implementation of decisions. Policy decisions are not usually designed to be easily monitored by the decision-makers and usually the decision-makers do not have the time or the will to monitor the implementation of the policy. Thus, the organization responsible to implement the policy has considerable leeway in their implementation of the policy or program. The organization responsible for implementing policy thus has a range of options. It can implement the policy as the decision-makers had intended. It can also, in certain policy decisions, do nothing or implement the program in such a way as to have a different effect than the decision-makers intended. In some instances, the organization responsible for the implementation of a decision has completely ignored the decision and has instead gone ahead with a program that it preferred. It has been difficult for the decision-makers to control the bureaucracy. Franklin Roosevelt gave a description of the problems the decision-makers have had in controlling the bureaucracy.

> The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I find it is impossible to get the action and results I want--even with Henry [Morgenthau] there. But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy, and action of the career diplomats, and then you'd know what a real problem was. But the Treasury and the

> State Department put together are nothing compared with the Na-a-vy. The admirals are really something to cope with--and I should know. To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.[8]

So looking at the decision is only part of the picture. The implementation of policy may be carried out in such fashion as to produce a result contrary to the result desired by the decision-makers.

Diego Garcia as a Case Study

This paper will apply Halperin's model to a series of American policy decisions on the creation of a naval base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The Diego Garcia case was chosen for a number of reasons. One reason was my interest in the Indian Ocean region. Another reason was that it was a recent development and consequently it has not been extensively studied. The study thus sheds some light not only on the decision-making process but also on the history of the base plan. Another reason was that it was not a momentous issue and thus it could be handled fairly easily. Because it is not a momentous event, the issue examined is fundamentally different from issues that have been previously studied through the use of a bureaucratic

model such as the Cuban missile crisis,[1] the Truman steel seizure[2] and the decision to deploy the ABM.[3] It is important to understand the more mundane decisions of the American government in order to determine if the decision-making process in the mundane decisions is different from the decision-making process in crisis and momentous situations.

The approach used is basically Halperin's but with two important alterations. Halperin's model does not bring Congress or public opinion into the model and therefore it only shows part of the decision-making process. This paper will include Congress because it played an important role in the decisions. This addition does not alter the basic model because the same factors, action-channels, the multiplicity of interests, and bargaining are important in the decision-making of both the Executive and Legislative branches. The other change is that this paper will deal, not with one decision on the Diego Garcia base, but rather with a series of decisions on the base. This change is based on the fact that decisions are often inseparably tied to other decisions that were made in the past. By using several decisions, one can see the continuity of a policy in a certain issue area, which is something that is often lost when one analyzes just one decision.

The case study is divided into four sections. The first section is an analysis of the national security

interests that underlie the debate about the Diego Garcia base. The second section is an analysis of the organizational interests of the Navy. This section will examine the structure, mission, capabilities and budget of the Navy, in order to understand why the Diego Garcia base became an issue. The third section outlines the action-channel for the decision on Diego Garcia. The final section deals with the decisions themselves. This section will pay special attention to the interests on which the players based their stands.

After the case is examined, this paper will turn back to Halperin's model. The first section of this chapter will examine the effectiveness of the Halperin model in evaluating the Diego Garcia case. The second section will examine whether the development of a typology of policy processes would help in developing a comprehensive model of decision-making. The final section will examine some important ramifications of bureaucratic politics.

This analysis will clarify several points about the development of American policy on the Diego Garcia base that cannot be explained using a rational actor model. Specifically, two questions will be answered.

1. By 1974, a decision was made within the Executive Branch to go ahead with the construction of a logistics base on Diego Garcia. In justifying the project before

Congress, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, emphasized the Russian threat to the interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean. When William Colby, Director of the CIA, testified before Congress, he downplayed the Soviet threat and raised serious questions about the evidence that was used by Zumwalt. Both men had virtually the same intelligence reports. So why the discrepancy in their testimonies?

2. Congress approved the construction of a logistics base on Diego Garcia in 1975. In 1970, Congress had rejected a similar plan and authorized only a limited communications station. In approving the communications facility, Congress clearly stated that no facilities for the logistics base were to be built on Diego Garcia. In 1972, the Navy was able to receive funds from Congress to dredge out the lagoon at Diego Garcia so it was capable of supporting a logistics base. The Navy received these funds even though Congress had not authorized the construction of any facilities on Diego Garcia that were for a logistics base. Why was the Navy able to get the funds to dredge out the lagoon for the logistics base before the logistics base was approved by Congress?

APPLICATION OF THE HALPERIN MODEL

National Security Interests

A June 1964 study done by the Navy's think tank, the Center for Naval Analysis, gives a good summary of the long and short range U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean. The study lists general U.S. objectives in the Indian Ocean. These are "to promote political stability and economic viability inasmuch of the region as is open or can be opened to United States influence" and "simultaneously, to prevent serious reversals as a result of Soviet, Communist Chinese, or indigenous Communist activities in the region."[1] The study lists the three main U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean: "successful prosecution of the cold war in the region, . . . the maintenance of free access to the Indian Ocean and free use of the transit routes through it, [and] the United States interest in the extraction and the unimpeded sea movement of Middle East oil out of the region."[2] American policy on the introduction of naval forces and the construction of support facilities should thus be designed to enhance the U.S. ability to achieve these objectives and to secure these interests.

These same interests were mentioned in Congressional hearings in 1974 as being important. James Noyes of International Security Affairs testified before Congress that the U.S. had three main security objectives in the Indian Ocean. The first is "to provide an effective alternate to the growth of Soviet influence in the region."[3] The second is "to have continued access to vital Middle Eastern oil supplies for ourselves and other nations of the free world."[4] The third is "to ensure the continued free movement of U.S. ships and aircraft into and out of the area."[5] These "objectives," as Noyes calls them, correspond closely with the interests stated by the Navy ten years earlier. There was no statement by any U.S. official that corresponded directly with the two general U.S. policy objectives as stated by the Navy. However, both of these general objectives are implicit in the statements of many of the decision-makers.

Ever since the Soviets tried to remain in Iran after the Second World War, U.S. policy-makers have been concerned about Communist expansionism. In the fifties this concern was shown by U.S. efforts to set up an alliance system that would contain the Soviets. To this end, the United States entered into bilateral defence agreements with Iran in 1950 and with Pakistan in 1954. Besides direct aggression, the U.S. was also concerned about Soviet attempts to create instability through the use of internal agents or by funding

insurgent groups. A State Department representative testified in 1971 that

> we see forward movement in economic development and toward political stability as the best means to promote an environment conducive to our own interests. Conversely, the instability and intra-regional antagonisms that characterize much of the Indian Ocean area could serve to promote Soviet interests at the expense of ours.[6]

At the present time the greatest concern of policy-makers is over the possibility of the Soviets manipulating the instability of the region to their own advantage.

There have been numerous crises in the Indian Ocean over the last twenty years which have affected, either directly or indirectly, U.S. interests. According to the 1964 Navy study, there were 157 crises in the Indian Ocean in the years 1953-1963 that involved Western interests. Of these 157 crises, the United States took some action in 80 of them.[7] These figures are somewhat misleading because they include the entire Indian Ocean littoral which includes a region stretching from Vietnam to Egypt. But, there was considerable instability in the region and this instability continues to this day. The military believes, as do many other policy-makers, that the presence of U.S. military forces near a crisis area can serve to stabilize the situation. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, testified before Congress in 1974 that the construction of a base on Diego Garcia "will enhance our

capacity to bring power to bear in the Indian Ocean and this in turn will have a stabilizing effect on a Middle East crisis and make it likelier that the situation which results is one that is generally favorable to U.S. interests"[8] Thus the presence of military force is often a stabilizing factor in a crisis and it can serve to help secure U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean.

The second major U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean area is to ensure continued access to Middle East oil supplies. The 1964 Navy study said that the cutoff of the Middle East oil supplies would result in the loss of 75% of Great Britain's oil imports, 62% of Western Europe's oil imports, and 78% of Japan's oil imports.[9] In 1975, the U.S. itself relied on the Middle East oil fields for 20% of its imported oil and Europe was 75% dependent and Japan 85% dependent on Middle Eastern oil supplies.[10] Also important to the U.S. is the capital investments by the U.S. oil industry in the Persian Gulf region. It was estimated in 1974 that the U.S. investments in the area were worth about $3.5 billion.[11] It is imperative that the U.S. and her allies have continued access to this oil. As long as the oil is flowing smoothly from the Middle East to the West there is no problem. But in the event of a war it is imperative that the U.S. secure the oil supplies and find a safe passage for the oil to the West.

The third major U.S. interest is maintenance of free access to the Indian Ocean. The major U.S. interest is in assuring access to the oil supplies for ourselves and our allies. But also important is the need for the U.S. to have free access to the Indian Ocean so that the U.S. can honor its commitment, if necessary, to her two allies, Iran and Pakistan. The Indian Ocean is also a major thoroughfare for the trade of Australia and Japan, two other key allies.[12] In the event of a war, the U.S. may have to secure these sea lanes in order to guarantee the survival of her allies.

In the last fifteen years, two events have occurred that have markedly altered the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean. The first event is the British withdrawal of most of her military forces from the region east of Suez. The second event is the introduction by the Soviets of a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. These two events have changed the strategic picture in the Indian Ocean and have complicated efforts by the U.S. policy-makers to secure U.S. objectives in the Indian Ocean.

In the early 1960's the process of decolonization and pressure on the British pound sterling started to force a major evaluation of the British policy toward the area east of Suez. British policy in the Indian Ocean up to 1947 was centered around the Indian subcontinent. India

was like the hub of a great wheel with the British bases at Aden, Simonstown, and Singapore being the main spokes. With the elimination of the hub, the necessity of the other colonies and bases was lessened, but this fact did not receive due attention in British policy circles. British policy was not substantially altered for years. Gradually the British began to free their colonies in the Indian Ocean area. By 1964, most of the British colonies were independent or being prepared for independence. The Conservative party was concerned with maintaining the vestiges of the Empire, but the Labour party, especially its left-wing, was much less concerned. Part of the Labour party platform in 1964 called for a lessening of British global commitments. With the Labour victory at the polls that year, it was apparent to U.S. policy-makers that the British would be taking a hard look at their commitments in the Indian Ocean.[13]

Up through the middle sixties, the military force with prime responsibility for the protection of Western interests in the Indian Ocean was British. If the British withdrew, there would be no large Western military presence permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean. The only American naval forces permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean up to the present time consisted of a command ship and two destroyers based at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. In 1966, it was

becoming clear that economic problems would probably force a British withdrawal from east of Suez. The 1966 White Paper on Defence emphasized Britain's interest in the area but said that there were many economic liabilities connected to the protection of these interests. The paper said that in the future the British would not undertake any major military action without the assistance of allies and that the British would be under no obligation to militarily assist any nation unless that nation provided the British with facilities necessary to make the military force effective. The White Paper on Defence issued the next year indicated that the withdrawal of the bulk of the British presence in the area would be completed by the mid-seventies. However, in January of 1968, this timetable was speeded up to end the British presence by the end of 1971.[14]

The second major event that affected the strategic picture was the introduction of a Soviet miltary presence in the area. In March of 1968, a small group of Soviet warships entered the Indian Ocean to make a series of port calls. This was not the first time that the Soviets sent fleet elements into the Indian Ocean but ever since this deployment, the Soviets have had a constant presence in the area.

There are a number of reasons why the Soviets would want to station naval units in the Indian Ocean. A number

of these interests do not conflict with U.S. interests in the area. The Soviet Union operates a sizable fishing fleet and this fleet has been operating in the Indian Ocean for years. By 1968, about one-third of the total Soviet catch of fish was made in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union has used the Indian Ocean as an emergency landing site for its space flights. The Indian Ocean serves as an important shipping route for Soviet goods going from Western to Eastern Russia. The Indian Ocean serves the Soviet Navy as a route to exchange elements of their Black Sea and Pacific fleets. The warm southern waters can also serve as a winter training ground for the Soviet Navy. These interests of the Soviet Union probably contributed to the introduction of the Soviet Navy into the Indian Ocean. These interests do not conflict with U.S. aims and interests in the area and if the U.S. was certain that this was the purpose of Soviet presence, the presence would not be a matter of great concern.

There are other interests in the Indian Ocean that the Soviet Navy may be meant to secure that conflict with the interests of the U.S. One reason why the Soviets may be in the Indian Ocean is to keep an eye on any Polaris-Poseidon submarines that the U.S. stations in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. officially denies that the U.S. has Polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean but there have been a number of

reports that the U.S. does station subs in the area.[15] The Soviet presence may also be designed to disrupt the oil flow from the Middle East in the case of a general war.

1964 marked the year in which Soviet thinking about the use of its Navy changed markedly. In that year the Soviet Union initiated forward deployment of Soviet naval elements based on afloat support. In that year the Soviets began to continuously deploy in the Mediterranean. With these forward deployments began the gradual use of Soviet naval forces as tools designed to further Soviet foreign policy objectives. The Soviet Union has since used its navy in crisis situations in ways designed to constrain the U.S. and in support of its clients in instances when these states faced crises that did not involve the U.S.[16] The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean serves to limit the feasible options that U.S. decision-makers have for dealing with crises in the area. The Soviet presence may also be used in a way that interferes with U.S. interests in the area.

It is not clear what the Soviet Navy's mission in the Indian Ocean are. The capabilities of the permanent Soviet presence in normal situations is limited. During 1974 and the first half of 1975 the average number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean at any one time was around twenty ships. Of these, one-half were usually combatants.[17] Up to the completion of the Soviet facility at Berbera, Somalia, the

Soviets were hampered by the lack of littoral bases. This lack of a littoral base severely reduced the capabilities of the Navy because of the special nature of Soviet equipment. The Soviet Navy has relied heavily on surface to surface missiles as its main offensive weapons. These highly sophisticated missiles need frequent adjustment and this adjustment has to be done in a base. Before the construction of the facility at Berbera, the Soviet ships had to return to their bases in the Pacific or the Black Sea to make these adjustments. Because the Soviets did not return often enough to their bases, the missiles could not be relied upon and the Soviet naval forces were "paper tigers." The construction of the Berbera base gives the Soviets the facilities to adjust these missiles in the Indian Ocean.[18] The Soviet Union has, however, temporarily augmented its presence in the Indian Ocean during crisis situations, such as the Bangladesh War of 1971 and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.

Organizational Interests of the Navy

It has long been a dream of many Navy men to establish a U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. has had major presences in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean for years. The Indian Ocean was the only major body of water

without a sizeable U.S. Navy presence. It is logical that the Navy would look at the Indian Ocean as being a prime way to expand their role in world affairs.[1] This expansion into the Indian Ocean would have important repercussions on the future of the Navy and its servicemen.

The establishment of an American Indian Ocean fleet would probably enhance the morale of the Navy in a number of ways. First of all it would give the Navy access to new and exotic ports-of-call. The Navy believes that one of the reasons why it draws recruits is that its sailors are able to see numerous parts of the world during their tours of duties. If the Indian Ocean became a naval operating area, the percentage of ships operating in warm water areas, as compared to the wintry waters of the North Atlantic, would increase. These two changes would hopefully help draw enlistees and help persuade men already in the Navy to extend their stay in the Navy. The move into the Indian Ocean would probably also have an effect on the officers class in the Navy. A move into the Indian Ocean might mean that the size of the Navy would have to be increased. The expansion of the fleet means that there would be more ships to command and thus more officers needed. The careers of the officers are likely to be enhanced.[2]

The Navy today consists of four arms: the flyers, the surface Navy, the submariners and the Polaris submariners.[3]

The dominant group in the Navy today is the flyers, who emphasize carrier-based aircraft. This group became dominant in the Second World War when the aircraft carrier became the mainstay of the fleet after the demise of the battleship. This group reinforced its dominant position after the war when they were able to persuade the top policy-makers that the Navy could deliver nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear war. The second arm of the Navy is the surface fleet which is concerned with the operation of the Navy's cruisers, destroyers and other similar ships. The submariners are concerned with the attack and hunter-killer sub marines of the Navy. The fourth group consists of the men that man the Polaris-Poseidon submarines. Although the move into the Indian Ocean has been led by the flyers, the other arms of the Navy have favored the idea or at least not opposed it. All the arms of the Navy would gain if the U.S. moved into the Indian Ocean because they all could perform their missions in the area. Therefore, there was little conflict within the Navy over the plans to move into the Indian Ocean.[4]

According to the Chief of Naval Operations, the U.S. Navy currently has four missions to perform: strategic deterence, sea control, projection of power ashore, and naval presence. Sea control and projection of power ashore are missions that the Navy would undertake in war time. There are two important uses of sea control. One is to deny the

enemy the use of the ocean waters in a certain area for their purposes. The second is to ensure that the U.S. can safely use certain of the world's waters without any enemy interference. Traditionally, projection of power ashore has been the use of sea forces to land ground combat forces in a combat area. However, in the Korean War and the Vietnam War two new ways of projecting naval power were used. These new ways were the use of naval bombardment and naval tactical air power. In contrast to the war-fighting missions of the Navy are the missions which are designed to prevent the need for the use of naval forces in combat. The doctrine of strategic deterrence is based on the belief that the U.S. must have a credible second strike capability in order to deter an enemy nuclear first strike on the U.S. Part of the U.S. strategic force consists of Polaris submarines and carrier-based bombers. The mission of naval presence is the use of military forces to achieve political objectives without engaging in combat. The activities that fall under this mission can range from warnings and coercion to demonstrations of good will and the providing of humanitarian assistance.[5] All four of these missions would be important if the Navy entered the Indian Ocean with a permanent presence.

The conflict over missions within the Navy is limited. The real conflicts are between the Navy and the two other services. It is unlikely that the Army and Navy missions

would conflict in the Indian Ocean. The Army's missions seriously conflict with the Navy's missions only when there is an extended land war involving both the Army and the Marines in land operations.[6] A more real rival to the Navy for a role in the Indian Ocean is the Air Force. There are a number of missions where the Navy and the Air Force may conflict in the Indian Ocean. One area is the gathering of intelligence about enemy activities. Both the Navy and Air Force have the men and equipment to gather this information. Another area where the Navy and Air Force may conflict is in anti-submarine warfare.[7] It is even conceivable that the construction of air bases on a string of strategically-located bases in the Indian Ocean could provide air support for a fleet operating in the Indian Ocean.[8] Because of these potential conflicts it was important for the Navy to try to keep the Air Force from assuming a role in the Indian Ocean.

One problem the Navy presently faces is the drastic reductions in the number of ships it has. In the early sixties, the Navy consisted of a few good modern ships and many ships that were built during the Second World War. In 1962, there were 860 ships in the U.S. active fleet, 598 of which were built during or shortly after the Second World War. The average life of a ship is about twenty years and so the Navy was faced with the problem of securing

replacements for these ships or ending up with a drastically reduced Navy in the 1970s. In 1962, it was clear that unless a massive increase in the shipbuilding budget was made, the Navy would consist of just about 500 ships in 1973.[9] Attempts to increase the shipbuilding budget soon faced the effects of Vietnam. The war requirement did not allow the money to be spent to modernize the fleet. Efforts at any time to expand the fleet also faced the fact that it takes years to build a ship. It takes about 6 years to complete a carrier once the decision to build has been made.[10] Today, the U.S. Navy consists of under 500 ships.[11]

This reduction in the size of the Navy has hampered Navy attempts to perform its missions. The U.S. Navy feels its resources are being stretched too thin. Admiral Zumwalt's testimony in 1974 shows the problems the Navy was facing with the planned reduction in the number of aircraft carriers to 12.

> "The device we have resorted to is to do with mirrors what we cannot do with numbers, to station one carrier with families permanently in Yokosuka so we can get by with only seven carriers in the Pacific and still rotate two forward on a one and three watch and by that device have three in the Western Pacific."[12]

The Navy has to use this mirror trick because it would take nine carriers to do the job properly. Given these problems in maintaining the present naval strength in the Western Pacific with the available resources, it would be impossible

for the Navy to permanently station a carrier unit in the Indian Ocean without seriously reducing U.S. strength elsewhere.

In order for the Navy to set up its dream fleet in the Indian Ocean, it has to obtain a larger budget or reduce its forces elsewhere. A study by the Brookings Institute in 1974 estimated that the acquisition costs of an Indian Ocean fleet would probably be about $4.8 billion (and maybe as much as $8 billion) and that operating costs would be about $800 million annually.[13] An increase of this magnitude would be carefully considered in both the Department of Defense and in Congress. The handling of the funding of such a build-up in the Navy would probably meet opposition in the Navy and the services depending on how the money is distributed between the services and between the arms of the Navy. If the submariners do not feel they are getting a large enough portion of the budget increase, they are likely to oppose the plan. If the money is spread among all the arms of the Navy,there is unlikely to be serious opposition.[14]

Action Channel

Proposals by the Navy to build bases are usually devel-

oped in the Navy's planning staffs. These staffs look at the force needs of the Navy over a five year period to determine what types of facilities and equipment the Navy will need over this time span. At some point a planning staff decides that the Navy has a new requirement and a proposal is drawn up. Often, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directs these staffs to study certain problems and to draw up proposals to solve these problems. These proposals are then submitted to the CNO for his approval. In the preparation of these proposals, these staffs work to meet the parochial needs of the Navy. These staffs realize that there are limits on what they can get approved by the Secretary of Defense and Congress, but within these limits they believe they should vigorously push for the programs that meet the Navy's needs. These staffs do not believe it is their job to decide what is in the national interest.[1]

After the proposal is drawn up and approved by the CNO, there are two possible ways for the project to be handled. One way is to submit the project to the Secretary of the Navy and, with his approval, submit it to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The other way is to submit the project to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and, with their approval, submit it to OSD. The Navy generally goes through the Joint Chiefs when it is an important project because of the greater institutional weight of the Joint Chiefs.

With the approval of the Joint Chiefs, the proposal is submitted to OSD where it is usually handled by either Systems Analysis or International Security Affairs. The Secretary of Defense makes the final decision on the proposal. He may, however, enter into consultations with the Secretary of State or other officials on the proposal. After the proposal is approved, it starts the whole project over again as part of the Defense Budget. The Defense Budget is then subject to the review of the Office of Management and Budget.[2]

After the Defense Department budget is approved in the Executive Branch, the project is submitted to Congress. Military construction appropriations are almost automatically assigned to the Military Construction subcommittees of the two Armed Services Committees and the two Appropriations Committees. The two Armed Services Committees hold hearings on the proposal, vote on the legislation, and report the legislation to the full chamber. Each house then votes on the legislation. If there are any differences between the House and Senate bills, the legislation is sent to a conference committee. The conference bill is then submitted to both chambers for approval. After the compromise legislation is accepted, the legislation is sent to the President for his approval. After the money is authorized in this fashion, the appropriations process begins. The appropriations process is identical to the authorization process

except that the legislation is handled by the two Appropriations Committees. After the money is authorized and appropriated, the Navy can begin work on the project.

The Decisions

Ever since the October 1962 Chinese attack on India, there has been a growing concern about the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean. By 1964, there was strong pressure from the Navy for action on the issue of strategic presence in the Indian Ocean.[1] In late 1963, it was announced that the U.S. would be sending a carrier group into the Indian Ocean early in 1964. It was emphasized, however, that the group would not be permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean but would only be visiting the area.[2] On December 23, the prestigious New York Times in an editorial called for the creation of an Indian Ocean Fleet. The editorial stated that

> "There are some sound strategic reasons for providing some military power to a huge area that is virtually a vacuum of power ... It seems clear that naval power of some sort must be ultimately assigned to the Indian Ocean. And today this can only mean United States naval power, for no other nation in the western world has the strength or capability to provide it."[3]

This concern about a "power vacuum" in the Indian Ocean was also voiced a few weeks later by Secretary of the Navy Paul

H. Nitze. Nitze suggested that the U.S. might seek naval bases in the Indian Ocean area.[4]

A permanent U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean has not been established to this day. The problem in 1963-1964 was that there was a sharp difference in opinion between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara about the solution to the problems in the Indian Ocean. Rusk thought the U.S. presence would act as a stabilizing factor in the region. Robert McNamara was opposed to the idea of a permanent presence by the U.S. because he thought it would be disastrous if the U.S. Navy was allowed to expand into another ocean. Instead of introducing a U.S. permanent presence, the two agreed to try to ease the financial burden for the British of maintaining their presence east of Suez through the establishment of joint bases.[5] Both governments were concerned about the protection of Western interests in the area and some sort of low-level American presence and some cost-sharing to help maintain the British presence would work together to ensure a continued Western presence in the area.[6]

The decision for the U.S. to commit herself to the Indian Ocean in this fashion led to negotiations between the State Department and the British Foreign Ministry. In 1965, an agreement was reached to create a new political entity in the Indian Ocean, the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT).

The British separated Aldabra, Farguhar and Ile Desroches in the Amirantes from the Seychelles and the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and joined these diverse islands into the BIOT. These islands were to remain under British rule when the Seychelles and Mauritius gained their independence. The Seychelles and Mauritius were to be compensated for their loss of sovereignty over these islands. The islands of the BIOT were sparsely populated and most of the population living on the islands in the sixties consisted of migrant workers from the Seychelles and Mauritius who were hired by the copra plantations of these islands. Eventually .65 million pounds was also paid to Mauritius for the resettlement of these contract workers when the British government bought out the plantation owners and closed the plantations on several of these islands. The U.S. agreed to pay up to half of the cost of establishing the BIOT, up to a maximum of $14 million. This was to be paid by waiving the research and development surcharges on the Polaris missiles that the British were buying.[7] This financial arrangement was not publically revealed until 1975.

In 1966, a further agreement was made between the two governments to make the islands of the BIOT available to both parties to develop jointly as military facilities. The agreement is binding for fifty years with an option to renew for another twenty. The British would retain sovereignty

over the islands and both flags would fly over any base that was constructed. The agreement said that normally each country would bear the cost of building its own bases but that "there may be certain cases where joint financing should be considered."[8] This agreement thus opened up one way to financially aid the British in their efforts to maintain their presence in the Indian Ocean.

The efforts to keep the British in the Indian Ocean ultimately failed. The basic reason for this withdrawal was the worsening economic condition in Britain. The U.S. was unable to come up with an effective way to keep the British in the Indian Ocean. One of the reasons for this was the lack of interest among Pentagon planners in keeping the British there. In an editorial, the New York Times stated that "they have been less interested in providing financing or new arrangements to keep Britain there on a long-term basis than in preparing the U.S. Seventh Fleet to operate in the Indian Ocean."[9] The Navy's solution to the Indian Ocean strategic problem is shown in its study "The Military Security Gap in the Indian Ocean Area" issued in June 1964.[10] This study reviewed the situation in the Indian Ocean and discussed what it termed the "security gap" in the Indian Ocean. The study concludes that the best way to fill the gap was through the deployment of a "reinforced battalion landing team (BLT) embarked in

amphibious shipping and escorted by a destroyer division [which] possesses all three required military capabilities: ground troops, warships, and military transportation."[11] In reference to the British presence the study said that this force "is highly adaptable to working with United Kingdom forces and facilities."[12] However this force "must not be so powerful as to relieve the British of the obligation to protect their own interests."[13] This solution was not what McNamara wanted for he was trying to prevent the introduction of American naval forces; so he did not follow the recommendation of the study group. The Navy's aims were not consonant with his aims.

In the beginning of 1967, the Navy prepared a detailed plan to develop one of the islands of the BIOT, Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago, as a naval base. The proposal was to build a facility primarily capable of giving logistics and communications support to the fleet.[14] The island is small and horseshoe-shaped with a perimeter of about forty miles. The lagoon is about five and one-half miles wide and about thirteen miles long with depths ranging from thirty to one hundred feet. It is located in the center of the ocean and is far removed from the littoral. It is 1,200 miles to the tip of India and 2,100 miles to Aden. Because of the small size of the island it is impossible to build a major facility like San Diego and its

remoteness would probably cause a morale problem if men were stationed there for extensive periods of time.

This island fit the description of what the Navy calls a "strategic" island. There are two factors which underlie the importance of these islands. One factor is the strategic location of these islands. Certain islands are well-suited to control the waters that surround them and the islands that are near the major sea lanes are especially important. The other factor is that island bases tend to have fewer problems with the local population because the population in the base area is limited. The Navy has done a number of studies on the idea of strategic islands.[15] Diego Garcia fitted the requirements for a strategic island since the indigenous population was small and because it was close to the sea lanes that lead from the Persian Gulf to Europe and Japan.[16]

The Navy's proposal to build a communications and support base on Diego Garcia was submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The proposal was primarily based on the need to have an oiling station for ships heading to Vietnam from the naval base at Norfolk, Virginia. The base was also supposed to be helpful in U.S. contingency operations in the Indian Ocean. Dean Rusk sent letters to Secretary McNamara indicating his support of the proposal.

He hoped that the base development might encourage the British to remain longer in the area. He also believed that if the British withdrew, the U.S. should make a commitment to the area in order to preserve stability in the region. But, despite Rusk's support of the proposal, McNamara rejected the project. The Systems Analysis staff of OSD had shown that refueling at Diego Garcia would not be cost-effective. The staff also showed that the contingencies that were to be handled by Diego Garcia could be handled in other ways. McNamara rejected the proposal on the basis of arguments by the Systems Analysis staff. The Navy had based the plan on narrow and meticulous grounds; McNamara gave a narrow and meticulous rebuttal based on the Systems Analysis' arguments. McNamara recognized that the Indian Ocean was a low-priority interest of the U.S. and he did not feel the U.S. should be expending limited resources there, especially in wartime. McNamara was very conscious of how the military was able to build on small commitments and enlarge them to the point where the costs far exceeded the benefits. This proposal seemed to be a case of bureaucratic expansionism.[17]

The Navy tried again the next year to gain approval for the project. Over the winter of 1967-68, a Navy planning staff did a study of future military requirements in the Soutern Hemisphere. This study acquainted them

with the security problems in the Indian Ocean and prepared them to answer their critics. This time, instead of presenting one proposal, they submitted three options to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. One option was for the U.S. to do nothing. The second option was to build the communications and logistics base that had been rejected the previous year. The rationale for this plan was that it would serve as a communications facility and forward deployment base for Polaris submarines. The third option was to build a facility on Diego Garcia much more extensive than the base proposed the year before. This plan would involve air staging, staging of ground troops, and forward basing of U.S. ships. The third option was designed to make the proposal of the year before look like a modest plan. By presenting the plan in this fashion, the Navy hoped to gain the approval of the proposal that was presented the year before.[18]

The Navy hoped to gain the necessary support for the project through a strategy. The Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed the third option of building the extensive base. Rusk was again pushing for the creation of some sort of facility on Diego Garcia. Fortunately for the Navy, Robert McNamara had left the Pentagon and he had been replaced by Clark Clifford. Clifford was too involved with Vietnam to take part in this decision and so the decision

was left up to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Nitze. Nitze was concerned about the existence of a "power vacuum" in the Indian Ocean and he felt that the U.S. should establish a role for herself in the

Indian Ocean. Nitze approved the middle option because of this concern despite the fact that the Systems Analysis staff again opposed the construction of the base because they did not believe it was cost-effective. Nitze was able to get enough support in OSD for the middle option because it seemed a prudent compromise. The Systems Analysis staff later tried, unsuccessfully, to have it struck from the budget.[19]

This proposal was then submitted to Congress as a classified line item. The Navy requested $9.6 million as the first increment of funding in January 1969. The proposal had little trouble securing the approval of the two authorizing committees, the House and Senate Armed Service Committees, since these two committees had been traditionally sympathetic to the Military's requests. The House Appropriations Committee also approved the project but the Senate Appropriations Committee rejected it. The rejection of the project in the Senate was primarily brought about through the opposition of Senator Mike Mansfield, who chaired the key Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction. Mansfield did not think that the U.S. should be expanding its role in that far corner of the world. Mansfield instead thought that the U.S. should be reviewing its world-wide commitments in order to find out if they could be reduced.[20] Mansfield was joined in his

opposition by Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The conference committee rejected the project but made an agreement with the Navy that the Navy could come back the next year to receive funding for a communications facility on Diego Garcia. All the logistics facilities were to be cut out of the project.[21]

After the project was defeated by the Senate in 1969, the Navy made another attempt to revive the project despite the agreement with Congress. A proposal was simultaneously being prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense which called for the construction of a communications station on the island of Diego Garcia and the infrastructure necessary to support it. The Navy proposal was rejected and the alternative plan was accepted. Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, knew from his experience on Capital Hill that Congress would probably reject the project and that there was no reason to create ill-will on the Hill. The State Department was also no longer actively supporting the proposal since by this time there was no hope of slowing a British withdrawal by constructing the facility. The cost in antagonizing the littoral out weighed the benefit. The Navy could not gain the necessary support in the Executive Branch for another try to gain Congressional approval.[22]

In March of 1970, Secretary of Defense Laird gave his

approval for the inclusion of $5.4 million in the military construction budget for the communications facility on Diego Garcia. The Congress approved the 1970 request and subsequently approved further increments of $8.95 million in 1971 and $6.1 million in 1972.[23] Congressional concern about the future of the U.S. communications station ~~on~~ in Ethiopia led them to approve Diego Garcia in the hope that the U.S. could remove the base in Ethiopia.[24] The last increment of the funding was for the dredging of the habor at Diego Garcia. Even though this dredging was supposed to be for the needs of the "austere" communications facility it is in fact capable of handling submarines and aircraft carriers.[25] The Navy had been attempting during this period to expand the base incrementally by adding facilities to it that were not required for the communications base but were required for the logistics base.[26] It is not clear whether the Secretary of Defense approved the additions knowing they were not necessary for the communications facility. However, Congress clearly missed the implications of this dredging. When the facility was expanded in 1974-75, Congress thought that one of the planned improvements was "an anchorage [their emphasis] which is capable of mooring a six-ship carrier task force. This will require lagoon dredging with the anchorage sized to permit ship to ship transfer of explosive ordnance."[27] It is interesting to note that no money was appropriated in 1974-75 for this dredging and the Navy did not ask for any.[28]

The 1972 appropriation was apparently enough for all the dredging needed for the logistics base.

In 1971, the U.S. naval presence was increased in response to the Soviet build-up in the area and because of the events surrounding the Indo-Pakistan War. In September of 1971 it was announced that the U.S. would be sending more ships into the Indian Ocean in response to the increased Soviet presence.[29] In December, 1971, a carrier task force was ordered into the Indian Ocean. After that war, the Pentagon announced that the Navy would periodically send naval forces into the Indian Ocean. It was expected that these patrols would be larger and more frequent than had previously been the case.[30]

The events of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 again resulted in the sending of a U.S. task force into the Indian Ocean and a reevaluation of U.S. policy in the region. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced in late November, 1973, that the U.S. naval patrols in the Indian Ocean would be conducted more frequently and regularly.[31] The idea of a base on Diego Garcia also received consideration. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was concerned about the Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean. He considered the Soviet activity to be a challenge that the U.S. had to respond to in some fashion. Schlesinger and Henry Kissinger got together to try to decide on an appropriate policy

position. Unfortunately, it is unclear exactly what interests Kissinger was pursuing. The two of them decided without much staff input that the U.S. should build a base on Diego Garcia capable of handling fleet logistics and troop trans-

port planes. This base would increase U.S. military flexibility in the area and signal to the Soviets that the U.S. was going to commit itself in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis. The inclusion of the Air Force was opposed by the Navy but there was nothing they could do to alter the decision.[32]

In early 1974, the plan to expand the facility on Diego Garcia was included as part of a supplemental budget request. The Navy request was $29 million. The main Navy projects were to build POL facilities, extend the landing strip, expand the aircraft parking area, construct barracks and construct a pier.[33] The project was included in the supplemental budget because it was hoped that the Congress would quickly approve the project if it was submitted while the memory of the Arab-Israli War and subsequent embargo was still fresh in the minds of the Congressmen.[34] There was however, a difference in opinion in the Pentagon on how to justify the base to Congress. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the State Department were going to present the base as being necessary for the broad national security interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean and not as a response to a Soviet "threat". The Navy, on the other hand, decided to use the idea of a Soviet threat to gain the support of Congress. Both groups recognized that there was a Soviet threat to American interests but that it was not

very serious. The Navy planned, however, to blow the Soviet threat way out of proportion in order to evoke a visceral response from Congress about the Soviet threat.[35]

The House of Representatives has been generally more favorable to the Diego Garcia project than the Senate. Both House committees that handled the proposal were favorable to the planned base development. The House had supported the plan in 1969 and they gave it strong support in 1974 and 1975. The opponents of the plan were never strong enough to threaten to defeat the plan. The Senate was more evenly divided on the issue and consequently the role of the Senators who did not have strong feelings about the bill became central. These people had to be persuaded in order to get the required majority. The Senate committees that handled Diego Garcia were less favorable than the House committees and both the Senate committees had strong opponents of the plan in key positions. Stuart Symington chaired the Armed Services subcommittee on military construction. Mike Mansfield chaired the Appropriations subcommittee on Military construction. These two Senators played important roles in the fight to block the expansion of Diego Garcia.

The proposal ran into difficulties almost from the start. Both House committees gave their approval to the project but it was delayed in the Senate. The House Armed Services Committee gave its enthusiastic support to the project,

basing this support on the need to counter the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean. The bulk of the committee report on Diego Garcia is a slightly edited version of Admiral Zumwalt's (Chief of Navy Operations) testimony before subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Appropriations Committee.[36] The House Appropriations Committee also supported the project and it based its approval on the need to have military flexibility in the region because of a potential for an increase in the Soviet presence.[37] The Senate Armed Services Committee, primarily through the efforts of Senator Symington, decided to defer consideration of the request until the Fiscal Year 1975 budget was considered. The committee deferred the project because it did not seem to the committee that the matter was urgent and because it was not clear at that time whether the British government would approve the expansion.[38] Senator Symington also felt that the Soviet build-up was not threatening enough to justify military expansion in this far corner of the world. Rather, he thought the U.S. should try for an arms agreement.[39] The deferral of consideration was supported by the conference committee.[40] The Senate Appropriations Committee did not take any action on the project since the money had not been authorized by the Armed Services Committee.

The hope of getting the project approved by Congress

in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War had failed primarily because Congress asked some questions about the efficacy of Diego Garcia in preventing a future embargo or in resupplying Israel. The oil question was of concern to Congress, but it was not clear what Diego Garcia could do to protect U.S. oil supplies. After all, the oil was cut off at the wellhead and not on the high seas. The relationship of Diego Garcia to the resupply of Israel was even more dubious. Admiral Zumwalt showed the tenuous link between Diego Garcia and a resupply effort when he said that "one can visualize in theory that naval forces might have to reinforce Israel up the Red Sea in which event the logistic support, in Diego Garcia would enhance your capability to get there. But this is rather remote, I think."[41] Nevertheless, some Congressmen were lobbied on this basis.[42] The use of Diego Garcia to resupply Israel would probably be vetoed by the British who would not want to be associated with such an effort because of possible Arab retaliation on an already weak and oil-dependent British economy. In a similar vein, it is unlikely that the British would allow the U.S. to use Diego Garcia to break an oil embargo unless her economic life was endangered. Consequently, the Middle East concerns were not decisive in securing Congressional support for the project.

The House of Representatives had approved the project

primarily out of concern about the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean. It appeared that the emphasis on the Soviet threat would assure enough support in the Senate that the project would be approved. The future of the proposal was altered by the testimony of William Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 11,1974. Colby's testimony raised doubts about the seriousness of the Soviet threat and undermined several arguments that Zumwalt was making. Colby's testimony gave a more realistic evaluation of the Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean and consequently, his appraisal was much less foreboding than the appraisal presented by Zumwalt. Colby testified that "the Soviet naval presence has grown slowly but steadily during these years, [since 1968] and has helped Moscow increase its influence in that part of the world. The forces the Soviets have deployed in the Indian Ocean, however, have been relatively small and inactive."[43] Colby also downplayed the importance of the opening of the Suez Canal on the level of Soviet deployments and the significance of the Soviet support facilities on the littoral.[44] Colby's testimony undercut the Navy's strategy of using the Soviet threat to gain approval for the facility.

This testimony by Colby weakened the Navy's position but it was not enough to decisively defeat the plan. The House Armed Services Committee reiterated its support of the project and authorized the requested $29 million in the fiscal

Year 1975 budget.[45] The Senate Armed Services Committee approved only $14.8 million. The Committee included qualifying language in the bill to

> "preclude the obligation of any of these funds until the President of the United States has advised the Congress in writing that he has evaluated all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for these facilities and has certified that this construction is essential to the national interest. Such certification must be submitted to the Congress and approved by both Houses of Congress."[46]

The Committee felt that the broader implications of the project should be explored and that the Executive Branch should explore arms control possibilities.[47] In conference the House conferees objected to this plan because it would allow the project to be defeated by simply not acting on it. The conference committee settled on a plan whereby the president would have to certify that the project was in the national interest. After Congress received the notification, either house has sixty days to pass a resolution disapproving the use of the funds.[48]

On May 12, 1975, Gerald Ford sent a letter to Congress certifying that he had evaluated the project and judged it was in the national interest to begin construction. On May 19, Senator Mansfield introduced a legislation of disapproval. His opposition to the proposal was based primarily on his feeling that the U.S. was already overextended and that it should not play policeman for the rest of the

world.[49] The House of Representatives did nothing because there was no chance in the House to pass a resolution of disapproval. The Senate Resolution appeared to be the last chance for the opponents of the project to defeat the project.

The resolution was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee which held hearings on June 10, 1975. The most important part of the hearing was the presentation by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger of aerial photography of the facilities the Soviets were building at Berbera, Somalia. These photographs revealed the existence of a facility capable of handling Soviet surface to surface missles.[50] Subsequent onsite inspection of the facilities in Berbera by a Senate team confirmed Schlesinger's report.[51] The testimony of Schlesinger was enough to convince many uncommitted Senators that the U.S. should match the Soviet creation of a base in the Indian Ocean by building our own facility. It was the Soviet threat that was the decisive factor in the subsequent voting.[52] The Senate Armed Services Committee voted ten to six against the resolution of disapproval.[53] On July 28, the Senate voted on the resolution. The disapproval resolution was defeated by a vote of 53 to 43.[54] With this vote it appeared that the Congressional debate on Diego Garcia was at an end.

A couple of months later, the issue re-emerged, pri-

marily through the efforts of Senator John Culver of Iowa. Culver did not think that the reasons given for the base were good enough to justify the project. The U.S. should try to commit itself to an arms agreement in the Indian Ocean instead of commiting ourselves there militarily. Culver was concerned about trying to head off a future arms race in the Indian Ocean.[55] The vehicle that Culver used to draw attention to the need for arms control was reports about the condition of the workers who had been removed from Diego Garcia so that it could be made into a base. Up to this time it was not clear to the Congress exactly how the people had been removed from the island and how the BIOT had been financed. When Culver heard reports that some of these workers had lived there for generations, he demanded a full report from the Pentagon. The report the Pentagon issued revealed that there had been a secret agreement between the U.S. and Britain for the U.S. to help finance the creation of the BIOT and to help pay for the resettlement of the workers.[56] The fact that there was a secret agreement between the British and the U.S. touched a sore nerve in Congress. Culver contended that the Congress had not been adequately informed about these monetary arrangements because by the time anyone in Congress was told anything, $9 million of surcharges on the Polaris missiles had already been waived.[57] Culver used the Congressional concern

about its treaty-making powers and its concern about the fate of the islanders to bring up the question of arms control.

Culver offered an amendment to the Military Construction Appropriation bill for the Fiscal Year 1976 which called for the delay of the funding of the base expansion until July 1, 1976 in order to give the administration time to check into arms control possibilities.[58] Two days before the vote was held, a subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee held hearings on the plight of the people who had been removed from Diego Garcia. Culver was one of the witnesses that testified before the committee and this gave him an important public forum to express his views.[59] When Culver brought his amendment to the floor of the Senate two days later he took great pains to emphasize that a vote for the amendment was not a vote against Diego Garcia, but rather a positive vote for arms control. If the arms control efforts failed, the base would be built without any more Congressional action.[60] The amendment passed by a vote of 51 to 44.[61] Central to the success of the measure was the support of Senator Henry Jackson. Jackson made a short statement on the floor of the Senate supporting the measure.[62] One observer of the vote noted that there were two factors that contributed to the approval of the amendment. One factor was Jackson's support, which seems to have

been part of Jackson's presidential electioneering. The other factor was the strong lobbying effort by Culver coupled with a poor lobbying effort by the Navy. The Navy apparently felt the amendment did not have much chance of passing and therefore did not lobby extensively against it.[63]

The Culver amendment was subsequently approved by the conference committee with some slight alterations. The House conferees agreed that the negotiations on arms control would be valuable but they feared that the delay would increase the cost of the base because of the effects of inflation. The conference committee therefore agreed to change the funding date from July 1, 1976 to April 15, 1976.[64] In April of 1976, the Executive branch submitted the required report to Congress. The report stated that the Administration had examined arms control possibilities but decided that the time was not right for the start of arms control talks because of recent Soviet actions in Africa.[65] With this report to Congress, the appropriated money could now be spent. After years of attempts, the naval facility on Diego Garcia could now be built.

EVALUATION OF THE MODEL

The Evidence of Diego Garcia

The Diego Garcia case study shows the policy-making process is a complicated one. It is impossible to make any firm conclusions about the policy-making process, or about the efficacy of the Halperin model in analyzing the process, through just one case study. Therefore, any observations made here have to be viewed as being tentative. With that in mind one can make some observations about the process and the Halperin model. First, we will turn to the questions that ended the first chapter and try to answer the questions.

1. Why did the testimony by Zumwalt and Colby conflict on the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean? Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Navy had the same intelligence on Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean. Zumwalt's testimony was not designed to give Congress a true estimate of the Soviet's activity in the Indian Ocean. Zumwalt was trying to convince Congress that there was a serious Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean because he believed that the best way to get Congressional approval of the Diego Garcia base

was to convince Congress to counter the Soviet threat through the construction of the Diego Garcia base. The Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) and the State Department did not feel that this was the best way to get approval of the base. They instead tried to emphasize the U.S. interests in the area that the U.S. should be protecting even if the Soviets were not in the Indian Ocean. The contrast between the testimony of Zumwalt and the State Department and ISA was not sharp because both were seeking the same objective. Colby, however, was not trying to sell the base to Congress; he was trying to present the CIA's estimate of the Soviet threat. Symington tried in his questioning to show the conflicts between Zumwalt's estimate of the threat and the CIA's estimate of the threat. It has been suggested that the main reason why Colby testified and undercut Zumwalt's decisional strategy was because of the enmity that exists between the CIA and the Navy.[1] Whether or not this was a reason why Colby testified, his presentation of the actual estimation of the Soviet threat did undercut Zumwalt's strategy.

2. Why was the Navy able to get the funds to dredge out the lagoon at Diego Garcia for a logistics base before the logistics base was approved by Congress? After Congress had turned down the proposal to build the logistics base on

Diego Garcia, the Navy wanted to revive the project. So it tried to include the project in the next year's budget in order to see if it could get the project approved this time. It had taken two tries to get the project approved in the Executive Branch and maybe the second attempt to get the project approved in Congress would be successful also. Laird, however, did not give them the opportunity. The Navy then switched to another tactic to get the logistics base.

The Navy tried to add facilities to the communications base that were not necessary for the communications base but were necessary for the logistics base. By adding facilities to the base a little at a time, the Navy could slowly enlarge the capabilities of the base until it got the desired logistics base. The only problem was slipping these items past the Secretary of Defense and Congress. In 1972, the Navy asked for funds to dredge out the lagoon so that supply ships would have a protected place to anchor. But, the funds they asked for were sufficient not only to dredge out the lagoon to meet the requirements of the communications base but also to meet the requirements of the logistics base. When Congress approved the dredging it did not realize how much dredging $6 million would buy. On this issue, Congress probably deferred to the experts in the Navy who could tell them how much dredging was needed at Diego Garcia and how

much this dredging would cost. The Navy was thus able to implement the base plan in a way that was not intended by Congress.

Neither of these two questions could be answered by using a Rational Actor Model. If there was one actor that was making decisions there would be no conflicting testimonies on the Soviet threat. If there was one actor, only facilities for a communications base would have been built after the decision was made only to build a communications base. These are two examples of how a Rational Actor Model fails to explain the decision-making process. The Halperin model, in contrast, can explain why incidents like this occur.

The Halperin Model differs from the Rational Actor Model in three important areas. First of all, the Halperin Model does not view the decision-maker as being unified and centralized. Rather the Halperin Model sees the decision-making process as involving numerous individuals with different degrees of influence on the decision. Secondly, the Halperin Model does not assume that the decision-makers are basing their decision on just one set of interests. Rather, the individual decision-makers are each basing their stand on different interests. Thirdly, the Halperin Model recognizes the importance of the bureaucracy in the creation of options and the implementation of policy. The evidence

of the case study will now be reviewed to examine how effective the Halperin Model is in explaining these three areas.

Decisions are the result of the interactions of numerous players in a bargaining game. The Diego Garcia case points out the importance of finding out who participated in the process. In the case of Diego Garcia, the action-channel had been pre-established and it was therefore a question of which people on the action-channel chose to participate. People were able to decide whether they wanted to take an active part in the decision-making process and certain actors, like the Air Force and Clark Clifford, simply decided not to take an active role. Their non-participation appears to have had a significant effect on the final policy outcome. If, for example, Clifford had decided to participate it is likely that he would have rejected the project in 1968. Whether a person opts in or out of the policy process is often the result of his evaluation of his interest in the matter and the potential cost, such as time consumed, through his participation in the decision.

The active participants in the process also varied in the amount of influence they exerted on the policy process. In the Executive branch, the key players in the process were the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Navy. The Secretary of Defense had legal authority over the project. It was his responsibility to approve military projects.

The Secretary of State participated because the project had foreign policy implications but he could not order the project on his own. He needed either the approval of the Secretary of Defense or a presidential order to make the Secretary of Defense approve the project. The Navy's role was partly the result of its organizational weight and the strategies it designed to try to gain approval for the project. The organizational weight of the Navy primarily is based on its sizeable budget, its manpower resources and its influence in Congress. This organizational weight meant that the Secretary of Defense could not lightly dismiss the Navy's proposal. The Navy was able to use its resources to devise strategies designed to increase the likelihood of the approval of the project. The maneuvers behind the 1968 approval of the project by Nitze are examples of the strategies used. Influence, however, is a difficult thing to measure and it is difficult to say why certain people had influence on a decision. It is almost impossible to predict who will have how much influence on an upcoming decision.

Certain players who participate in the decision-making do not use the potential power that they have. Congress suffers from many structural disabilities that prevent it from exercising an effective role in the formation of U.S. foreign policy. Congressmen are hampered by lack of time and staff resources and by lack of expertise. Lewis Anthony

Dexter has observed that Congressmen are extremely hesitant to question the programs of the military. The Congressmen view the military men as being experts and they do not feel they have the expertise to challenge them.[2] This deferral to the experts means that Congressmen do not effectively challenge the proposals of the military. If the military tells them that the Navy needs $6 million to dredge out the lagoon at Diego Garcia for the communications base, the Congressmen are inclined to accept the word of these experts. Time and staff problems hampered the Congressmen because they could not devote as many resources to the Diego Garcia project as the Navy could. These problems are complicated by the lack of a coherent Congressional leadership and the internal divisions within Congress.

More important than these structural deficiencies is the lack of the will by Congressmen to try to assert themselves in foreign policy. Congress has the Constitutional authority to exert more influence on foreign policy but it has failed to use it. Congressional hearings are poorly handled and in the case of Diego Garcia, the witnesses were mainly military men. The Congressmen asked these military men about the diplomatic consequences of the proposal even though this question should have been asked of a State Department official. The committee ends up with the military's understanding of the policy or with an answer that blatantly reflects the bias of the Navy. Dexter supports this point.

He said that "the military exercises a monopoly or quasi-monopoly on presentation of alternatives, with the result that Congressmen have no reason to be aware of the gamut of possibilities open to them."[3] Even if the committee calls up men from the appropriate departments, the questioning of these men is often feeble. The Congressmen often allow the witnesses to duck the hard questions and they fail to follow up on the answers to questions. An example follows. The questioner is Congressman Pierre du Pont and the witness is George Vest of the State Department.

du Pont: In order to get the question laid to rest, would it be your opinion that the Diego Garcia base was in any way related to the potential invasion of Saudi Arabia by the United States? You shouldn't be hesitating.

Vest: I am so stunned with the question, Mr. Congressman.

du Pont: Well, you may be startled with the question but having spent two weeks there, I can say that their perspective is very different.

Vest: Yes.

du Pont: I think it is very important that we make it clear that the United States has absolutely no intention of such military action, that such military action would be inappropriate and beyond consideration on the part of this country and I hope you would agree with that. Thank you.[4]

The questioning was then taken up by another Congressman who inquired about the Colby testimony. This type of action by Congress shows how Congress lacks the will to participate in foreign policy-making to any extent. Congress may assert itself on a few issues but it has generally failed to utilize its Constitutional powers. So even though Congress was part

of the action-channel on Diego Garcia, its influence on the formulation of Indian Ocean policy was weak.

These players, with their differing amount of influence, interact in a bargaining game. In the Diego Garcia case, there were a number of instances when the policy position reached was a compromise. McNamara and Rusk had to compromise in 1964 on the question of the level of American involvement in the Indian Ocean. Congress and the Executive Branch compromised in 1970 when they decided that only the communications facility was to be built at Diego Garcia. There were compromises within Congress such as the compromise between the Senate and House Armed Services Committees on the plan to ask the President to certify Diego Garcia as being in the national interest and then allow either house to disapprove the project. Influence within the decision-making process is diffused and when there is disagreement among the key players it is often necessary for the players to seek a compromise solution.

The evidence has supported Halperin's contentions about the nature of the decision-maker. Decisions are made by numerous people who have different degrees of influence on the decision. It is important to know who is participating in the decision-making and, if possible, to determine the amount of influence they had on the decision. Because influence on the process is diffused, it is often necessary

for the players to settle on a compromise plan.

At this point it is necessary to discuss the question, can policy be rational? The decision reached through bureaucratic politics can only be considered rational if there is agreement about what is in the national interest and the best way to achieve it. The decision reached in these instances is designed to maximize or satisfice this interest. On most issues there is disagreement on the interests involved and the decision reached is a compromise. This compromise is designed, not to secure a particular interest, but rather to gain the support of the key players.

Charles Lindblom[5] has attacked the notion of a rational, centralized decision-maker. Three criticisms are important. The first attack is that any attempt to change policy by examining all the possible consequences is doomed to failure because the human competence necessary to undertake this task is lacking as is the motivation to undertake such a project. The second attack is that it is nearly impossible to sum individual preferences and determine what societal preferences are. A third criticism is that value and policy choices cannot be separated and therefore means-ends analysis does not work. Attempts to centrally decide policy do not necessarily achieve a welfare maximization because there is a good chance that the policy choice made by the decision-makers reflects their own inaccurate appraisal

of societal needs.

A more appropriate way to try to achieve a welfare maximization is through mutual adjustment. Instead of trying to centrally decide policy, policy is created through the interaction of numerous people who all are trying to achieve their personal goals. Lindblom argues that "people can coordinate with each other without anyone coordinating them, without a dominant common purpose, and without rules that fully prescribe their relations to each other."[6] Lindblom uses the analogy of two groups of people trying to cross a street in opposite directions. Each person will adjust his actions to the people around him and make his way across the street despite the mass of bodies that seem to be in his way.[7] People who are left to their own devices will accomodate themselves to the interests and goals of each other.

Lindblom argues that the process of partisan mutual adjustment is the best approximation of rationality possible. Each participant in the policy process pursues his own self-interest and since there are many individuals and interests involved in the process, almost all interests will be heard and have some effect on the policy outcome.

Another possible form of rationality in decision-making is an individual form of rationality. There have been a number of instances where the President has in effect cut the bureaucracy out of the policy-making process. The

Christmas bombing decision seems to have been made by Nixon and Kissinger without any outside input. The result of this type of decision is the maximization of the interests of Nixon and Kissinger.

The rational decisions in the Halperin Model are made by the individuals. These individuals examine the interests they perceive as being involved in the issue and try to maximize them. Halperin divides these interests into four types: national security, organizational, Presidential and personal. This categorization of the interests did not seem appropriate. Some of the interests clearly fit into these catagories but others do not. Is a Navy officer's support of a Navy plan based on organizational interests or his belief that what is best for the Navy is best for him? Is Senator Culver's stand on the issue based on his estimation of the national security interests or on his desire to be reelected? Trying to categorize the interests on the basis of Halperin's four categories is difficult. A problem emerges with the notion of Presidential interests if the President has not made any stand on the issue, as was the case with Diego Garcia. How can a top level official try to achieve an unexpressed interest? How does an analyst decide that a decision-maker was basing his stand on an unexpressed Presidential interest?

The problem is that the participants in the policy-making

process, especially the high-level, Presidential appointees, do not have just one role. Rather, these individuals have many different roles and many different constituencies to serve. Richard Neustadt suggests that the President has to serve five different constituencies: Executive officials, Congress, his partisans, citizens at large and abroad.[8] In a similar way, the Secretaries of Defense and State have to serve numerous constituencies. Both of them have to serve at least three constituencies: the President, other Executive officials and Congress. Both Secretaries also have numerous roles. Each Secretary has to manage the bureaucracy, oversee the preparation of plans and the budget, advise the President, serve as a diplomat at international meetings, serve as a public relations man and keep Congress informed. The bureaucratic role of these types of players is very complex.

Because of the complexity of the roles of these upper-level players, it is difficult to figure out how a top level official looks at an issue and what interests he believes are involved. The aphorism, where you stand is where you sit, is suspect in the case of higher level officials because of the numerous roles these officials have. These players do not "sit" in one place but in numerous possible places. The three Secretaries of Defense that actively participated in decisions on Diego Garcia all were looking at different

interests. McNamara saw it as a question of the misallocation of scarce resources and also as a problem of bureaucratic expansionism by the Navy. Laird saw the question as being one of good relations with Congress. Schlesinger saw it as a question of responding to outside events. It is interesting to note that Secretary of State Dean Rusk was much more willing to introduce military forces into the Indian Ocean than was Secretary of Defense McNamara. It is no simple task to relate a man's stance on an issue to his place in the bureaucracy, because of the multiplicity of roles the top executives have. Organizational interests may be a guide to the interests of the bureaucracies headed by careerists but trying to impute organizational interests to high-level presidential appointees is a dangerous undertaking. Presidential interests may be a guide to the interests of certain high-level players but trying to figure out how Presidential interests have affected the stand of players, especially in cases where the President has not expressed any interest, can be extremely difficult.

The analyst who uses Halperin's Model may end up using a method of analysis similar to the method criticized by Allison in his "Rationality Theorem." This theorem stated "there exists no pattern of activity for which an imaginative analyst cannot write a large number of objective functions such that the pattern of activity maximizes each

function."[9] The rationality of the Halperin approach is the rationality of individuals and not the rationality of a monolithic national actor. But, the danger exists that the analyst will place himself in the position of the player and rationally establish the stand of the player, if the player's interests are known, or rationally establish the interests pursued, if the player's stand is known. But, because there are multiple interests pursued by the high-level players, it is impossible to establish a large number of interests or stands that would be rational. Halperin himself may have fallen victim to this because he had to guess what positions were taken by key players in his ABM article.[10] It is conceivable that there were multiple interests involved and that Halperin based his estimate of the player's stand on the wrong interest.

The evidence here has raised some important questions about the efficacy of the model. The idea that the player's position in the bureaucracy can reveal his stand is doubtful in the case of high-level Presidential appointees. The division of interest into four categories has also been questioned. Now this paper will turn to the last section of the model, the role of the bureaucracy in the creation of options and implementation of policy.

The influence of the bureaucracy in the decision-making process is hard to measure. The final decision on Diego

Garcia lay with the Secretary of Defense and Congress and it is not clear how much influence the Navy had on them. The influence of the Navy is more clearly evident in its creation of options. Except for the 1973-74 decision by Kissinger and Schlesinger, and the Laird decision, all the decisions were on options that were presented by the Navy. The Navy created its own base plan, gathered intelligence and arguments for the base, and presented the plans to the decision-makers. In the other two decisions Navy options were considered but a plan other than the preferred Navy plan was accepted. No attempt was made to analyze a broad spectrum of possible facilities. Rather, only a few options were considered and some variations of them. The structure of the base was heavily influenced by the structure of the Navy and its logistics requirements. These logistics requirements were based on decisions made years ago on the Navy needs for oilers and fleet replenishment ships. The decisions made on the support structure of the Navy meant that it would be difficult for the Navy to operate in the Indian Ocean during a crisis situation without an ensured oil supply. These decisions narrowed the options which the decision-makers had to choose from.

Another major way the bureaucracy has an effect on policy is through the implementation of policy. There is evidence to suggest that the Navy was not working very hard to try

to find ways to keep the British in the Indian Ocean in the mid-sixties. The Navy was more interested in pursuing its self-serving goal of getting an American presence in the Indian Ocean. An even more glaring example of the bureaucracy ignoring decisions was in the construction of the communications facility on Diego Garcia. Despite the firmly expressed decision by Congress that Diego Garcia was only to serve as a communications station, the Navy was able to get funds to dredge out the lagoon at Diego Garcia so that it was capable of handling a carrier task group.

The bureaucracy is thus able to affect policy primarily through its creation of options and its implementations. Its effect on the decision-making itself is questionable, primarily because of the difficulty in measuring influence. The Halperin Model points out some of the major contributing factors to the decision-making process such as the importance of the action-channel and the multiplicity of interests. However, the model does not clearly explain the derivation of the interests and how these are related to the stands the people took on the issue.

Toward a Typology of Policy Processes

The difficulty with the Halperin Model is that it may

be attempting to be too comprehensive. There may be important differences between types of policies that are ignored by employing one model for all decisions. Perhaps the Halperin Model is appropriate for only certain types of policy processes, while a modified Rational Actor Model is appropriate for others. Halperin and Allison admit that in some cases the use of a Rational Actor Model is preferable to the use of the Bureaucratic Politics Model. They assert that "in general, Model I is more useful for explaining actions where national security interests dominate, where shared values lead to a concensus on what the national security interests require, and where actions flow rather directly from decisions."[1] However, the two of them do not specify when these types of actions are likely to occur. Theodore Lowi has suggested a typology of policy processes that distinguishes between three types of policy outcomes: distributive, regulatory and redistributive. He has suggested that each of these types of policy outcomes is marked by a different political process.[2] Maybe there is a difference between types of foreign policy outcomes and, thus, more than one model of decision-making is required.

To get some clues about the possible differences, it is necessary to turn again to Lindblom. In his work, Lindblom contends that the process of partisan mutual adjustment can result in an outcome that is the closest possible to the maximization of the welfare of society. But, Lindblom does not

argue that partisan mutual adjustment is the only way that policy is formulated. Lindblom writes that "what has been said about partisan mutual adjustment in this study is enough to suggest that in an enormously wide variety of circumstances it will be an appropriate policy-making method, superior to attempts at central decision-making. Conversely, in an enormously wide variety of circumstances it will not."[3] Lindblom, however, does not try to say what types of policy should be handled by each method.

One possible clue to the differences in types of policy is the notion of incrementalism. Lindblom makes an important addition to the understanding of this notion. He argues rather convincingly that most policy-makers do not use a rational-comprehensive method of analysis. Instead the policy-makers concentrate on the incremental change in the policy or budget and compares this inoremental change with other possible incremental changes. After a decision is made another decision will be made in the future through the analysis of incremental changes. Policy is constantly being remade at the margin to remedy problems that arise in the implementation of the policy in changing times. Looking at marginal changes is the only effective way for a policy-maker to evaluate policy changes. The policy-maker makes no attempt to try to be comprehensive in his analysis and therefore the consequences of the policy change is often not seen

in advance. But, since policy is always being remade, the policy-makers can change the policy incrementally to take care of unforeseen consequence.

It is possible that there is a relationship between the two types of policy-making processes, central decision-making and mutual adjustment, and the two types of policy outcomes, incremental policy change and drastic policy change. But, first it is necessary to determine whether the types of policy process and policy outcomes are valid. Then an attempt could be made to try to correlate the two types of policy processes with the two types of outcomes,.

Any decision-making theory would also have to take into account the bureaucracy's role in creating options and implementing policy. Here the important division may be between crisis and non-crisis decisions. In a crisis decision it is likely that the importance of the bureaucracy in creating options and in implementing policy will be heightened. In a crisis situation, it is difficult for a high level decision-maker to spend a great deal of time searching for alternative plans of actions. The high level officials will have to rely more on the options presented by the bureaucracy and the bureaucracy's estimate of the utility of the option. The high level officials will also not have the time to monitor the implementation of the decision so the bureaucracy will again have considerable freedom to implement the policy as desired. However, in a non-crisis decision, the high level officials

will not be pressed into a hasty decision and thus they can try to have more options analyzed. Most high level officials have some type of personal staff that could be authorized to look for alternatives that the permanent bureaucracy did not present. In a similar way, the high officials can spend the time to monitor the implementation more closely to insure that the policy is implemented in a manner consonant with his desires. The problem is that with low-level, non-crisis decisions, it is unlikely that the officials involved will consider the matter important enough to spend the time looking for alternative programs, or in monitoring policy implementation. Without oversight, the danger increases that the bureaucracy will fail to generate options in routine circumstances and this can help create crises. Hah and Lindquist pointed out that the failure to generate certain options early enough helped create the steel seizure crisis.[4]

The failings of the Halperin model must be remedied before a comprehensive theory of policy development can be developed. Halperin's model is a step in the right direction because it tries to show the importance of domestic events and interests on the creation of foreign policy. The development of a typology of policy processes may help to surmount some of the weaknesses of the model. An examination of the importance of the bureaucracy in creating option and implementation of policy in both crisis and non-crisis decisions may also offer important insights into the decision-making process.

Ramifications of Bureaucratic Politics

One of the characteristics of the policy process is that it is difficult to decide what the real policy is by looking only at the public explanation. The U.S. has numerous interests to pursue and these interests often conflict. On the question of Diego Garcia, it is possible to state American interests in the area in terms that make Diego Garcia seem essential. It is also possible to state U.S. interests in the area in terms that make Diego Garcia seem to be a foolish policy. Both Rusk's and McNamara's arguments of the mid-sixties could be applied today. It is also possible for the Secretary of State to come up with a rationale that makes a compromise policy decision seem to fit with U.S. policy aims in the region. The Secretary of State can act as the "imaginative analyst" of Allison's Rationality Theorem and find a function that the decision appears to maximize. Thus, a compromise decision can be made to appear as a rational action of the government.

It must be remembered also that concern with an immediate policy problem may result in a solution that conflicts drastically with long term policy requirements. The decision to go ahead with the construction of the facility results in a marked increase in the American presence in the area that may lessen the chance for an effective agreement on arms control in the Indian Ocean. The downplaying of the chances

for arms control is to a great extent the result of the lack of influence the Arms Control Agency has in the policy process. In the Diego Garcia decisions, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agnecy had no direct input. In contrast, the Navy, which had a definite stake in forestalling arms control, had a direct role in the process. So there existed a definite bias against arms control in the Executive Branch decision-making on Diego Garica even before the Arab-Israeli War led Kissinger and Schlesinger to approve the project. With no influential decision-maker calling for arms restraint, it was unlikely that the decision-makers would give the option much consideration. Therefore, the policy process was biased against certain types of policies that may be as appropriate or more appropriate to the national interest than is the policy that is implemented.

Richard Neustadt analyzed some of the potential international ramifications of a misunderstanding of the workings of government in his Alliance Politics.[1] The book deals with two problems in British-American relations in recent history: the Suez Crisis and the Skybolt issue. The history of the two incidents is not important, but the lessons that Neustadt draws are important. Neustadt argues that many of the problems of these two incidents were the result of the British and American policy-makers misunderstanding the nature of the decision-making process of the other country. Neither side realized that the relations of the key players in the ally's policy-making process were different from their own policy

process. They instead relied on hunches and faulty analogies and a Rational Actor Model of the policy process. Neustadt argues that

> had our men consistently conceived themselves and Londoners as players in two intricate and subtly different bargaining arenas, interacting on each other by and through the side-effects of their internal games, then I suspect they would have found it harder to depend upon analogies, easier to overcome temptations of convenience, fears of risk. And almost certainly they would have found it indispensible to formulate the questions they appear not to have asked.[2]

Because the U.S. and Britain did not look at themselves in this way, a crisis in our relations ensued. If the U.S. can so misunderstand its closest ally, how much more does it misunderstand a country like Bahrain or Saudi Arabia?

Following Neustadt's argument, how does the Soviet Union analyze the construction of the base at Diego Garcia? The American move in the Indian Ocean was intended to send a subtle signal to the Soviets. The Soviets might respond to this American signal in a way that Kissinger and Schlesinger intended or they might not. The Soviet Union has been concerned since the mid-sixties about the possibility of an American base on Diego Garcia. So do the Soviets look at the incident as being a response to the events of the Arab-Israeli War, or do they look at it as being a major step in the U.S. commitment in the Indian Ocean that began in the mid-sixties, before the Soviets entered the Ocean with their own naval

forces? If the Soviets analyze the actions of the U.S. on the basis of a Rational Actor Model, they might well decide that the U.S. action has nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict at all. They might interpret Zumwalt's testimony as being evidence of a rise of a militaristic and aggressive American attitude toward the Indian Ocean. The Soviets may point to early dredging of the Diego Garcia lagoon to "prove" that the Americans had intended to expand Diego Garcia before 1974. The Soviets might point at New York Times reports stating that the U.S. has Polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean. If the Soviet Military operates on a worst-case assumption, like the U.S. Military does, it is likely that they have raised these questions about American intentions in the Indian Ocean. The intended signal might get misinterpreted because of the conflicting information that the Soviets are receiving about U.S. intentions.

This is the danger of not using a model that emphasizes the domestic factors behind the creation and implementation of policy. If the U.S. policy makers try to understand the actions of other countries by using a Rational Actor Model, they are likely to come away with an extremely distorted view of the actions of other nations.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1. THE HALPERIN MODEL

Development and Description of the Model

[1]Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971) and "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 3, (September, 1969), pp. 689-718.

[2]Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 35.

[3]Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," World Politics, Vol. 24 (Spring, 1972 Supplement), pp. 40-79.

[4]Ibid., p. 55.

[5]Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1974).

[6]Ibid., p. 5.

[7]Ibid., p. 85.

[8]Halperin, p. 250.

Diego Garcia as a Case Study

[1]Allison, Essence of Decision

[2]Chong-do Hah and Robert M. Lindquist, "The 1952 Steel Seizure Revisited: A Systematic Study in Presidential Decision Making," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 20 (December, 1975), pp. 587-605.

[3]Morton H. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," World Politics, Vol. 25 (October, 1972), pp. 62-95.

Chapter 2. APPLICATION OF THE HALPERIN MODEL

National Security Interests

[1]Institute of Naval Studies, The Military Security Gap in the Indian Ocean (c) June 1964, p. 11. This is a previously classified government study that was obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request. The study was slightly edited on national security grounds before it was released.

[2]Ibid., p. 12.

[3]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing: Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, p. 52.

[4]Ibid., p. 52.

[5]Ibid., p. 52.

[6]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing: Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future, Ninety-second Congress, First Session, 1971, p. 164.

[7]Institute of Naval Studies, p. F-5.

[8]House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion, p. 150.

[9]Institute of Naval Studies, p. 8.

[10]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Disapproving Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia, Report No. 94-202, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, 1975, p. 13.

[11]House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion, p. 24.

[12]Institute of Naval Studies, p. 10.

[13]A good history of British policy is: Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez. (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

[14]K. Rajendra Singh, Politics of the Indian Ocean (Dehli: Thomson Press Limited, 1974), pp. 80-81.

[15](London) Times, 20 April, 1965, p. 8 and also New York Times, 8 January, 1972, p. 10.

[16]Barry M. Blechman, The Changing Soviet Navy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 22-24.

[17]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Hearing: Diego Garcia, 1975: The Debate Over the Base and the Island's Former Inhabitants, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, 1975, p. 23.

[18]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C.,Fall 1975.

Organizational Interests of the Navy

[1]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[2]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[3]Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics, p. 32.

[4]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[5]ViceAdmiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, "Missions of the U.S. Navy," United States Naval Institute proceedings, Vol. 100 (December 1974), pp. 18-25.

[6]Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics, pp. 46-47.

[7]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C. Fall, 1975.

[8]Daniel J. Carrison, The U.S. Navy (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 86-87.

[9]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report of Special Subcommittee on Composition of the Fleet and Block Obsolescence of Naval Vessels, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session, 1962, p. 7241.

[10]Arnold M. Kuzmack, "Where Does the Navy Go From Here?" Military Review, Vol. 52, (February 1972), p. 40.

[11]Milwaukee Journal, 28 January, 1976.

[12]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing: Briefings on Diego Garcia and Patrol Frigate, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, p. 27.

[13]Barry M. Blechman, Edward M. Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman, Setting National Priorities: The 1975 Budget (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 123.

[14]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C. Fall 1975.

Action Channel

[1]Confidential Interviews, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[2]Confidential Interviews, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

The Decisions

[1]Darby, p. 265.

[2]New York Times, 18 December,1963, p. 3, and New York Times, 20 December, 1963, p. 6.

[3]New York Times, 23 December, 1963, p. 24.

[4]New York Times, 10 January, 1964, p. 84.

[5]Darby, p. 265.

[6]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[7]House Committee on International Relations, Diego Garcia 1975, pp. 40-45.

[8]"Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defence Purposes," (30 December, 1966), rpt. in House Committee on International Relations, Diego Garcia,1975, p. 51.

[9]New York Times, 21 July, 1967, p. 30.

[10]Institute of Naval Studies, see footnote 1, Chapter 2, Section entitled "National Security Interests."

[11]Institute of Naval Studies, p. 28.

[12]Institute of Naval Studies, p. 41.

[13]Institute of Naval Studies, p. 40.

[14]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975. Some published material in House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion, p. 86.

[15]Information on the study entitled "Study of the Application of the Strategic Island Concept in the Pacific" was obtained from two confidential interviews in Washington, D.C., in Fall 1975.

[16]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[17]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975. Some published material in House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion, p. 86.

[18]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975. Some published material in House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion, p. 87.

[19]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[20]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[21]"Statement by Senator Mansfield" in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Selected Material on Diego Garcia, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, 1975, pp. 45-46.

[22]Confidential Interviews, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[23]House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion, p. 156.

[24]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing: Military Construction Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, Ninety-second Congress, First Session, 1971, pp. 224-225, and "Statement by Senator Mansfield" in Senate, Committee on Armed Services Selected Material , p. 46.

[25]House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion, p. 93.

[26]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[27]Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Selected Material , p. 7.

[28]House, Committee on International Relations, Diego Garcia 1975, pp. 62-63. and U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearing: Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill 1974, Part 2, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, p. 52.

[29]New York Times, 30 September, 1971, p. 9.

[30]New York Times, 7 January, 1972, p. 1.

[31]New York Times, 1 December, 1973, p. 5.

[32]Confidential Interviews, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[33]House, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriations, p. 52.

[34]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[35]Confidential Interviews, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[36]Compare: U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974,

Report No. 93-934, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, pp. 13-15, with

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Proposed Expansion, pp. 130-134, and

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings: Second Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, pp. 2115-2120.

[37]U.S. Congress, House, Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1974, Report No. 93-977, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, pp. 74-76.

[38]U.S. Congress, Senate, Authorizing Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Military Construction and for other Purposes, Report No. 93-781, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, p. 29.

[39]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[40]U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, Report No. 93-1064, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, p. 9.

[41]House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion, p. 150.

[42]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[43]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing: Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1975, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, p. 161.

[44]Ibid., pp. 165, 169, 170.

[45]U.S. Congress, House, Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1975, Report No. 93-1244, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, p. 32.

[46]U.S. Congress, Senate, Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1975, Report No. 93-1136, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, p. 7.

[47]Ibid., p. 7.

[48]U.S. Congress, House, Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1975, Report No. 93-1545, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, 1974, p. 35.

[49]Senate Committee on Armed Services, Selected Materials, p. 42.

[50]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing: Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, 1975, pp. 13, 20.

[51]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia, Report of Senator Bartlett, 1975, pp. 21-22.

[52]Confidential Interviews, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975, and New York Times, 29 July, 1975, p. 6.

[53]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Disapproving Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia, Report No. 94-202, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, 1975, pp. 1-2.

[54]U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record July 28, 1975, p. S13972.

[55]House, Committee on International Relations, Diego Garcia, 1975, pp. 38-39.

[56]House, Committee on International Relations, Diego Garcia, 1975, pp. 40-45.

[57]House, Committee on International Relations, Diego Garcia, 1975, p. 45.

[58]U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, November 6, 1975, p. S19451.

[59]House, Committee on International Relations, Diego Garcia, 1975, pp. 38-59.

[60]U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, November 6, 1975, p. S19451.

[61]U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, November 6, 1975, p. S19465.

[62]U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, November 6, 1975, S19457.

[63]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[64]U.S. Congress, House, Military Construction Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976, Report No. 94-655, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, 1975, p. 7.

[65]Milwaukee Journal, April 22, 1976.

Chapter 3. EVALUATION OF THE MODEL

The Evidence of Diego Garcia

[1]Confidential Interview, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975.

[2]Lewis Anthony Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy," in Davis B. Bobrow, ed., Components of Defense Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 101.

[3]Ibid., p. 102.

[4]House Committee on International Relations, Diego Garcia, 1975, p. 17.

[5]Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965) and "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" Public Administration Review, Vol. XIX (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-88.

[6]Lindblom, Intelligence, p. 3.

[7]Lindblom, Intelligence, p. 3.

[8]Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 7.

[9]Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 35.

[10]Halperin, "Decision to Deploy the ABM," p. 66.

Toward a Typology of Policy Processes

[1]Allison and Halperin, p. 58.

[2]Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, and Case Studies and Political Theory," World Politics, Vol. 16 (July, 1964), pp. 677-715.

[3]Lindblom, Intelligence, pp. 293-294.

[4]Hah and Lindquist, p. 595.

Ramifications of Bureaucratic Politics

[1]Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York and London: Columbia University, 1970.)

[2]Ibid., p. 138.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allison, Graham T. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII No. 3. September, 1969.

_____ Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

_____ and Morton H. Halperin. "Bureaucratic Politics" World Politics. Vol. 24. Spring, 1972 Supplement.

"Availibility of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defence Purposes." 30 December, 1966. rpt. in House Committee on International Relations. Diego Garcia, 1975.

Blechman, Barry M., Edward M. Gramlich and Robert W. Hartman. Setting National Priorities: The 1975 Budget. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974.

Blechman, Barry. The Changing Soviet Navy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1973.

Carrison, Daniel J. The U.S. Navy. New York: Praeger, 1968.

Darby, Phillip. British Defence Policy East of Suez. London: Oxford University Press. 1973.

Dexter, Lewis Anthony, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy." ed. David B. Bobrow, Components of Defense Policy. Chicago: Rand Mc Nally, 1965.

Hah, Chong-do and Robert M. Lindquist, "The 1952 Steel Seizure Revisited: A Systematic Study in Presidential Decision Making." Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 20. December, 1975.

Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974.

_____ "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration." World Politics. Vol. 25. October, 1972.

Institute of Naval Studies. The Military Security Gap in the Indian Ocean(c). June, 1964.

Kuzmack, Arnold M. "Where Does the Navy Go From Here?" Military Review. Vol. 52. February, 1972.

Lindblom, Charles E. The Intelligence of Democracy. New York: Free Press, 1965.

_____ "The Science of Muddling Through." Public Administration Review. Vol. XIX. Spring, 1959.

Lowi, Theodore J. "American Business, Public Policy, and Case Studies." and Political Theory. World Politics. Vol. 16. July, 1964.

Milwaukee Journal. 28 January, 1976.

Milwaukee Journal. 22 April, 1976.

Neustadt, Richard E. Alliance Politics. New York and London: Columbia University, 1970.

_____ Presidential Power. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960.

New York Times. 18 December, 1963.

New York Times. 20 December, 1963.

New York Times. 23 December, 1963.

New York Times, 10 January, 1964.

New York Times. 21 July, 1967.

New York Times. 30 September, 1971.

New York Times. 7 January, 1972.

New York Times. 8 January, 1972.

New York Times. 1 December, 1973.

New York Times. 29 July, 1975.

Singh, K. Rajendra. Politics of the Indian Ocean. Dehli: Thomson Press Limited, 1974.

The Times. 20 April, 1965.

Turner, Vice Admiral Stansfield, U.S. Navy. "Missions of the U.S. Navy." United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 100. December, 1974.

Congressional Hearings

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations. Hearing: Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill 1974. Part II. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearing: Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future. 92nd Cong. First Session. 1971.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearing: Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

U.S Congress, House, Committee on International Relations. Hearing: Diego Garcia, 1975: The Debate over the Base and the Island's Former Inhabitants. 94th Cong. First Session. 1975.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings: Second Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974. 93rd Congress. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Hearing: Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia. 94th Cong. First Session. 1975.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Hearing: Military Construction Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972. 92nd Cong. First Session. 1971.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Hearing: Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1975. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing: Briefings on Diego Garcia and Patrol Frigate. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

Congressional Reports

U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974. Report No. 93-934. 93rd Congress. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, House. Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974. Report No. 93-1064. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, House. Military Construction Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976. Rerport No. 94-655. 94th Cong. First Session. 1975.

U.S. Congress, House. Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1975. Report No. 93-1244. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, House. Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1975. Report No. 93-1545. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, House. Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1974. Report No. 93-977. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services. Report of Special Subcommittee on Composition of the Fleet and Block Obsolescence of Naval Vessels. 87th Cong. Second Session. 1962.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Authorizing Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Military Construction, and for Other Purposes. Report No. 93-781. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Disapproving Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia. Report No. 94-202. 94th Cong. First Session. 1975.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1975. Report No. 93-1136. 93rd Cong. Second Session. 1974.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Selected Material on Diego Garcia. 94th Cong. First Session. 1975.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia. Report of Senator Bartlett. 1975.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Congressional Record. July 28, 1975.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Congressional Record. November 6, 1975.

INTERVIEWS

Russell Barber Bureau of East African Affairs, Department of State

Igor N. Belovsovich Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Barry Blechman Brookings Institute

Alvin Cottrell Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University

Captain Elton Hankins Political- Military Policy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

David Johnson Center for Defense Information

Thomas Jones Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Anne Kelly Center for Naval Analysis

Robert C. Nicholas III Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee

Commander James Patton Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Earl Ravenal School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

David Raymond Senator Symington's staff

Vorley M. Rexroad Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee

James Schumate, Jr. Counsel, House Armed Services Committee

Commander Gary G. Sick International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Commander Clyde Smith Navy Policy and Plans, Department of Defense

Charles Stevenson Senator Culver's staff

Thomas Thorton Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

James Timberlake International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Michael Van Dusen Staff Consultant, House Committee on International Relations

A Representative of the British Embassy

A Representative of the Indian Embassy



Indian Ocean