Blood on the Third Coast: Causes and Consequences of Madison's 1970 Sterling Hall Bombing

Andrea Rochelle Blimling

Lawrence University

Follow this and additional works at: https://lux.lawrence.edu/luhp

Part of the History Commons

© Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

Recommended Citation

https://lux.lawrence.edu/luhp/130

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by Lux. It has been accepted for inclusion in Lawrence University Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of Lux. For more information, please contact colette.brautigam@lawrence.edu.
BLOOD
ON THE
THIRD COAST

Causes & Consequences of Madison's 1970 Sterling Hall Bombing

Andrea Rochelle Blimling
Prof. Jerald Podair, Advisor
Lawrence University
Honors Thesis
June 4, 2004

I hereby reaffirm the Lawrence University Honor Code.
In describing the national fadeout of the New Left movement of the nineteen-sixties, historian Todd Gitlin writes that “activism never recovered from the summer vacation of 1970,” and on the national level, this is most certainly the case. Though popular anti-war opinion increased after the Cambodia/Kent State uprisings in the spring of that year, student anti-war protests and other outward expressions of frustration declined in size and intensity across the country. The 1970-71 school year had fewer protests than either 1968-69 or 1969-70, and media attention declined from forty percent of protests covered in 1969-70 to ten percent in 1970-71.1 The national leadership of the best-known New Left organization, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), split during its national convention in the summer of 1969. The smaller, more radical Revolutionary Youth Movement took control of the group and quickly marginalized the majority. They adopted the name “Weatherman” (later changed to the gender-neutral “Weather Underground”) and preached a doctrine of violence that many, both in- and outside the movement, saw as poisonous and corrupting.2 “After this,” FBI historian David Cunningham describes, “SDS, which had had over one hundred thousand supporters in more than three hundred campus chapters only a year earlier, simply faded away from the national spotlight.”3 A New York Times headline in late August, 1970 summarizes the situation: “Campus Radicals Said To Splitter, Survey Finds Split Leaves Leftist Groups Bitter.”4

Over the past two decades, American historians have offered many different explanations for the collapse of the mainstream New Left movement. R. David Meyers suggests that the appearance of a fadeout was a result of the decline in organization of any vanguard group, as opposed to a decline in any actual leftist sentiment.5 Weather Underground historian Jeremy Varon concurs with Meyers’ assessment, describing the alienating effect of October, 1969’s Days of Rage on New Left rank and file. He further asserts that the Weather Underground’s elusive, cultist nature and extreme lifestyle, which rendered it nigh impenetrable in the eyes of the FBI, precluded the popular understanding necessary for widespread support.6 Gitlin also agrees with Meyers and

---

6 Weatherwoman Bernardine Dohrn described the induction into Weather life as follows: “One day you’ll wake up and look out your window. And there, on your front lawn, will be a great flaming W and you will know the time has come for you to be a WEATHERMAN!” The unspoken rule was that you did not choose Weatherman; Weatherman chose you. The “Weathermyth,” some of it true and some of it apocryphal, described the Weather experience of starvation, constant drug use, mandatory rotation of sexual partners, acid tests, Maoist brainwashing, memorization of
extends his argument to suggest that whatever New Left organization the SDS schism failed to eliminate, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) took care of.  

Other historians, such as David Westby, David Cronon, and John Jenkins, take more of an “Old Left” stance. With classic liberal faith in electoral politics and democracy, they say that a reduction of violent protest was most likely the result of governmental reforms. These historians maintain that Nixon’s Vietnamization program, the U.S. Senate’s repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the end of the draft, and the ratification of the 26th Amendment left the mass movement with increasingly little to protest and provided them with means to redress their remaining grievances within established channels. William Chafe concurs, adding that what remained of the movement collapsed under the weight of its own contradictory ideologies and the fear of informers, namely from COINTELPRO, which worked with local law enforcement to infiltrate a wide variety of protest movements in the nineteen-sixties, passing information to the authorities and spreading general discord.

Certainly the movement’s decline cannot be attributed to any one cause; each of these events played a part. However, most general histories of the New Left call its time of death somewhere in the middle of 1970. They all describe the national shift from SDS protests to Weather Underground bombings, but many do not even discuss the fate of those leading the masses that once filled the streets of college towns in protest of American foreign and domestic policy. Moreover, few mention that the New Left was responsible for what was at the time the largest act of terrorism on U.S. soil, a distinction that remained uneclipsed for twenty-five years. This one destructive act altered the shared vision of a majority of student radicals.

The August 24, 1970, bombing of the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Sterling Hall, which housed the Army Math Research Center (AMRC or “Army Math”) and the university’s Physics and Astronomy Departments, is barely a ripple in the available revolutionary texts, and violence. The “total commitment” required led the FBI to abandon its attempts to infiltrate the group. Susan Stern, With the Weathermen: The Journey of a Revolutionary Woman, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976, epigram; Varon, 20-21, 56-61; Cunningham, 66.

7 Gitlin, 412-417.
8 “Old Left” philosophy combines liberal politics with faith in democracy’s ability to cure society’s ills. The “New Left” distinguished itself by asserting that Western capitalist democracy was imperialism in disguise. They believed that true social change required a universal suffrage that was both political and economic, and that attaining this would require a large-scale overhaul of global political systems.
12 The new “record” is held by Timothy McVeigh’s 1995 attack on a federal building in Oklahoma City. The Sterling Hall bombing was his inspiration; it featured the same explosive and the same modus operandi. Sharif Durhams and Peter Maller, “30 Years Ago, Bomb Shattered UW Campus: Anger Over Vietnam Reached Tragic Climax in Sterling Hall Explosion,” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Online, August 19, 2000, cited on March 2, 2003, section 1 paragraph 8.
historical literature on the decade's student unrest. Historians who do discuss Sterling Hall usually lump it into the small, slightly extraneous category of "bombings by Weather wannabes." The only historical works that discuss it in detail are a 1979 Wisconsin Public Television documentary, The War at Home, an out-of-print monograph by journalist Tom Bates called Rads, Tom Buhle's History and the New Left, and the fourth volume of Edmund Cronon and John Jenkins' The University of Wisconsin: A History. Although each brings up the bombing, all of them categorize it as "the end of an era." In short, they mis-punctuate the history of the New Left at Madison, using Sterling Hall as a period instead of a comma. The Army Math bombing did not end New Left activity at Madison, and by failing to assess its impact on the remaining years of New Left protest, they do a disservice to the era's history.

A closer look at the activities of Madison's New Left before and after the bombing reveals that this one act of violence was largely responsible for changing the minds and hearts of radical students, both within the city and all over the country. It helps to answer the question posed by Madison's Young Socialist Alliance on the op/ed page of the student newspaper, The Daily Cardinal, in December, 1970: "Whither Goest the Mass Movement?" Though the Army Math bombing stunned the New Left into inaction for a time, it did not end radicalism. The bombing of Sterling Hall, which racked up a stunning $1,369,000 in damage to public buildings alone, destroyed years of scientific research, and shed innocent blood on New Left ideals, showed a large majority of Madison's radicals that change would be better brought not by resisting established institutions, but by working within them.

---

13 Sale mentions the bombing in a footnote, Gitlin in a one-sentence bullet, O'Neill in a four-sentence paragraph. Varon, whose focus is Weather-specific, briefly refers to it thrice; Cunningham, Westby, Meyer, and Chafe do not discuss it at all.

14 Varon, who writes of notorious Weather operatives, criticizes this scholarly decision. He carefully distinguishes between the work of Jeff Jones, et al., and that of non-Weather copycat groups. Varon, 15.


WHY MADISON?

"Whatever may be the limitations which trammel inquiry elsewhere, we believe that the great state University of Wisconsin should ever encourage that continual sifting and winnowing by which alone the truth can be found."

The class of 1910 presented the university with a plaque with this statement from the UW Board of Regents, 1894. Since that time, "sifting and winnowing" has come to embody the university's proud tradition of vigor and tolerance in the pursuit of knowledge and truth. The plaque now graces the statue of Abraham Lincoln in front of Bascom Hall. 18

Protest at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (UW) is far older than the radicals of the nineteen-sixties. It is in fact the legacy of protest unique to UW that allowed the events of the New Left movement to converge with historic intensity upon Madison, rather than Urbana, Ann Arbor, Iowa City, or another Big Ten metropolis. Many historians will attribute the university's position in the nineteen-sixties to administrators' faithful practice of the "Wisconsin Idea," the belief that a land grant college's ultimate purpose was to serve its state by working for the improvement of society. Wisconsin's famous progressive governor, Robert M. "Fighting Bob" LaFollette, is said to have inaugurated the Wisconsin Idea when he declared that the school was for all Wisconsinites; the borders of UW were to be the borders of the state. Administrators took Fighting Bob's charge to heart, and by the end of the Second World War, UW's academic standards had risen far above those of its athletic competitors. The University of Wisconsin, nestled on a quiet Midwestern isthmus and surrounded by five picturesque lakes, was now on par with the coastal dwellers of Yale, Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Berkeley.

UW's Regents took seriously their duty to use education to improve society, and the university had the money to do just that. By the nineteen-twenties the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) was one of the largest endowments of its kind in the country, and it attracted young professors eager to begin their research. 19 Madison's dazzling array of talent and funds made UW the perfect solution to a problem that plagued many aspiring East Coast academics, who often lacked the money and connections necessary for admission to the Ivy League. At the time, East Coast state universities were either sorely under-funded, in the case of the smaller New England states, or nonexistent, in the case of New York. These eastern students looked westward for their education, and Wisconsin's affordable quality welcomed them with open, Midwestern arms. UW, a bastion of Midwestern populism, created an ideal environment for these students to blossom into academically shrewd, politically conscious citizens. 20

The university's public commitment to "sifting and winnowing" brought with it an acknowledgement on the part of the administration that discourse often stirred up protest in its wake, and that such discourse and protest, as long as it remained civilized, was the essential element of a progressive university. A chronology of UW student protest compiled recently by University Archivist David Null reveals that even before the First World War, UW students frequently took to the streets over injustices having to

---

19 Bates, 66.
do with race, economic discrimination, and the status of women's education.\textsuperscript{21} After the Second World War, students battled “Red Menace” rhetoric and compulsory Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), then turned their attention to racial and religious discrimination on campus and in the city of Madison. As former UW President Thomas Chamberlain had commanded them to do in 1890, the students were “radiating the university’s influence throughout the state... through the investigation of old and new truths and the dissemination of the results of these investigations for all.”\textsuperscript{22}

The progressive university attracted the brightest and best of the state and, by the nineteen-sixties, the nation.\textsuperscript{23} While most state colleges served their own residents first, with an average freshman class that was only eight percent non-resident, Wisconsin drew its academic strength from a student body that was nearly one-third non-resident at the undergraduate level and one-half at the graduate level.\textsuperscript{24} A large number of non-resident students, many of them Jewish, came from the East Coast.\textsuperscript{25} They tended to be the sons and daughters of hard-line left-wing parents, some of whom were targetsed by Joseph McCarthy during the nineteen-fifties because of their membership in the Communist and Socialist Worker Parties. These students, often known as “Red Diaper Babies,” were exponentially more politically active than their parents. Additionally, or perhaps consequently, they were also far more visible in extra- and co-curricular programs than their Wisconsin peers.\textsuperscript{26}

In the late nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties, Madison’s Red Diaper Babies were active participants in the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) Freedom Rides, the March on Washington, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) Mississippi Freedom Summer, and the Selma-Montgomery March for the Voting Rights Act. At the same time, they steered on-campus politics even further to the left. The university, having been a bastion of the “Old Left” after the turn of the century, already featured many strong, left-leaning organizations, including the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and a chapter of the communist W.E.B. DuBois Club. In 1962 several graduate students in the humanities founded a chapter of SDS, which remained merely one of the myriad leftist societies on campus for several years. The first campus anti-war protest took place in the fall of 1963, and in 1965, reacting to the commencement of bombing sorties in Indochina, the leaders of nearly every leftist organization quickly formed the \textit{ad hoc} Committee to End the War in Vietnam (CEWV), which coordinated

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{23} Cronon & Jenkins, 450.
\footnote{24} Soglin, \textit{Tradition}.
\footnote{25} East Coast students of Jewish heritage would be singled out more and more as the New Left era wore on. In 1965, Madison Police detective Tom McCarthy was asked by UW’s dean of students Joe Kauffman how he went about finding the drug crowd. McCarthy is said to have replied, “Easy. You take the student directory, go down to the first Jewish name from New York, and start there.” In 1968, the Republican-controlled State Legislature tried to quell campus unrest by passing a resolution that non-resident students could only make up 25% of each year’s admissions. Maraniss, 180; Cronon & Jenkins, 483-484.
\end{footnotes}
most of the campus's anti-war activities from that point on. As graduate students, Red Diaper Babies were responsible for the formation of the country's first union for teaching assistants, the TAA.\textsuperscript{27}

University faculty encouraged their students' activism, and the students, in turn, looked to their professors for guidance and inspiration. A nexus of political activity developed around the offices of leftist history professors William Appleman Williams, George Mosse, and Harvey Goldberg. Often at odds with one another as to the appropriate strategy for achieving their mutual goals, the trio would plant their teaching assistants in each other's classes to report on what the others were saying. Each professor would then weave responses to and criticisms of his colleagues' theories into his own lectures. The lectures, which came to resemble fiery revivalist sermons, attracted hundreds of students at a time (a significant portion of whom were not even registered for the classes) and filled the largest halls on campus.\textsuperscript{28} Many East Coast students came to UW specifically to study under the triumvirate, and Williams, Mosse, and Goldberg each taught upwards of one thousand students per year. Many of their most devout followers, usually graduate students, were the leaders of leftist campus organizations. Together these prophets of the Left and their disciples constructed the beginnings of Madison's anti-war movement.\textsuperscript{29}

Beyond the university, much of the city of Madison itself was sympathetic to the anti-war movement's cause. Father Arthur Doyle and his troupe of lay clergy made the rounds of city churches each Sunday to discuss the immorality of war. Throughout 1964-65, Senator Gaylord Nelson and Congressman Robert Kastenmeyer, both of Madison, and Congressman Ben Rosenthal of Queens, New York, exerted pressure on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee to hold public hearings on U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Washington Democrats refused, but Kastenmeyer was undeterred. "If there are not to be hearings in Washington on this crucial question," he said, "we ought to have hearings at the grassroots level, back home."\textsuperscript{30} With Rosenthal in tow, Kastenmeyer and Nelson returned to their home state in the summer of 1965 and held their own public hearings in Madison. University faculty and students gave testimony at the hearings, as did a number of area "townies." Louise Smalley, a Madison housewife and mother of four small children, echoed the sentiments of many Madison residents:

\begin{quote}
I have never done anything political other than voting, and I'm not particularly interested in politics, but I do read the papers, and I am confused by the news. I talk to people and I don't like what I hear. If this war is so unpredictable and goes on for six years, seven years, decades, my children could be drawn into this horror. I have read and heard about some of the atrocities, and it is unbearable for me to know that our boys are taught to use napalm and phosphorus bombs. I try to teach my children the value of individual human worth, and I don't want this destroyed by my country. I do not have a solution to the war, but I want a solution, and I want you to find it. Thank you.
\end{quote}

Smalley, choked up at the thought of her children's fighting and dying in Vietnam, was barely able to finish her statement. She returned to her seat amidst thunderous applause.\textsuperscript{31} Eighteen months later the middle-aged Joe Elder and Betty Boardman, along\textsuperscript{27} Cronon & Jenkins, 450-452, \textit{The War at Home}.
\textsuperscript{28} Bates, 66-69; Cronon & Jenkins, 456-457.
\textsuperscript{29} Bates, 81-82.
\textsuperscript{30} Robert Kastenmeyer, \textit{The War at Home}.
\textsuperscript{31} Louise Smalley, \textit{The War at Home}.
with thirteen of their fellow Madison Quakers, sailed from Nagasaki, Japan to Haiphong, North Vietnam on a fifty-foot schooner. Their humanitarian mission made headlines around the world, and the group brought $10,000 worth of medical supplies to civilians injured by Operation Rolling Thunder, the sustained American bombing of North Vietnam. Many hawks questioned Boardman's patriotism, but she remained steadfast in her principles, and she was well-respected by nearly everyone associated with the university. Simultaneously, the newly-formed Madison Area Peace Action Council (MAPAC), an anti-war coalition of more than fifty community organizations, began canvassing the city and circulating petitions to put a referendum about the war onto the ballots for the next Madison City Council election.

From the outset of the nineteen-sixties, the university's policy in dealing with protesters was conciliatory. Student protest against the draft accelerated dramatically in 1966, when the Selective Service System stiffened the requirements for an S-2 student deferment by requiring universities to administer the College Qualification Test and release students' grade-point average and class rank to local draft boards. Madison students wanted UW to refuse to comply on both counts and took over the Peterson Administrative Building to press their point. Disciplined, orderly, and respectful, the Peterson protestors gave speeches, drafted leaflets, studied, and played cards, but did not interfere with employees or disrupt business. After five days of patience earned them the endorsements of SDS, the Inter-Fraternity Council (IFC), the Cardinal, and the growing Faculty for Peace, administrators granted students an audience on the subject. "There are serious questions involved," said UW's Chancellor Robben Fleming to a crowd of students gathered outside the Peterson Building, "and it will be useful for faculty and students to take a fresh look at them together." In a gesture of good faith, the protesters ended their sit-in twenty-four hours before the faculty meeting that was to decide the issue, so as not to influence the vote. In the end the faculty voted that UW would not administer the test or release records directly to the draft boards, but that it should make records available to individual students on demand. Though the more radical students saw this as a betrayal, most liberal activists felt that democracy had allowed the majority to speak and were willing to live with the faculty's decision. Commending both parties and mentioning Chancellor Fleming and President Fred Harvey Harrington by name, the Milwaukee Journal declared, "The UW seems to have shown the nation that a student protest can be a legitimate exercise in democracy, not a disruptive episode of bitterness."

The following semester, the administration's response turned from amiable to what the State Legislature deemed "downright indulgent." This time, students were protesting the presence on campus of recruiters from Dow Chemical Company, the leading manufacturer of napalm. Acting under a mandate that any obstruction of students' freedom to interview with the companies of their choice constituted an attack

32 Betty Boardman, *The War at Home.*  
33 Maurice Zeitlin and Marianne Rice, *The War at Home.*  
34 *The War at Home.*  
35 Their endorsement of the Peterson sit-in represented the first public political action of SDS, IFC, and the *Cardinal.* The *Cardinal*'s endorsement was especially significant because at the time, it was UW students' primary news source. Henry Haslach and Jack Calhoun, *The War at Home.*  
36 Cronon & Jenkins, 454-455.  
on the university, University Protection & Security (UP&S) arrested seventeen students who blocked their classmates' access to the interviews. Later that evening, Fleming announced that he had donated $1,155 of his personal funds in bail money to the eleven protestors who lacked the financial means to secure their own release from jail. In defending his actions, Fleming argued that many of the students in question were "unsophisticated undergraduates," and that it would be unfair of him to leave them incarcerated while the wealthier instigators could and did make bail on their own. 38 Fleming's response to that protest, which came to be known as "Dow I," mollified many students, who hoped that this sort of administrative sympathy would be the standard for demonstrations to come.

The source of the Dow protest reveals one more feature of UW's that made the university a crucible for the tumultuous years to come. Over the first half of the twentieth century, the aforementioned WARF had attracted not only academic attention, but also that of government and corporate heavyweights. By 1964, the university had more government contracts than any other in the country, and Fortune 500 corporations competed fiercely with each other to interview and hire Madison graduates. Though outside investment and interest was necessary to the continued development of the Wisconsin Idea, it came to be a major point of friction between university administrators and student radicals, who criticized UW's complicity in the "military-industrial complex." One of the university's largest contractors, and the one that would prove the most costly and damaging, was the AMRC. 39

38 Few administrators were surprised when shortly thereafter, Fleming announced that he was resigning his chancellorship in Madison to take up the presidency of the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. He never saw his bail money again. Cronon & Jenkins, 459-460; Bates, 83.
Army Math

"THIS IS PHYSICS. AMRC IS UPSTAIRS."

A sign hung out the window of the Physics Department in the spring of 1970 to deter student protestors’ throwing rocks through the windows. The director of the AMRC ordered it taken down. ⁴⁰

Army Math had been a target of the campus anti-war movement for years prior to the Sterling Hall bombing. Radicals and activists considered AMRC, along with ROTC and the Selective Service offices, to be one of three major political eyesores of the university. Together the institutions represented UW’s cooperation with U.S. foreign policy, but radicals believed Army Math’s research to be the most insidious of the three. Madison had won the contract to house AMRC in 1955, and according to AMRC’s 1969 annual report, the center’s stated purpose was to “conduct mathematical research which has relevance to problems that exist or are inherent to Army operations.” ⁴¹ AMRC’s director, J. Barkley Rosser, had his hands full trying to keep his charge off of student radar, and he managed a modicum of success for most of the early nineteen-sixties. He publicly minimized the significance of the “A” in “AMRC,” articulating the broad civilian uses of AMRC’s research while privately proving to the army how well its money was being spent. ⁴²

Madison’s radicals, especially those on the Cardinal staff, did not buy into Rosser’s arguments. They bombarded him with requests for information about the military relevance of AMRC. Irritated by their persistent inquiries, Rosser finally threw his hands in the air and commented sarcastically, “It’s quite true our work is helpful to the Army. That’s why the Army is paying for it.” ⁴³ Eventually, the radicals reporters went over his head and worked independently to identify a direct link between Army Math and the U.S. government’s agenda in Vietnam and around the world.

The Cardinal’s task proved difficult due to the army’s insistence that public AMRC documents not reveal the often-classified military applications of the center’s research. When the AMRC refused to give Cardinal reporter Jim Rowen a copy of its 1967 annual report, maintaining that such reports were not printed before 1968, Rowen turned to Senator William Proxmire to obtain a copy. The copy that Proxmire procured was censored; it was missing a five-page section that the table of contents identified as “Assistance to Project Michigan.” The report led Rowen and his team of Cardinal investigators on a semester-long chase before they finally ascertained a connection.

Inquiries at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor revealed that Project Michigan involved the development and refinement of infrared detection and tracking technology. The army had long used infrared devices in nighttime surveillance and for precision bombing raids on targets concealed from plain sight. Rowen extrapolated that Project Michigan was the foundation for the Electronic Battlefield used in Vietnam to zero in on targets hidden beneath the rainforest canopy. ⁴⁴ With this conclusion, he established the missing link between the AMRC and America’s imperialist agenda in

⁴⁰ Bates, 6.
⁴⁴ Bates, 247; Jim Rowen, The War at Home.
Southeast Asia. Rowen’s exposé depicted an AMRC and a University that were willing participants in a grand CIA conspiracy and further suggested that the CIA was paying the Board of Regents to ensure their silence on the matter. Together, he wrote, the University, the AMRC, and the CIA were responsible for the “genocide” in Vietnam and, among other things, the covert jungle assassination of Che Guevara. The series, titled “Profit Motive 101,” ran in the Cardinal in the spring of 1969, and the protests it incited proved a headache to both UW and AMRC administrators. 45

From that point on, Army Math became the major focal point of campus demonstrations. “It seemed to me,” said one student after learning of AMRC’s operations, “that the university’s stated policy of neutrality was being violated by harboring an institution that was developing weapons of war.” 46 The students’ demand was simple: a complete severing of ties between Army Math and the university. Margery Tabankin, the 1969-70 WSA vice president, announced during the autumn’s war moratoriums that the WSA had passed a resolution condemning both AMRC and ROTC. 47 From many students’ points of view, the continued relationship between UW, AMRC, and ROTC was an outright endorsement of the military-industrial complex and U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, students’ tuition dollars made them unwilling accomplices to everything they opposed. Throughout 1969’s fall semester, they expressed their disgust in confrontational but nonviolent ways. Radicals picketed mathematics symposiums with signs reading “SMASH ARMY MATH,” performed lurid guerilla theatre in front of Sterling Hall, attacked the center with toy machine guns, and sprayed red paint on mathematicians attending international conferences there. They even left coffins on the center’s doorstep. 48

Whenever visiting Weathermen encouraged students to trash campus buildings, Sterling Hall was their intended target. After they left campus in the fall of 1969, the remaining Madison SDS members ratified their much-touted “Three Demands,” the first of which was Army Math’s removal from the campus. 49 By 1970’s spring semester, the situation had grown so dire as to prompt Rosser’s assistant to send the latter a memo suggesting:

The Center might well find to its advantage to conduct a minor public relations campaign—polish up our image so to speak... I think that [those in charge of AMRC’s funding] would go along with spending a small amount for a part-time editorial assistant... to turn out an article or news feature each week. 50

By that point, however, a “minor public relations campaign” would have been too little, too late. Like their national counterparts in SDS, Madison’s radicals grew impatient with seemingly ineffectual nonviolent tactics and began destroying property to prove their point to University administrators.

45 Bates, 248-251; Cronon & Jenkins, 487; Jim Rowen, “Profit Motive 101,” The Daily Cardinal, March 11-14, 18-21, and 28; May 14, 20 and 22; August 5 and 15; and October 3, 12, and 15, 1969.
46 Tom Simon, quoted in Bates, 267.
47 Marjorie Tabankin, The War at Home.
48 Bates, 243-252; The War at Home.
49 WSA’s second demand was the removal of ROTC from the campus; the third was the dissolution of the Land Tenure Center, a federally-funded agrarian reform project for Central America. Bates, 137-138; Tabankin, The War at Home.
The radical vandals' most common strategy was to throw rocks through the windows of the AMRC offices. These missiles usually missed their seventh-floor target, instead shattering glass throughout the Physics Department's laboratories, which, along with the Astronomy Department, also resided in Sterling Hall. Both departments eventually pleaded with UW administration to move Army Math to a different building for the safety of everyone's research. Chancellor Edwin Young, however, feared the cries of "Munich" that would inevitably come from the scandalized State Legislature and Board of Regents if he were to grant the radicals even one shred of victory. Hindsight would tell him that accusations of appeasement would have been a small price to pay, but at the time, Young was prisoner to those who held the university's purse strings. Throughout that semester, protests against the center would only increase, building to an explosive climax.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{51} Cronon & Jenkins, 488.
THE PLAYERS

"Come mothers and fathers throughout the land, and don't criticize what you can't understand. Your sons and your daughters are beyond your command; your old road is rapidly aging, so just step aside if you can't lend a hand."

Bob Dylan, "The Times, They are a-Changing"

In the nineteen-sixties, Rolling Stone called the Madison Isthmus "America's Third Coast." Both academically and politically it was competitive with New York and Berkeley. As the university's enrollment grew to 20,000 in 1964 and the Vietnam conflict began to escalate, Madison and other college towns across the nation felt the first turbulence of anti-war protest on their campuses. In February of 1965, political activism at Madison had reached the point at which a protest march against Operation Rolling Thunder drew upwards of 10,000 students, but not all of these students—not even half of them—were "radicals."

Historians and just about anyone who attended college during the Vietnam era are quick to agree that simple anti-war sentiment did not make one a radical. "I was opposed to the war," argued a Wisconsin alumnus who classifies himself as an activist. "Hell, my mom and dad were against the war. But I wasn't a radical. They didn't represent me." The same can be said for beliefs in feminism and racial equality. Liberal activists believed that each issue was a separate problem with its own unique causes. They maintained an Old Left faith in their government, however, and thought that a little trim here, a little change there, and a drive to "get out the vote" would make it all better. Though willing to engage in civil disobedience, activists tended to prefer the more legal, less disruptive tactics of marching, petitioning, canvassing, and lobbying. Furthermore, they believed that the radicals tainted the entire liberal position with the extreme changes and tactics they proposed.

At Madison, activists of all stripes planned and staffed the numerous, ephemeral, and ubiquitous campus anti-war groups and activities that came and went beneath the umbrella of CEWV: the Committee on the University and the Draft, the Anti-Dow Coordinating Committee, the United Front, the Wisconsin Draft Resisters Union, the University of Michigan-Berkeley Solidarity Rally, the Committee to Liberate the Southeast Area Dorms, the "CIA-Why? Speak-out Teach-in," the "March Against State Interference," and the "Women Say Yes to Men Who Say NO" March. To be sure, radicals also planned and participated in many of these events, believing that students "had an obligation to try and disrupt the war effort, blocking Selective Service busses, protesting companies that made war material," and so on, but they remained a small percentage, and Vietnam was not their main concern.

Varon labels "radical" all those committed to "revolutionary anti-imperialism, whose main premise was that the prosperity of advanced industrial societies depended on their economic exploitation of developing countries, evident in the intensity with

---

53 Bates, 70.
54 UW students Tim Higgins, Jim Rowen, Tom Schneider, Paul Soglin, and Margery Tabankin all agree on this issue, as do historians Alexander Bloom, Wini Breines, Bruce Franklin, Jane Franklin, Marvin Gettleman, and Jeremy Varon, and Marilyn Young, and journalist David Maraniss.
56 Varon, 3.
which the United States battled left-wing insurgencies in the Third World."

Radicalism had its roots in the Civil Rights movement of the late nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties. Early in the decade, white civil rights activists formed SDS when the black members of SNCC and CORE began arguing that whites needed to organize against racism in their own communities. As civil rights leaders such as Malcolm X began linking the struggles of American blacks to the national liberation movements of the Third World, SDS members adopted a more global view. The 1962 Port Huron Statement declared war on the general, overarching causes of society's ills, and by 1965, SDS had become the flagship of America's radical movement. At their first march on Washington, national SDS president Paul Potter proclaimed the organization's transcendent mission:

The people in Vietnam and the people in this demonstration are united in much more than a common concern that the war be ended. In both countries there are people struggling to build a movement that has the power to change their condition. The system that frustrates these movements is the same. All our lives, our destinies, our very hopes to live, depend on our ability to overcome that system.

By definition, then, radicals were predisposed to shun liberal activists' faith in "the system," and most believed mainstream politics to be the domain of an elite few who "preferred a docile public to an engaged one." They judged American society not by its accomplishments, but its promises, and they found it sorely lacking. Radicals often described activists as single-issue robots who cared only about things that affected them personally. Only three months after Potter's revolutionary statement, Evan Stark, a disciple of Harvey Goldberg's, succinctly articulated the Madison radicals' position vis-à-vis the establishment to Congressmen Kastenmeyer, Nelson, and Rosenthal at the July, 1965 Vietnam hearings:

[What] is not good is that we must wait until a time of crisis before putting the machinery of democracy into high gear. Gentlemen, I ask you to tell your colleagues that we [students... are willing to defend and support democratic and social revolutions if only this government has the courage to do so. But if it does not, we believe that this government must be changed.

Radical Madison groups—of which SDS is the prime example—rallied around the belief that social injustice was a many-headed Hydra. Henry Haslach, the 1966-67 president of Madison's SDS chapter, gravitated to SDS because its members "were interested in the total picture":

It wasn't an anti-war group in any sense at all. My feeling was that there had to be a total change... We were trying to build a mass movement, and what I mean by that is a movement dealing with all the issues of as many people as possible. We were trying to

---

58 Varon, 7.
62 Gitlin, 177-178, 184.
63 Varon, 21.
64 Evan Stark, The War at Home.
build a whole counterculture. I felt that the war in Vietnam was not the right place to center the organizing. I felt that we had to focus on all the issues, to create a whole new society. 66

Their alignment against the pervasive poisoning of society by imperialism, capitalism, racism, and blind acceptance of the status quo defined the radicals. They formed collectives and saw themselves as the true counterculturalists. 67 They felt that, in addition to organizing, the best way to solve society's problems was, as Mahatma Gandhi commanded, to live the changes they wanted to see.

According to Paul Soglin, a radical who studied history, law, and public policy at the university beginning in 1962 and served as the alderman representing Madison's student district from 1968 to 1973, the radicals were a couple of hundred "highly mobile, politically sophisticated" individuals who formed the heart of the movement:

The lifestyle at that time basically revolved around political activity, and people spent their time doing only a few things. They'd go to school, do a little studying, they'd spend a good deal of time with politics, then they had their social lives, and somehow on the side they'd slip in work. But all these things were brought together, the kind of work people would do, the kind of social life, it was all connected to the politics. 68

The politics that connected life at the university were most evident in the Mifflin/Basset Street neighborhood, the home of the student radical movement. Its residents dubbed it "The People's Republic of Miffland," and national SDS leader Tom Hayden designated it "one of seven liberated zones in the United States." 69 Miffland and all of Ward 8, which would eventually elect Soglin, featured the high rents, absentee landlords, and ancient, decrepit buildings that characterized a student ghetto. In the early part of the decade, Miffland's only noteworthy inhabitants had been a few aging beatnik poets, but by 1967, the neighborhood was the place to be as far as Madison's radicals were concerned. In addition to Miffland, radicals commandeered a number of social hangouts on and around campus, including the Memorial Union's Rathskeller and a local bar, the Nitty Gritty. Using these "pockets of liberation" as strategy centers, Mifflanders led the wave of daily protests that would become a Madison noontime ritual by the spring of 1969. 70

As the protests grew in size and intensity during 1968-69, the line blurred between radicals and the smallest and most volatile group of Madison politicos. This group agreed with radicals that the establishment was the problem, but they took matters a step further: they drew a line in the sand and proclaimed that anyone not actively fighting for their cause was a silent accomplice to the enemy, a "good German." 71 They called themselves "enlightened." Everyone else called them the "crazies." Soglin has vivid recollections of their mindset:

They were a core of fifty to a hundred people who truly believed that the Revolution was right around the corner, that this was everything unfolding, that the collapse of capitalism was coming, that Vietnam represented the last stages of imperialism and the last stages of capitalism.

66 Henry Haslach, The War at Home.
67 Just as activists felt that radicals tainted their liberal movement, radicals felt that stoners and hippies had ruined the image and agenda of the legitimate counterculture. Bates, 265.
68 Soglin, The War at Home.
69 Bates, 119, 259.
70 Bates, 236, 264; Susan Colson, The War at Home.
71 Varon, 6.
It would just take one explosive act, they thought, to bring the establishment to its knees. They themselves would catalyze the Revolution, and everyone else who had any hope of enlightenment would jump right on board.\textsuperscript{72} According to Gitlin, the heart of crazies’ philosophy was a syllogism: “The Revolution had to be; there was no one to make it; therefore it had to be forced.”\textsuperscript{73}

Nearly a year before SDS’s national split into the Weather Underground and Progressive Labor factions, crazies broke off from Madison’s SDS chapter and formed the Mother Jones Revolutionary League. Mother Jones founder Ken Mate describes his comrades as “a group of people who saw us in a war”:

I think that we were isolated from the mass feeling at the time, which was a play war. And we thought that all those people would come right along with us. I distinctly thought that. I thought that people, y’know, would rise to the occasion.\textsuperscript{74}

At the end of 1969, from the ranks of the crazies, there arose a “group” that called itself the “Vanguards of the Revolution.” Inspired by the rhetoric of the Weather Underground and Mother Jones, the Vanguards believed that they would be the ones to commit the first explosive act that would bring down the establishment and usher in the revolution.

\textsuperscript{72} Soglin interview; Soglin, \textit{The War at Home}.

\textsuperscript{73} Gitlin, 382.

\textsuperscript{74} Ken Mate, \textit{The War at Home}. 
UW students were well-trained in civil disobedience. Political science professor and CORE veteran David Tarr drilled his pupils in the techniques of nonviolent resistance that he had mastered during his days of desegregating lunch counters in and around Washington, D.C. Throughout 1963, on evenings and weekends in classrooms, lounges, and the Memorial Union, Tarr supervised Soglin and his fellow students as they practiced going limp during mock arrests and curling into a fetal position to shield their heads from beatings. Tarr's crash courses in civil disobedience first came to fruition in the fall of 1963, when between twelve and twenty students, activists and radicals together, marched to Truax Army Air Base to make a citizen's arrest of the base commanders. The protestors sat in at the airfield for hours, singing songs, banging drums, and chanting. When they refused to leave, Truax officials had them arrested for trespassing. Reporters from all over Wisconsin documented the event; it was the first anti-war protest many Wisconsinites had ever witnessed. According to Paul Ginsberg, who was UW's dean of students at the time, the radicals began to part ways with their activist classmates soon after the Truax protest. "They lost their ability to distinguish dissent from disloyalty," he said.

Such a distinction was necessary to maintaining popular campus support. In late 1965, the UW Survey Research Library polled the university and discovered that 72% of the student body gave "unreserved support" to American participation in the war, 12% disagreed, and 16% were unsure. Radicals, who constituted less than half of those opposed to American involvement in Vietnam, could not afford to alienate their classmates. In an attempt to raise awareness, they organized a teach-in that fall. Tarr, who had spent nearly a decade in Washington, D.C. as a national defense analyst for the Congressional Research Service, and who had experience with the military's role in Southeast Asia, recalls:

On April 15th, 1965, twenty-five faculty members held a teach-in about the war. I had no experience with the concept, no idea what [a teach-in] was, but I was saddened when I wasn't invited to teach about what I knew about the war. It lasted from 2 P.M. until 10 P.M. and had very little to do with teaching. It was an academic fraud. It wasn't about teaching; it was about convincing people of a particular political point of view. When I complained about the bias, I was told, "Go run your own damn teach-in!" My professional training was in the area of warfare, so I thought I knew what to do to keep the peace, but I wasn't going to proselytize to my students.

Frustrated but undeterred, Tarr met with CEWV representatives a week after the teach-in and told them, "I have contacts in Washington and I'd like to bring in government spokesmen to make their case to you." The students reluctantly agreed, suspicious by that point of anyone with establishment credentials. Tarr made his request to the Johnson administration, who organized Truth Squads, groups of government officials

---

76 Stark, The War at Home.
78 Cronon & Jenkins, 453.
sent to campuses across the country, explaining the government's rationale for their current Southeast Asian policy.  

When the Truth Squad arrived at UW, students jammed the Great Hall of the Social Science building to hear them speak. Radicals filled the first several rows and fired off a barrage of inflammatory questions. The speakers adhered to the party line with their answers, offering technical responses to such questions as, “What does napalm do?” When one army officer began to describe napalm as a “hydro-carbonic gel,” students in the front rows jumped up and began chanting, “Tell the truth! Tell the truth!” A mob scene ensued, but several fire marshals managed to distract the students long enough for UP&S to escort the Truth Squad safely back to its car. Tarr was humiliated, but students and even some faculty members were gleeful. One professor who was sympathetic to the radicals remarked:

I think it was a good thing to confront students with what you call a Truth Squad. A lot of students are much more convinced now than they were before that we're not likely to get candid answers from anyone in the [government] administration in defense of [American] policy in Vietnam.  

A similar drama played out when Senator Ted Kennedy came to campus the following fall. Sensing trouble, the charismatic senator invited a CEWV spokesman to join him on the dais to facilitate a more productive discourse. The young man, a rhetorical novice compared to Kennedy, soon found himself debated into a corner. Frustrated that Kennedy had verbally hamstrung their representative, radicals heckled the senator offstage. Their goal had been to publicize the New Left cause, but all their shouts and catcalls earned them was the near-universal condemnation of their peers. One activist complained, “How can you claim you want to talk about the war and then not let people talk?” The WSA quickly circulated a petition for signatures to attach to a letter of apology for Kennedy. They also moved to place the CEWV on probation, but Chancellor Fleming, not wanting a Madison incarnation of Berkeley's Free Speech Movement, deterred them from martyring the radicals. However, the student body at large remained suspicious of the radicals and anything they advocated until the events of October 18, 1967.

79 Tarr, Tradition.  
80 Soglin and Stark, The War at Home; Tarr, Tradition.  
81 Cronon & Jenkins, 457-458; Stark, The War at Home.  
82 Schneider interview.  
83 Tabankin, The War at Home; Cronon & Jenkins, 457-458.
Dow Day

“So do your duty, boys, and join with pride: serve your country in her suicide. Find the flags so you can wave goodbye... just before the end, even treason might be worth a try.”

*Phil Ochs, “War is Over*

Radicals had long preached against the university’s complicity in the military-industrial complex, and Dow I represented the first skirmish on that front. Fleming had hoped that his donated bail money would serve as a peace treaty of sorts between the administration and campus radicals, but his generosity won him nothing more than a cautious and temporary cease-fire. The chancellor departed for the University of Michigan that summer and his replacement, William H. Sewell, inherited the mess. When *Cardinal* published its Fall Registration Issue in 1967, radicals were appalled to read that, after the events of the previous spring, the university had the audacity to bring Dow back for an encore. The administration, in turn, thought that Fleming’s $1,155 olive branch should have diffused the situation. Administrators first identified the possibility of Dow II in the *Cardinal* shortly thereafter. In his weekly column, called “Hi There, Badger!” Soglin could barely contain his excitement:

The Placement Office has brought back one of the longest running road shows, the Dow Chemical Company. We are promised that the October 17-20 show, back for a second performance, will not simply be a return of last spring’s spectacle. To start with the University has agreed to tell the Left where the show will be held. To give Dow an equal chance, the University will supply more police protection. The four day festival will be highlighted by an obstructive sit-in.

Sewell’s liberal rhetoric may fail him when the pressure’s on or he may simply become an administration tool, exercising no independent power; in either case, the pot is going to blow up in his face.”

In the eyes of Soglin and his fellow radicals, Sewell, who as a sociology professor had been a crucial ally (he was the chief faculty architect of the 1965 teach-in that so embittered Tarr) was now the enemy: an administrator. Fleming, when courting Sewell to take over the chancellorship, had promised his successor that student protests had peaked. Fleming assured Sewell that Dow I had taught the administration how to deal with radical unrest. Sewell took a more dismissive attitude—“I didn’t become chancellor of this university to be dean of students!”—and thrust the problem of Dow II on the man who did hold that job, Joseph Kauffman.85

The previous spring, Kauffman had responded to Dow I by drafting a lengthy set of guidelines for student protests. Desperately hoping to avoid a repeat incident, Kauffman issued a blanket warning to all students. After reiterating university policy that students were prohibited from disrupting university functions, including those of corporations who were using university facilities, he threw down the gauntlet:

If any student obstructs scheduled placement interviews, or otherwise disrupts the operations of the University or organizations accorded the use of university facilities, the University will not hesitate to invoke university discipline, including disciplinary probation, suspension or expulsion whether or not arrests are made.86

The “Kauffman Statement” as it was called, was a point of friction in subsequent meetings of the *ad-hoc* Anti-Dow Coordinating Committee. In the hopes of garnering

85 Maraniss, 119-122.
broad campus support, YSA activists moved for non-obstructive demonstrations “to avoid arrests which might take the wind out of the protest sails.” SDS radicals, on the other hand, favored obstructive protest not limited to Dow, but “maintained against any organization which comes to the university to recruit personnel and which is involved in any way in the war effort.”

Eventually the two factions reached a compromise. The first day of interviews would have protest only, and students would again demand that the administration move Dow interviews off-campus. If that demand was not met, willing students would use civil disobedience to obstruct interviews the next day, while the remainder of the crowd would engage in supportive picketing. UP&S Chief Ralph Hanson, whose undercover agents had informed him of students’ plans, prepared several sets of guidelines for police intervention in the Dow protests. Arrest was to be a last resort, and if students made “significant physical efforts” to thwart the arrest of their fellows, police would back away “to preclude further physical violence.” They would only summon the MPD and Dane County Sheriff’s Department (DCSD) as a last resort.

The first day of Dow II went off as planned. Protesters handed out leaflets entitled “Dow: The Predictable Explosion,” and the administration refused to move or cancel the interviews. That night the San Francisco Mime Troupe performed to a standing-room only Union Theatre; afterwards, the actors encouraged student participation in the next day’s Dow Extravaganza and promised their own supportive presence. True to their word, they came the next morning in the form of a guerrilla marching band and paraded around the Commerce Building. Not to be outdone, the local guerrilla theatre group arrived costumed as symbols of the university and the military-industrial complex: Lyndon Johnson, Uncle Sam, Bucky Badger (UW’s mascot), and “Miss Sifting and Winnowing,” a beauty queen in whiteface.

Those students willing to risk arrest and expulsion, including Soglin, Jim Rowen, and his wife Susan McGovern, took their places indoors. The crowd not only prevented would-be Dow employees from going about their business, but also made it impossible for classes to take place. The sit-in lasted until two o’clock, when Kauffman refused to negotiate with the students any further and ordered police to clear the building. Rowen encouraged those sitting around him to “hold the moral high ground” and lock arms, forcing police to disentangle protesters and carry them into the waiting paddy wagons. He was encouraged when he saw the women pulling their hair back and removing their jewelry in preparation for passively resisting arrest, but was startled to see several large, male protesters removing their belts and wrapping them around their fists, eagerly anticipating a fight.

Madison police in full riot gear formed a wedge and forced their way through the crowd outside Commerce. When they entered the building, the crowd of students surged forward against them. Untrained in the proper use of batons for crowd control, the flustered officers began swinging their nightsticks. Chaos erupted. The first human wave flowed out the front doors and directly into the grip of the waiting sheriff’s deputies, who had already begun arresting the picketers outdoors. Miss Sifting and Winnowing was among the first to be subdued. Indoors, Rowen recalled:

---

87 Maraniss, 174-179.  
88 Maraniss, 180-184.  
89 Maraniss, 348-374.
I heard a sound I had never heard before, and then I realized what it was—the sound of people having their heads hit. It was like hitting a watermelon with a baseball bat.... It all became clear to me then. Civil disobedience wasn't working on our terms. They weren't arresting people, they were beating people. That's how they were clearing the hallway: just going through like a machine and beating people. 90

The mêlée indoors spilled out into Commerce Plaza, where students returned police clubbing by throwing shoes, bottles, rocks, bricks, and anything else within reach. Professors, naïve enough to think that they could mediate, were drawn into the fray. 91 Soon the MPD became the first agency in the country to use tear gas against protestors on a college campus. In response to this, one student climbed onto the roof of Bascom Hall and cut down the American and Wisconsin flags that had fluttered over Madison's first bona fide riot, setting off firecrackers to attract the crowd's attention as the ensigns fell to the ground. Police reacted to this sight with even more fury. 92 Many students, Soglin among them, spent a portion of "Dow Day" in an emergency room, a jail cell, or both. Forty-seven students and nineteen police officers suffered injuries ranging from scalp lacerations to fractures. The most seriously injured were a police officer whose septum was displaced by a flying brick, and a coed whose uterus was ruptured by prolonged abdominal clubbing. 93

Emergency physicians easily treated the physical wounds of Dow Day, but the psychological scars of the riot lingered on the isthmus for years. A "monster meeting" of nearly 3,000 students took place that evening on Library Mall, where students responded to the administration's endorsement of police brutality by calling a general strike. At the meeting, the bruised and lacerated Soglin gave his first impromptu public speech. Hundreds more would follow in his career as alderman, attorney, professor, and mayor, but it was Dow Day that propelled him into a leadership role, and he found that it suited him nicely. In the marches and rallies of the next month he would build his political base, making a name for himself as a pragmatic radical who identified early on the importance of broad community support for the New Left movement. 94 Dow Day also transformed Karleton Armstrong, a future "Vanguard of the Revolution," who had observed the entire disaster from a balcony of Bascom Hall and could not believe his eyes. It was there that he made his transition from activist to radical. "I examined the institutions of Nazi Germany," he recalled, "and I thought that around the year 1967 the institutions in America were taking on the same character." He was no longer living in America, but "Amerika." 95

90 Rowen, quoted in Maraniss, 374.
91 Maurice Zeitlin, The War at Home.
92 Jonathan Stielstra, a transfer student from Indiana, was an Eagle Scout who felt it wrong that the flags should be flying over such a miscarriage of democracy. The photo of him atop the Bascom Hall roof infuriated patriots all over the state. Jonathan eluded capture for weeks because police kept confusing him with his twin brother Phil, but eventually he was apprehended and served twenty three days in the Dane County jail. After his release, Maraniss reports, Stielstra participated in "virtually every memorable event of the counterculture and New Left in the sixties," traveling from Woodstock to Altamont and Paris to Hanoi before resettling in Madison and opening an organic foods grocery. Maraniss, 493, 510.
93 Bates, 20, 89; Maraniss, 380-397.
94 Maraniss, 396-397.
95 Bates, 92.
Karleton's Dow Day radicalization was typical for many at UW. All across the campus, students wondered if taking any sort of stand against the administration would endanger their personal welfare. As Henry Haslach had said, the radicals' most effective method of organization was the application of a person's own life situation to the plight of oppressed peoples. SDS veterans quickly illuminated the relevant juxtapositions for neophyte radicals, pointing out that the police brutality of Dow Day was nothing compared to what those in Vietnam suffered on a daily basis.96 A frenzy of organizing ensued as memories of Dow Day kindled the flame beneath the campus's predisposition towards protest. In the following weeks, the WSA sponsored a program to train student medics for future protest violence. It also established a bail fund for students arrested in acts of civil disobedience.97

Soon after Dow Day, faculty members voted not to change university policy with regard to placement services or student protest. Dismissing the faculty as “bankrupt” (liberal), the betrayed SDS began organizing undergraduates on the department level and moving into the community to raise awareness about the war and, American imperialism, and its societal implications. Soglin's election to the Madison City Council that spring was directly related to these efforts. Feeling that this sort of grassroots organization was slow, ineffective, or perhaps even illegitimate, crazies firebombed UW's South Hall on May 19, 1968. The culprits were never apprehended. Over the rest of 1968, amidst a record number of arrests for civil disobedience, agitation over the university's oppressive policies towards students increased.

This resentment paved the way for massive campus backing of a general strike sponsored by the Black People's Alliance and supported by the TAA. Among the striker's demands were “greatly expanded recruitment of minority students, faculty, and administrators; more black-run minority support services; and most important, the creation of a black studies department.” Though officially about civil rights, the strike had a broader purpose in the minds of newly radicalized students, who were eager to stand in solidarity with their oppressed fellows. The university's treatment of students in general and minorities in particular, police violence against protestors, the national disenfranchisement of the poor, and the wholesale slaughter of Vietnamese civilians had become one cause. White students acted in solidarity with their black classmates and downtrodden peoples across the world. Cronon and Jenkins comment that the Black Strike, as it came to be known, reflected the growing militancy of blacks nationally, noting that it began shortly after a BPA-sponsored symposium on the “Black Revolution,” at which speakers used militant rhetoric and advocated violent resistance to racism and other forms of oppression.98 Strikers “upgraded” their tactics to include obstructive picketing and vowed not to let anyone into the main campus buildings. When UP&S appeared to have lost control entirely, UW called in the National Guard, who ringed the buildings, armed with bayonets. Unable to block the buildings, protestors blocked the streets instead; when the guard moved to clear the streets, students would quickly return to their picketing.99

96 Haslach, The War at Home.
97 Higgins interview; “Report of the WSA Voucher Review Committee,” In WSA Student Senate Minutes, February 10, 1971, University History Project.
98 Cronon & Jenkins, 477-478.
99 Mate, The War at Home.
Riots continued throughout that fall and winter, inspired by events such as the election and inauguration of President Richard M. Nixon and Madison’s TAA strike, culminating in May with the Mifflin Street Block Party. Drugs and alcohol flowed freely, several bands played, and students lounged on porch roofs and danced in the streets. The event, which Miffland radicals had organized as a celebration of counterculture and community, turned violent when police began arresting radicals for dancing in the streets and “disrupting the flow of traffic.” Predictably, a riot ensued. It took three days for several hundred police to quell the disturbance, which spread across campus. The DCSD reinforced the MPD with new anti-riot technology that relegated the throwing of tear gas canisters to the Stone Age. Known as a “pepper fogger,” the high-powered machine looked like a zip gun and could gas rioters one square block at a time. Officers used so much tear gas that several senior citizens and a six-week-old baby who lived nearby had to be hospitalized for respiratory difficulties. Soglin, Miffland’s alderman, was arrested for trying to drive his car up the street—an irony, since police intervened to clear the street in the first place—and received as part of his booking an involuntary haircut and shave. Throughout the siege of their neighborhood, Mifflanders remained cheerful. Singing, dancing, and bonfires occupied residents through the night. The police intervention, which the DCSD thought would put “those weirdos” in their place, had the opposite effect of uniting radicals against the establishment.

Though many protests would turn into riots during the latter half of the year, Madison’s radical student leadership had begun 1969’s fall semester committed to advancing the revolution through nonviolent resistance. The SDS-sponsored “Freshman Unorientation” was a stop for Jeff Jones and Rennie Davis’s Weatherman Days of Rage Recruitment Tour. They quoted Dylan—“You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows!”—and attempted to incite the crowd to storm and trash campus buildings and “tear up the country!” The 1,300 freshmen watched in awe as more than 200 Madison SDS regulars hassass the Weathermen off the stage, yelling, “You don’t need a rectal thermometer to know who the assholes are!” In the next morning’s edition of the Cardinal, SDS leadership reaffirmed the split with Chicago, stressing that they wished the city’s movement to remain nonviolent. The radicals instead focused their energy on the fall’s War Moratoriums.

In October and November 1969, busloads of Madison protestors, activists and radicals alike, traveled to Washington, D.C. for demonstrations outside the Pentagon, the Capitol and the White House. Moratorium organizers hoped that if anything, the candlelight vigil and recitation of the entire list of American soldiers killed in Indochina would move Nixon to some sort of action. Those who remained in Wisconsin staged

100 Colson, The War at Home.
101 Bates, 120; Soglin, The War at Home.
102 Colson, The War at Home.
103 Varon, 61.
104 Weathermen and -women often quoted the lyric from Bob Dylan’s “Subterranean Homesick Blues” that headed their manifesto.
105 Bates, 137-138; Cronon & Jenkins, 487.
protests at AMRC, ROTC, and Truax Field.\textsuperscript{107} They also performed a state-level version of the candlelight vigil and recitation on Madison's Capitol Square.\textsuperscript{108} The largest campus rally to date culminated the Moratorium, and 15,000 people packed into the Field House to hear Jim Rowen and others speak.\textsuperscript{109} Rowen disabused the crowd of any notion they might have had that a university could be neutral and laid on them a charge: “It is up to you—the people—in this community... each and every day to militantly confront the war makers and their cohorts on campus.”\textsuperscript{110} Neither the university or the governor acknowledged the state protestors, and those in Washington were crushed to learn that Nixon had deliberately ignored them, having informed the White House press corps of his plans to watch a football game.\textsuperscript{111}

Beginning with the Black Strike, Ken Mate and the Mother Jones crazies had thought that the revolution was upon them.\textsuperscript{112} Violent rhetoric and frustration eroded nonviolent resolve over the course of that autumn, and by the following spring a sense of desperation and disillusionment had all but replaced it. Black Strike organizer Wahid Rashad remembers:

> You could see the consciousness being raised. It's kind of hard to describe that. One example would be the upgrading of tactics from disruption to destruction of property... it was mainly the question of... putting your body on the line, and it became less of a discussion or an essay and more something of, “Hey, I have to make a decision because I'm in SDS, and SDS is talking about this.”\textsuperscript{113}

Many radicals began to think that talk was doing them no good.\textsuperscript{114} Perhaps the crazies were right, after all. Ron Carbon, a veteran recently returned from Southeast Asia and new member of Vets for Peace, felt that “something concrete, something specific, some blast, some strike against the war machine as a machine needed to happen”:

> I can remember sitting in the basement of Francis House, in a Vets for Peace meeting where we were talking about more parades, more marches, and so forth, and thinking, 'This isn't going to get us anywhere anymore! We ought to be talking now about blowing up railroad trains coming out of the Baraboo ammunition plant where they're building this stuff and sending it to Vietnam.'\textsuperscript{115}

Carbon's feeling was nearly universal on the isthmus. That fall, Madison radicals steeled themselves for the move beyond resistance to overt action. That winter, the Vanguards of the Revolution took the next step.

\textsuperscript{107} Truax Army Air Base opened in 1942 but was deactivated as an active military base in 1968, at which time its name changed to “Truax Field” and the 115th Fighter Wing of the Wisconsin Air National Guard moved in. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/truax.htm.

\textsuperscript{108} Colson and Rowen, The War at Home.

\textsuperscript{109} Cronon & Jenkins, 488; Rowen, The War at Home.

\textsuperscript{110} “15,000 Attend Field House Rally,” The Daily Cardinal, October 23, 1969, 1; Rowen, The War at Home.

\textsuperscript{111} Colson, Tabankin, The War at Home.

\textsuperscript{112} Mate, The War at Home.

\textsuperscript{113} Wahid Rashad, The War at Home.

\textsuperscript{114} Mate, The War at Home.

\textsuperscript{115} Ron Carbon, The War at Home.
THE WINTER OFFENSIVE

"Hope you have got your things together. Hope you are quite prepared to die. Looks like we're in for nasty weather. One eye is taken for an eye."

*Creedence Clearwater Revival, "Bad Moon Rising"

In reality, the Vanguards of the Revolution were no more than one Karleton Armstrong, an on-and-off student at the university, usually acting with the assistance of his younger brother Dwight. Neither was in the leadership of any campus or community political organization, though both participated in protests and found inspiration in the rhetoric of crazies and the writings of Che Guevara. Drawn into the New Left movement in 1967, when he saw police beating and gassing protestors during the Dow Day riot, Karleton began his protesting career like many others: radical in outlook but committed to nonviolent civil disobedience. He attended the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago and was appalled by the demonstrations of police brutality. He remembered:

The police marched up into our ranks, and I told everybody around me just to sit down and be arrested, just peacefully arrested. About, I would say, a dozen people around me sat down, and then the police came in and they just started hitting people over the head. I mean, they weren't interested in arresting anybody, just hitting people... I had my face on that asphalt and in that split second, I thought to myself, I'll never be caught in a position like that again. If they're gonna make war on us, we're gonna make war on them.!

If Dow Day pushed Karleton from activism to radicalism, then the Chicago experience is what turned him from a radical to a crazy. He returned home empty-handed (his backpack and sleeping bag having been stolen) and recounted his Convention experiences to Dwight in vivid detail. Dwight, who idolized his big brother, expressed his support for Karleton when his social studies teacher and classmates at Madison East High School made disparaging remarks about the Chicago. Enraged, Dwight hollered, "You people are being soft-soaped! You've got to reject this! This is superficial bullshit!" He stormed out of the building, vowing never to return.

In the autumn of 1968, Karleton Armstrong flunked out of UW for the second time. He soon received his draft induction notice and consulted with the Wisconsin Draft Resisters Union on the best strategy for taking his entire busload of inductees to Canada. Army doctors thwarted this subversion by classifying Karleton as 1-Y due to his lifetime of sleepwalking. Karleton returned to Madison, his relieved parents, and his worshipful little brother. He recalls that his frustration with society and guilt at being unable to serve any tangible purpose to the movement festered and grew into a militant rage. Over the course of the year, Karleton and Dwight grew much closer. The brothers did little but get stoned in Miffland, drink at the fraternity house where Karleton was a boarder, work at menial jobs, attend protests, and plan.

---

116 Bates, 117.
117 The War at Home.
118 Bates, 106-111.
119 The most common classifications for draftees during the Vietnam era were 1-A (fit for immediate military service) and 2-S (student deferral). A classification of 1-Y indicates a medical exemption. Classification information obtained from the Selective Service website, http://www.sss.gov/classif.htm.
120 Bates, 106-111.
The Vanguards' first move did not take place until winter of the 1969-1970 school year. Early in the morning of December 27th, Karleton torched Temporary Building #16 (T-16), the location of the campus's ROTC classrooms. An agriculture student noticed the flames and called UP&S and the fire department, who quickly controlled the blaze and confined the damage to some scorched furniture. Dwight joined his brother on New Year's Eve, piloting a stolen plane from which Karleton threw mayonnaise jars full of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO). Cronon and Jenkins call this a "risky and harebrained idea," as Dwight had never flown solo, at night, or during a snowstorm. As Karleton prepared to eject his missiles, a puzzled Dwight asked, "Aren't you going to light them?" Karleton demurred, believing that the jars would detonate on contact. The dud bombs landed harmlessly in the snow, and the would-be target, Baraboo's Badger Ordnance Works munitions plant, was undamaged. After a hair-raising landing, Karleton called UW's most popular underground newspaper, the Madison Kaleidoscope, to tell them of the sortie. He chose to publicize the attack in spite of its failure, hoping that the knowledge that someone had attempted an aerial assault would inspire widespread militancy.

A few nights later, Karleton firebombed the Armory, or "Old Red Gym," which contained practice facilities for all university athletics as well as the ROTC offices, and attempted to torch the Wisconsin Selective Service headquarters. Once again, his efforts did not have the desired effect. The fire in the Old Red Gym destroyed $80,000 worth of athletic practice equipment but left the ROTC offices in the heart of the building untouched. Even less successful was his assault on the Selective Service headquarters. Karleton did not even attack the correct building that night. The offices were unmarked from the street to shield the headquarters from riots and assaults, and Karleton mistakenly torched the Wisconsin Primate Research Center next door. The fire did very little damage, and neither human nor monkey suffered injury as a result. Karleton later apologized, saying in a press release that though they did not like pigs (police) the Vanguards of the Revolution had nothing against monkeys (monkeys).

The timing of the group's initial actions earned the Vanguards the nickname "New Year's Gang," and the Kaleidoscope compared the Vanguards to ancient peoples who shot off fireworks and made a racket to drive off evil spirits in the coming year. "Here in Madison," it mused, "some radical activists are seeking to drive off evil spirits which are a lot more substantial, and so are the fireworks!" The Kaleidoscope's commentary on their "exclusive interview" with the Vanguards attributed to them other assaults that they had not committed. Including firebombings at nearby universities and throughout the city on the New Year's Gang's résumé, the Kaleidoscope painted a dramatic picture of a clandestine group executing a strategic campaign to force the spring of revolution.

Karleton capitalized on the media's desire to print only the bloodiest, sexiest, most violent copy. After every assault, he called either the Cardinal or the Kaleidoscope to update reporters on his latest activities. Even though most of his offensives were

---

121 ANFO, also known as a "fertilizer bomb," is the same explosive that Timothy McVeigh employed at Oklahoma City in 1995.
122 Bates, 160-165; Cronon & Jenkins, 490.
124 Bates, 175-176, 178.
unsuccessful in destroying the actual target, he felt that the campus needed to know of his attempts in order that they might join the rebellion. The Kaleidoscope romanticized the New Year’s Gang’s attacks, claiming that they marked Weatherman’s arrival in Madison. In reality, Karleton’s actions were independently haphazard and his political motivations poorly thought through. When he called the Kaleidoscope after the T-16 torching, Karleton told editor Mark Knops: The policy of our group is to increase the level of violence against both on-campus and off-campus institutions of repression. On the campus, our activity will escalate until the university administration accedes to the demands of SDS and other student power-oriented groups. The level of violence will be raised until either these demands are met or the university physical plant is destroyed and the institution shut down. Knops, who held a master’s degree in philosophy from the university, responded by suggesting that Karleton clarify the politics behind his actions. In the following days, however, Karleton’s demands became even more convoluted, consisting mainly of vague threats to bomb state office buildings, specific threats to bomb the university, and a demand that independent individuals rise up and destroy local draft board offices.

Regardless of the Vanguards’ revolutionary myopia, the Kaleidoscope sympathized with the Vanguards’ cause and used its editorial influence to incite more violence: “The bombings were PROPOGANDA BY THE DEED, acts of resistance designed to create a mass movement, NOT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR IT.” On page two of that edition was a bastardization of the Uncle Sam recruiting poster (“The New Year’s Gang Wants YOU!”), and page three featured an illustrated, step-by-step recipe for a “Molotov Cocktail Party.” Upon receipt of this article from the Madison field office, the Internal Security section of the FBI ordered the resident agents to investigate the Kaleidoscope to “ascertain if individuals affiliated with this publication are engaged in a communal-type existence and whether members of this group advocate or have a propensity for violent acts to bring about a revolution.”

The deluge of suspicion engulfing law enforcement officials was nothing compared to the shockwave of trepidation and awe that struck the students upon their return to campus. As the university-chartered O’Hare shuttle busses rolled up to the Memorial Union at the end of the 1969-70 winter holidays, students gaped at the burned-out shell of the Old Red Gym. Immediately upon disembarking they gravitated to the crazies hawking the Kaleidoscope’s “Bomb Extra!” to learn what had happened while they were away. Radicals radicalized fraternity boy and ROTC cadet Jack Calhoun reported: I had a hard time concealing my glee that the ROTC had been getting what it had been producing. It was producing officers to fight in Vietnam and now they were getting some of that back. The thing that really caught my imagination was the fact that the New Year’s Gang had apparently rented a plane and dropped a bomb on the Badger Munitions plant. Unfortunately it didn’t go off.
Henry Haslach, by then a graduate student and leader of Madison SDS, concurred with Calhoun’s sentiment: “I thought the New Year’s Gang was a good idea because it seemed to me like it was the only way things were going to be stopped.”\textsuperscript{132} The general increase in tension on campus, along with relief at the fact that somebody, somewhere, was actually doing something, began to shift the mindset of radicals. An SDS alumnus writing for one of Madison’s “mainstream” dailies, \textit{The Capital Times}, confirmed that the New Year’s Gang had “captured at least the imagination of those students who are teetering between radical reform and ‘revolutionary’ positions.”\textsuperscript{133} The truly unprecedented result of Karleton’s Winter Offensive appeared on the \textit{Cardinal’s} op/ed page three days after the last assault:

There are some, perhaps many in the movement who see one and only one way of renewing and strengthening the fight for change. Several of those people, whoever they are, were responsible for the firebombings... in the last four days. They call themselves the Vanguards of the Revolution. They are indeed. They have chosen to initiate direct action. They have chosen to show to those both in and outside the movement that the immobile and repressive position taken by this nation can only be countered head on in the streets with bombs and guns.

It is a new phenomenon on this campus that the very men who have passed the repressive laws... and refused to listen at all to calls for change are now very much against the wall, trembling not only for the safety of their institution but for their own safety as well. We can have no sympathy for them. They are receiving the inevitable product of their actions.

If acts as those committed in the last few days are needed to strike fear into the bodies of once fearless men and rid this campus once and for all of repressive and deadly ideas and institutions, then so be it.\textsuperscript{134}

Cronon and Jenkins report that this editorial was “an endorsement of terrorism, the first in the country by a college student newspaper... [it] received national press attention and condemnation.” Upon its publication, UW’s Board of Regents seriously considered banning the paper from the campus entirely.\textsuperscript{135} The SDS leadership, after hours of debate, also endorsed the New Year’s Gang. Arguing in favor of the endorsement, one member commented, “I never thought I’d see the day when the \textit{Daily Cardinal} would be more revolutionary than SDS!” Their eventual endorsement was careful to distinguish between destruction of property, of which they now approved, and violence against people, which was still taboo. An SDS spokesman elucidated, “The bombings are a blow against the day-to-day terror perpetuated around the globe by the ruling class system of American imperialism.”\textsuperscript{136}

As the Vanguards’ adoring public grew, Karleton spent the better part of January on “sabbatical” at the home of his narcoleptic uncle Paul, a modern Minneapolis Robin Hood whose revolutionary specialty was the redistribution of wealth. Paul admired and encouraged Karleton’s devotion to his cause, but marvelled at his nephew’s naiveté over the dud ANFO bombs. Under the tutelage of Paul and his gang, Karleton soon branched out to the world of Primacord and TNT. In February, inspired by the mass arrests and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{132} Haslach, \textit{The War at Home}.  \\
\textsuperscript{133} Jim Hougan for \textit{The Capital Times}, quoted in Bates, 185.  \\
\textsuperscript{134} “The End of the Road,” \textit{The Daily Cardinal}, January 6, 1970, 6.  \\
\textsuperscript{135} Cronon & Jenkins, 492.  \\
\end{flushright}
trashings in the recent protest against the General Electric Company’s recruiting at UW, Karleton returned to Madison for another sortie against Badger Ordinance. This time, his target was actually the Sauk Prairie substation of Wisconsin Power & Light, which powered Badger Ordinance. He had armed his dynamite with blasting caps and placed it under a transformer when he noticed a night watchman standing in the doorway of the plant. Abandoning his explosives, Karleton dashed back to his car and hurried back to Madison, where he once again called the Kaleidoscope and gave Knops a full report. Two days later, the Cardinal heralded the New Year’s Gang’s return:

Mark Knops of Madison Kaleidoscope said that he received a phone call around 2 A.M. Monday from a spokesman for the “Vanguards of the Revolution” stating that the group had attempted to blow up the [Sauk Prairie] substation but were observed. Knops said the spokesman told him that the attempt was the beginning of a “second offensive” and... that there would be future attacks “even at the cost of high personal risk.”

The Kaleidoscope reported the attempt and quickly diverted readers’ attention from the non-explosion to the Capitol Times’ refusal to print the New Year’s Gang’s statement. Knops warned, “The CRAP TIMES had better watch out. The gang might pay it a visit.” The renewed attack and promise of a “second offensive” stirred the MPD into frenzied action. They even went so far as to release long-haired juvenile delinquents from jail with the command to “find the New Year’s Gang.” The Kaleidoscope quoted one such youth as saying that the detectives “had threatened to put [him] at the bottom of the lake” if he failed to deliver the bombers. Police paranoia affirmed to the New Left that the New Year’s Gang had the establishment up against a wall, a sure sign of impending revolution. Graffiti revealed the New Left’s outlook, and throughout the winter and spring, revolutionaries scrawled on Madison’s buildings and fences the new mandate: “NEW YEAR’S GANG—LIVE LIKE THEM!”

139 Bates, 204.
140 Bates, 201-206.
CAMBODIA/KENT STATE

“What if you knew her and found her dead on the ground? How can you run when you know?”
Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young, “Ohio”

After his abortive “second offensive,” Karleton, with Dwight in tow, once again retreated to Minneapolis and the house of his uncle. Driving a hearse borrowed from one of Paul’s friends, Karleton returned to Madison on the weekends to peddle on State Street the drugs his uncle obtained at bargain basement prices. He had, for the moment, abandoned the Vanguards, but his Madison peers were unaware of this. Conventional wisdom continued to attribute bombings and trashings to the New Year’s Gang. Mother Jones took up the banner of strategic sabotage, holding rifle practice in local quarries and destroying university property with sniper-like precision. However, their new allegiance to marksmanship did not prevent them from using the cover of peaceful marches to trash buildings up and down State Street. Chancellor Young, who could not afford even the appearance of capitulation, was steadfast in his resistance to the protestors’ demands. By April the national guardsmen had become mobile lawn jockeys and tear gas was just another cloud in the sky. Jim Rowen, in his last year of graduate school, described the defeated mood of UW students during the spring of 1970: “On campus, there was a greater sense of frustration every day, like the war was never going to end, it was just getting worse. And then [on April 30] Nixon invaded Cambodia.”

Immediately, campuses all over the nation erupted. Within forty-eight hours, student radicals from across the country, already convened in New Haven, Connecticut for a protest in support of the Black Panthers, called a general strike. Madison, whose students had just passed a referendum against the war with nearly 80% of the campus favoring immediate withdrawal, joined those at ninety-nine other universities in the strike. The administration of thirty of those institutions co-signed a telegram to Nixon, warning him to get out of Cambodia as soon as possible. An editorial in the Cardinal warned, “Nixon had better begin arming for a new kind of war in this country: civil war.” During a later interview, radical Miffland resident Susan Colson concurred with the Cardinal and articulated the students’ mission:

People had a very concrete objective in mind, and that was to get to government to stop sending U.S. troops to Cambodia. We felt that if the level of reaction in this country was strong enough, they would start to think that they couldn’t afford another Vietnam in Cambodia.

Herman Thomas, Chief of the MPD, saw things differently: “These people want to take over the state!” Nixon would have agreed with Thomas’s assessment. The nationally televised address in which he announced the Cambodia invasion included a dig at the New Left: “My fellow Americans, we live in an age of anarchy, both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free

141 Bates, 218-221.
142 Rowen, The War at Home.
143 Cronon & Jenkins, 508.
144 Gitlin, 409-410.
146 Colson, The War at Home.
147 Thomas, The War at Home.
Civilizations in the last 500 years. Even here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed. 148

Four days after Nixon's address, a mindless attack of a different sort occurred at Kent State University in Ohio, when twitchy national guardsmen fired their M-1 rifles into a crowd of taunting demonstrators, killing four students. If Nixon's escalation announcement was not enough to push students all over the nation into militant action, the death of their fellows at the hands of the government was. Over six hundred campuses joined in the general strike, and demonstrations reached a fevered pitch. Within twenty-four hours of the Kent State shootings, more than half of the nation's 2,500 college campuses were involved in some sort of protest. 149 “If it happened to them,” said radicals, “it could happen to you.” 150 The shootings were enough to make many college administrators break their silence on the issue of Southeast Asia. UW's president Fred Harvey Harrington was one of them. On May 7, Harrington and a group of administrators from all over the nation met with Nixon, communicating the agony on their campuses and begging him to withdraw American forces from Indochina. 151

Upon hearing news of the shootings, Ken Mate says, the entire university headed to Bascom Hill which, as the highest and most central point on campus, was a popular starting place for rallies and marches. Perched on the statue of a seated Abraham Lincoln, Mate recalls glancing northwest towards the Lakeshore Dorms and seeing the entire stretch, more than a mile, black with people. Rotating his gaze towards the Southeast Dorms, he saw the same condition. 152 Protests began with about ten thousand students in attendance and only increased in size from there. 153 On campus, the Cardinal implored students to join the strike:

How many more deaths will occur in this country over the next few days is an open question. The stakes are very high now in the United States of America....

Each of us is involved not only in the human machines of war, such as the draft, but in an institution which is essential to waging such wars. We must strike and strike hard—into the community and on our campus—to turn the tide now raging so viciously against us. 154

Rena Steinzor, a rising senior and the Cardinal's recently-crowned editor-in-chief, led the paper on a new editorial path. One associate editor characterized Steinzor as a cross between a stereotypical Eastern radical and a mother hen who took the entire campus under her wing. Steinzor saw that the Cardinal cautioned insurgents to wear goggles and advised them to soak bandanas in a mixture of baking soda and egg whites to protect themselves from tear gas. She told her reporters that the time had come to abandon their "journalistic neutrality" and lend a hand in the "highly disciplined fight against institutions and ideologies which are repulsive and fatal to the way of life we want to lead." Though she did not stop nagging her troops to remember their gas masks before

149 Gitlin, 410.
150 Bates, 231.
151 In addition to UW, the Nixon Mission included administrators from Chicago, Rochester, Vanderbilt, North Carolina, Minnesota, Berkeley, and Harvard. The Harvard delegation was none other than Nathan Pusey, late of Lawrence University. Bates, 237-238.
152 Mate, The War at Home.
153 Cronon & Jenkins, 508-511.
going out on the beat, she now encouraged them to take leadership roles in the streets. Her motto was, "Do it first, then report it." 155

Jim Rowen, a good friend of Steinzor's, remembered that after Cardinal reporters joined in, "there was a riot for ten days straight; nobody went to class. When it got dark out, there were lootings, trashings, firebombings, and mass chaos." 157 Crazy and radical counterculturalists barricaded themselves in Miffland, declaring it a free nation, and the MPD responded with tear gas. SDS circulated leaflets advertising the private addresses of UW administrators, ROTC and Army Math officials, and the exact locations of all scientific research sites on campus. They annotated the fliers with a brief description of the contractors each location served and possible attack strategies. Each night, hordes of torch-bearing radicals ambushed the targets, flinging sticks, rocks, and Molotov cocktails, and the MPD responded with tear gas. Militants attacked the local Kroger's grocery store, lighting Twinkies on fire and throwing them against the walls, where they conveniently stuck. A Cardinal associate editor reported, "Students snake danced around the blaze while a garage band next door played Jefferson Airplane's 'Volunteers of America.' The celebrants all wore complicitous grins, soon to be know as 'Kroger Smiles.'” And the MPD responded with tear gas. 158

UP & S, MPD, and DCSD were up to their ears in riots, and Chancellor Young, though publicly insisting that the school would not be intimidated into closing early, begged the governor to declare a state of emergency and return the National Guard to campus. 159 Cadres of Mother Jones sharpshooters joined Guardsmen in their nocturnal patrols of State Street. Ken Mate commented, "As soon as the students were shot at Kent State, we knew that all hell was going to break loose," and things only worsened with the guard's arrival:

I remember a cop... with his pistol down on the edge of a car using it as a rest, and I distinctly thought he was going to shoot someone, but I couldn't see that far up the street. I was there with my friend Lloyd Gousher, we were both sitting there, we both had our guns, we both put rounds into the chamber, and we just aimed, y'know. And then the guy just lifted his hand up and he just walked away. Well, that cop never knew how lucky he was. 160

The crazies had used the Rathskeller as their strategy center until the DCSD brought their pepper fogger into the building and gassed the entire Union clear. Mother Jones retaliated by assisting the Committee for the Liberation of the Southeast Area Dorms in the construction of barricades in the busy streets surrounding their residence. As an additional caution to those townies who were living under rocks and unaware of the unrest on campus, the UW student radio station ("Up Against the Wall FM!") helpfully advised Madison commuters to avoid the downtown area altogether. 161

The killing of two more students at Jackson State University in Mississippi exacerbated the situation. Liberty Washad, a Black Strike veteran, grimly commented that Madison's white radicals seemed more upset at the lack of mainstream press

157 Rowen, The War at Home.
158 Peter Greenberg, quoted in Bates, 234-235.
159 Cronon & Jenkins, 509.
160 Mate, The War at Home.
161 Bates, 235-236.
coverage for the killing of black students than at the actual shooting. After Jackson State, she said, “white guilt” brought even more students into the streets.162 Amidst this, any effort to maintain business as usual seemed absurd. Cronon and Jenkins write that though UW technically remained open, those professors who did not suspend classes entirely ceased lecturing and instead invited discussion about the war. By the end of the year UW’s New Left had proved itself so volatile that the MPD and UP&I requested a budget increase of $450,000 to control the coming school year’s anticipated rioting.163

At that point, the students would accept nothing less than unilateral withdrawal, but Nixon merely removed ground troops and accelerated air assaults. Students were dismayed at the notion that this bloody trade-off might actually appease the American public. Elinore Pullen, a freshman protestor and devotee of Rowen’s, recollected, “It was inconceivable that we could turn this many people out into the streets night after night, take the college apart, and that it would mean nothing, that we wouldn’t in some way change the course of history.”164 By the end of May, even the pacifist MAPAC chairman Marianne Rice had grown desperate. She explained, “The frustration that we felt was that if the war was to be ended at all there was only one thing that was going to do it, and that was to make one big impact somewhere. Whether that was going to be in Madison or not, something had to happen somewhere.”165

162 Liberty Washad, The War at Home.
164 Elinore Pullen, The War at Home.
165 Colson, The War at Home.
THE BOMBING
"THE STUDENTS AND FACULTY
OF THE PHYSICS DEPARTMENT
DEPLORE THE USE OF VIOLENCE
IN THE NAME OF PEACE."
A hand-lettered sign tacked to the East Wing entrance of Sterling Hall in the summer of 1970.166

When summer arrived, those students remaining on campus felt that the previous spring’s riots had been useless. Reflecting on the disappointment, Dan Lazare, a Cardinal columnist, commented, “The second American Revolution seemed to be upon us—but alas, an illusion.”167 Scrawled across construction fences and boards covering the holes where windows used to be was the desperate cry: “NEW YEAR’S GANG, WHERE ARE YOU?” When the Armstrongs returned from Minneapolis in July, they found the city enveloped in a tenuous silence. Karleton and Dwight gathered some friends and decided that there was no chance of any of the radicals’ demands—including Army Math’s peaceful removal from campus—being met. It was time for them to force matters.168

The Vanguards’ newest recruits were Cardinal reporters Leo Burt, a varsity rower and apocalyptic editorial writer, and the baby-faced David Fine, a junior-varsity coxswain, aspiring investigative journalist, and darling of the editorial board. Karleton and Leo had met the previous spring in a Miffland living room, where they had both taken shelter from tear gas during the Block Party riots.169 Like most radicals, Leo had begun 1969-70 committed to nonviolent resistance, but was frustrated by the movement’s lack of progress. Leo’s position on the Cardinal’s editorial board gave him access to confidential information, including the identity of the Vanguards of the Revolution. Over that year, both his disillusionment with the system and his friendship with Karleton deepened, and he found himself cheering the crazies on. He and Karleton spent 1970’s Memorial Day weekend discussing strategy. When Leo finally affirmed aloud that peaceful protest was no longer an option, Karleton asked, “Are you ready to do something about it?” and invited his friend to join the New Year’s Gang.170

Seven weeks later, at a rally marking Cuba’s Independence Day, Leo introduced Karleton to David, a rising sophomore. The two became fast friends. David had attached himself to Jim Rowen and Rena Steinzor at the first Cardinal meeting of 1969 and rose quickly through the ranks of the paper’s editorial board, executing Steinzor’s “anarchistic journalism” with precocious alacrity.171 The brilliant but impressionable freshman had read and agreed with every piece that his idol, Rowen, had written on Army Math, so once Karleton had decided to assault AMRC, bringing David into the New Year’s Gang was a simple matter. David remembers, “We didn’t really have any heavy political discussions. It was more like, ‘Hey, right on! Let’s go to the bombing!’”172

Working out of their apartment on Iota Court in Madison, the New Year’s Gang took most of July and August, 1970, to plan the attack on AMRC. The foursome stole a
van and drove out to Devil's Lake State Park, about forty-five minutes north of Madison, to assemble and load their bomb. The van was a white Econoline with oversized rearview mirrors, chrome bumpers and long, narrow taillights. It rode flat on its axles under the weight of its cargo: four large barrels, each containing 500 pounds of ANFO and a Primacord fuse. Early in the morning of August twenty-fourth, Karleton maneuvered the van into the loading dock of Sterling Hall. Leo, feverish, nauseated, and shaking from anxiety, rode shotgun, and Dwight tailed them in the Armstrongs' mother's yellow Corvaire. When they arrived at the target site, Karleton and Leo exited the van, joined Dwight in the rear, lit the fuse, dove into the Corvaire, and burned rubber. Karleton had stationed David in a phone booth at the corner of University Avenue and Park Street and told him to wait for "the signal," the Corvaire's zooming past him. At 3:40 am, the Madison Police Department received his now-infamous phone call. David ordered:

Okay, pigs, now listen and listen good. There's a bomb in the Army Math Research Center, University, set to go off in five minutes. Clear the building. Get everyone out.
Warn the hospital. This is no bullshit, man.\textsuperscript{173}

Two minutes later, the Econoline exploded with the force of 8,300 sticks of dynamite, or a small nuclear bomb. Twenty-six university buildings were damaged, four people were injured, and a postdoctoral physics researcher was killed. Thirty-three-year-old Robert Fassnacht was a married father of three small children who was personally opposed to the war. He had vocally protested the presence of AMRC both in his building and on the campus.\textsuperscript{174} Ironically enough, the department that bore the brunt of the bomb's wrath was Physics, the most dovish of the university's hard science departments. Not only did Physics lose a promising young scientist, but also a federally-funded nuclear reactor. The bomb reduced their research to ash and memory. Army Math itself suffered little more than superficial damage.\textsuperscript{175} The next morning, the New Year's Gang contacted the Kaleidoscope with an explanation for the bombings and a list of three demands. They wrote:

The Vanguards of the Revolution demands the immediate release of the Milwaukee 3 [three soldiers who had sabotaged the airbase at Camp McCoy outside of Milwaukee in 1969], the abolition of ROTC, and the elimination of the male supremacist women's hours on the Wisconsin campus. If these demands are not met by October 30th, revolutionary measures of an intensity never before seen in this country will be taken by our cadres. Open warfare, kidnapping of important officials, and even assassination will not be ruled out. Although we have sought to prevent any physical harm to all people in the past, we cannot be responsible for the safety of pigs if our demands are not met.

The threats were quite a bit more than the New Year's Gang could actually make good on, but their goal was to maintain an illusion of power in hopes of scaring the university into compliance. They signed their communiqué in the well-known Weather Underground style, with the code name “Marion Delgado.”\textsuperscript{176} None of the bombers were

\textsuperscript{173} Bates, 304.
\textsuperscript{174} Bates, 5-16.
\textsuperscript{176} “Marion Delgado is the name of a five-year-old Chicano boy who had derailed a train by placing a concrete block on the tracks in 1947; the Weathermen and other radicals took him up as a rebel folk hero and, on occasion, used his name as an alias.” Varon, 80, “Bombing and a Weatherman
in any way associated with official Weather cadres; the signature was just another trick to frighten administrators and mislead investigators.\textsuperscript{177} For all its threats, however, the New Year's Gang did not commit any more acts of violence. Within six hours of the explosion, the Armstrongs, Burt, and Fine were on their way to Canada, where they would be fugitives for at least two years. The New Left would have to answer for their actions.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{177} Sale, 654.
\textsuperscript{178} Bates, 5-16.
"We have the beginnings of an outright revolution," said Wisconsin Attorney General Robert Warren to the state legislature on August twenty-fifth. Students had not yet returned for the fall semester, and campus officials, still shaking from the Cambodia/Kent State riots of May, feared the worst. Immediately upon learning of the bombing, Chancellor Young granted Physics and Astronomy their wish, moving AMRC across campus into the WARF building. The Center's mathematicians resumed work immediately.

Consequences for the radicals came down swiftly. Within twenty-four hours of the bombing, the FBI declared jurisdiction on the premise that, in addition to the obviously-federal Army Math Research Center, the destroyed nuclear reactor in the basement was also U.S. government property. On top of their tangible jurisdiction, something about the bombing seemed eerily familiar to the FBI's Madison field office. David Fine's phone call, in which he warned the MPD to clear Sterling Hall, rang distant warning bells in the heads of investigators. A Manhattan townhouse explosion four months earlier, in which three Weathermen were killed, had stunned Weather cadres into "imposing limits on their violence [and making] the conscious decision not to be killers" by abandoning the use of nail bombs. In addition, they now issued warnings of pending detonations so that buildings might be cleared. The explosion had also prompted several of the most notorious Weathermen and -women to retreat completely into the New Left's underworld. Well aware of Madison's connections—Weatherman Howie Mechtinger's younger twin sisters were UW students—and recalling the tendency for Weather operatives to take lodging in Miffland during their visits to the campus, the FBI asked the MPD for assistance in a sweep of the student ghetto. They lost their element of surprise, however, when a long-haired Paul Revere responded to the first flash of their badges by zipping down the street on his bicycle, blowing on a whistle.

Undeterred, federal agents continued to bring in students for questioning. They greeted returning students with unannounced visits and grand jury subpoenas, causing many of the more notorious Mifflanders to seek refuge in communes out West. All Madison students were stunned by the Fassnacht's death, though most claimed to have seen something like this coming. Jim Rowen, like many radicals, blamed the university. "I was not surprised [by the bombings]," he said, "and I felt that the university should have broken that contract and gotten Army Math off the campus because that bombing was an inevitability. It was bound to happen at some point."

---

181 In the March, 1970 explosion, three Weather operatives had perished when one accidentally detonated the nail bombs they were manufacturing. Varon, 11-13.
183 Bates, 49.
184 Rowen, The War at Home.
up and down State Street shortly after the bombing concluded, “The death of a man who should not have died will be felt by all of us... Bob Fassnacht, we needed you too.”

The blurry line between radicals and crazies became distinctly clear as the previous spring’s rioters reacted to the bombing. Radicals were caught between the rock of approving manslaughter and the hard place of admitting that their rhetoric had been dangerously wrong. Such sentiments hit home especially hard at the Cardinal when David and Leo were implicated. The paper refused to judge them, however. In an article that was tantamount to an endorsement, they wrote:

The AMRC was a physical and symbolic installation whose sole purpose was to serve the strong arm of American economic interests across the globe. This military arm of our government has been the most violent instrument in the history of the world and has stolen from, murdered, and destroyed the lives of people in countries from Cuba to Vietnam, as well as those at the bottom of the social ladder within its own turf....

In order for its physical and symbolic destruction to have any meaning beyond this specific point in time, the movement from which the booming sprang must be expanded.

We are with Leo and David now because they are people we care for very deeply and know very well. They pointed out that the bombing was nothing compared to the violence that the U.S. was perpetrating in Vietnam on a daily basis. “Furthermore,” one columnist wrote, “if Fassnacht had been drafted and killed in Vietnam, none of us would stir.” For radicals, the New Year’s Gang had brought the war home.

The New Year’s Gang itself expressed sorrow over the Fassnacht’s death, but maintained that the bombing was a regrettable necessity. Crazies rallied behind their Kaleidoscope missives in agreement. Ken Mate, like other Mother Jones folk, saw death as an unfortunate cost of doing business:

What the bombing did was that it changed, y’know, the sort of rock throwing, comic strip type of revolution that was going on into a real revolution. It told people that yes, indeed, people were going to be hurt.

Militants all over the city expressed an emotion similar to that of Ron Carbon, who said, “If I’d had the courage to do what Armstrong did, I would have.” Michael Jaliman, the WSA president, made a score of enemies in the student body and stunned authorities when he told a local press conference, “I’d be less than realistic to predict any change in the violent atmosphere on campus... A large number of [Miffland] students are stockpiling weapons.”

As for the rest of UW’s students, Cardinal editor Rena Steinzor summarized: “Assaulted with the dual pressure of the police investigation and the confirmation of seriousness that the bombing itself represented, we retreated into ourselves, into dope, into whatever music we could find.” Professors reported that students were far more attentive to their studies that year; from the first day of classes, student attendance had

---

186 “Where Do We Go From Here?” The Daily Cardinal, Registration Issue—Fall 1970, 11.
188 Mate, The War at Home.
189 Carbon, The War at Home.
returned to pre-Dow Day levels, and in January the average student GPA showed a marked increase from that of the previous year. 192

The bombing encouraged some of the more trepidatious or contrite radicals to turn informant for the MPD. Several Madison law enforcement agencies had put undercover agents in the field as early as 1966; they called themselves the “Sedition Men.” 193 Working through and with the Sedition Men, in 1970 COINTELPRO’s Madison presence grew significantly. 194 Notorious crazies like Kaleidoscope editor Mark Knops, who had been jailed for contempt of court when he refused to divulge the identities of the New Year’s Gang to a Walworth County grand jury, were under constant surveillance. When the judge released Knops nine months later, COINTELPRO even had an informant in the car that retrieved him from jail. 195 The movement’s paranoia increased accordingly, causing radicals to imitate crazies and split into “affinity groups” of five or six people to avoid infiltration. 196 By February, 1971, the radicals began to suspect anyone with a crew cut who did not conform to the “freak” type, often harassing them out of the room. 197 Their paranoia thwarted the sort of mass organization that had been so prevalent before the bombings, and the Sedition Men chalked up many a psychological victory. By the end of 1970, they had successfully infiltrated the movement to the extent that, when a protest was called, half of those demonstrating were undercover agents from one law enforcement agency or another. 198

In a mid-September speech to Kansas State University, President Nixon encouraged “responsible university and college administrators, faculty, and student leadership to stand up and be counted.” He urged his “silent majority” to begin policing their fellow citizens. “These terrorists want to bring down the United States of America, a building here, an institution there, a life whenever it gets in the way,” he said. “Only the people can stop them.” 199 The text of Nixon’s speech ran in the Madison daily The Wisconsin State Journal the next morning, and soon the city of Madison had taken his charge to heart. The Cardinal lost seventy-five percent of its advertising overnight after its editorial board endorsed the bombings. Residents chased a local mime troupe off Library Mall during a performance that glorified the bombers. Agitated townspeople beat up radicals hawking the Kaleidoscope on State Street. As Bates writes, “the role of revolutionary had suddenly become a lot more difficult to play.” 200

Madison’s Mayor William “Bull” Dyke publicly defended and encouraged such actions, saying “This is a do-it-yourself age.” The Madison community came down on radicals even as it paraded its broad-based opposition to the war. The April 1971

193 Bates, 50.
194 In order to increase pride among their ranks and prevent them from reacting to students’ calling them pigs, Madison’s Chief of Police named his undercover officers after breeds of hogs: Duroc, Chester White, Poland China, and so on. Herman Thomas, The War at Home.
195 Bates, 55.
196 Bates, 132.
198 Prosecutor Michael Zaleski, quoted in Durhams & Maller, sidebar.
200 Bates, 49.
elections featured an anti-war referendum that won in every precinct and passed with a resounding 66%. Local polling suggested that popular anti-war sentiment was even higher, with some statisticians reporting as much as 73% of Madison's citizens favoring immediate withdrawal. However, the common citizenry had no patience for violent radicals. The same citizens who voted against the war re-elected Dyke, a vocal opponent of the referendum, for his proven record of zero tolerance for Miffland, its inhabitants, and their causes. Paul Soglin, who had thrown his hat into the ring in December, never even made it past the primary. Shortly after Dyke's victory, he proposed the underwriting of armed, roving groups of vigilante to aid police in patrolling Miffland and other "hotbeds of student unrest." It looked like the radicals' philosophy of meeting violence with violence would henceforth be met with even more violence.

For radicals, it was gut-check time. The bombing, like every act of violence before it, had failed to initiate the revolution. Radicals felt like accomplices to murder because they had drawn a line in the sand and said, "If you're not actively with us, then you're against us." Soglin recalls that the ever-increasing level of militant rhetoric led the New Year's Gang to believe that "when they blew up a building, they had the mandate of a movement." Rena Steinzor confided to Soglin upon their return to campus that she knew that the New Year's Gang was wrong because she herself was not capable of doing something like that. In print nearly a year later she explained:

What made our dilemma acute was the realization that in a thousand different ways, we had been a part of the historical process that led to the bomb crater... Everything about us seemed to have been called into question: our ability to live as we wish, our ability to stop the murder in Indochina, and our desire to change America into a better world....

Somehow, as we always have before, we will muddle through. For there is a difference between apathy and desperation. We are not sleeping in a resigned stupor. We are trying to figure out how to live in an increasingly unlivable world.

Steinzor and most Madison radicals concluded that there would be no revolution; furthermore, if there ever was to be one, violence was not the way to bring it about. A mass change of strategy soon commenced.

---

204 Bates, 49.
205 Soglin, Tradition.
206 Soglin interview.
207 Steinzor, "The End of the Beginning."
MOVING ON

“You say you want a revolution. Well, you know, we all want to change the world...
But if you’re talking about destruction, well, you know that you can count me out!”

The Beatles, “Revolution”

A radical’s reaction to the bombing revealed his true colors, and many liberals in crazies’ clothes used the cover of the bombing to emerge cautiously from the closet. Though some of the crazies grew even crazier when the masses did not join them in revolution after the bombing, most radicals readily admitted that further violence would not bring about change. They now realized that large-scale destruction of property carried with it the risk of violence against people, against which they had spoken all along. Most urged a recess from more confrontational forms of direct action and encouraged a serious discussion and articulate criticism of the issues. One radical commented in the Cardinal:

There seems to be a pervasive assumption in our community that an individual’s degree of commitment to a revolutionary change is in direct proportion to his willingness to support and commit revolutionary violence. Although Che Guevara and Mao Tse-Tung may have more dash and charisma than Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, we should not let this interfere with our judgment of who has the best strategy for change in our society. My analysis suggests that effective commitment of revolutionary change requires courage for restraint rather than for acts of violence.208

In a similar editorial, James Boulting, a member of the Progressive Labor Socialist Coalition, commented, “The latest Madison bombing won’t bring socialism to America, nor will testimonial actions of this kind bring an end to the far flung military establishment and war theatres of the imperialist leaders.”209 Groups that had never endorsed the bombings or called for violence at all, such as the Young Socialist Alliance, grew in popularity as riots and trashings faded into collective campus memory.210

The 1970 fall semester was the quietest the university had seen in a long time, kicking off what went down in student lore as “The Year of Grave Calm.”211 The Badger Herald, a new conservative campus newspaper, cited an old-fashioned panty raid in Witte Residence Hall as evidence that UW students were retreating from politics.212 Mainstream media outlets joined them in trumpeting the New Left’s demise, but that was not nearly the case. Though the bombing did exorcise the demon of violence from the souls of most Madison radicals, it did not touch their desire to make political change. Instead, it pushed them into the arenas of community organization and local politics.

Miffland resident Susan Colson insists:

I don’t think that the anti-war movement died. I think that what happened was that there was a lot of repression, which effected the kinds of work that were going on. There were increasingly new directions that political people were taking. They moved into

communities that hadn't been touched by a lot of anti-war organizing and tried to talk about whole new issues of life in this country.\textsuperscript{213}

In the interest of diversification, UW's Student Volunteer Services issued a massive call for students to assist with tutoring, day care, elder care, handicapped rehabilitation, and programming at neighborhood community centers.\textsuperscript{214} Where the headlines in the \textit{Cardinal} during the spring semester of 1970 had talked of little but riots and tear gassings, the headlines in the fall semester of that year showed a community-oriented trend.

The fruits of this organizing ripened almost immediately as radicals led community activists on the well-trodden protest route from the statue of Abraham Lincoln, down Bascom Hill, up State Street, and around the Capitol Square. After seeing their movement discredited by the Sterling Hall blast, radicals realized that the only way to save the New Left was to establish widespread community support. One WSA senator reflected, “When a person is having his consciousness raised about the problems in American society because of the war, then he'll look around the other parts of his life and say, ‘Oh, there are problems here, too.' People on campus were more interested in their own lives, so [radicals] would use whatever they could to get people out into the streets.”\textsuperscript{215} Trusting that Madisonians opposed to the war would eventually awaken to the pervasive problems of which it was symptomatic, student radicals joined with MAP AC and the rapidly growing Vets for Peace. Radicals found the latter's contribution invaluable because, as leader Ron Carbon explained:

We had some credibility as guys who'd been in Vietnam, coming back and saying, “Hey, it's not working. They're lying to you. The light at the end of the tunnel ain't there, folks. Calley and My Lai, and atrocities aren't aberrations. They're not unusual. It's the day in, day out, routine conduct of the war in Vietnam...”\textsuperscript{216}

Together the groups planned a gigantic march and rally during the fall Homecoming festivities. MAP AC pulled out of the rally at the last minute, fearing that right-wing politicians might incite violence as a ploy to effect the upcoming state elections.\textsuperscript{217} Students chose to rally anyway, but made a concerted effort to remain calm. At one point, laughter broke out when a speaker asked the crowd, “What do you want?” and instead of the expected response (“Peace!”) some radicals hollered, “REVOLUTION!” Protestors wore black armbands during the football game and “anti-war cheerleaders” led chants after the national anthem and half-time gun. The Madison City Council had endorsed the rally and march during the previous week, and Alderman Soglin presided over anti-war speeches by union presidents, clergy, veterans, Quaker peace activists, Kent State survivors, and members of the Inter-Fraternity Council.\textsuperscript{218} One speaker pronounced that “President Nixon [was] moving the country into a garrison state—otherwise known as fascism,” but the others were far more moderate.

Police stood by during the rally and directed traffic on the march route, but in the spirit of détente, they did not instigate violence or even come close to the protestors. Only once did it appear that radicalism might rupture the rally's placid surface, when a few students led a chorus of “Two, four, six, eight! Arm yourselves and smash the

\begin{footnotes}
\item Colson, \textit{The War at Home}.
\item Higgins interview.
\item Carbon, \textit{The War at Home}.
\end{footnotes}
 Afterwards, the *Cardinal* commended radicals for their behavior, saying, "At this point, we need the kind of internal discipline demonstrated by the revolutionary contingent during the planning for the MAPAC march." Reminiscing in February 2003, Soglin characterized this and other post-bombing demonstrations as "akin to what we see today in regards to protests about a possible war in Iraq. They were not just campus—they were citywide, they included everyone—and they were very peaceful."

The largest act of violence that occurred during the fall of 1970 was a Miffland mêlée that ensued when landlord William Bandy employed poison gas and the C.C. Riders Motorcycle Club in an effort to clear out the rent strikers who were protesting his criminal actions. Beyond this, radicals seemed to go out of their way to avoid militancy. Such evasion took an ironic twist when, during the first rally of the school year, an audience member threw eggs at a speaker delivering a bellicose missive from Timothy Leary, newly-liberated by Weather cadres. When the speaker's calls grew militant, the audience member charged the dais in protest of the allusion to violence. Police immediately spirited the ovum-hurling assailant away, and the audience heeded the speaker's calls to ignore the riot bait and remain seated. The duration of her speech, as well as the ones that followed from such groups as the rent-striking Madison Tenants' Union and the Illinois Black Panther Party, "stressed the need for calm in the face of police provocation."

A panel of three federal judges overturned the Regents' ban on bullhorns in early October, and the cease-fire appeared sufficiently widespread for the MPD to declare cautiously that the bombing was "an isolated incident" after an unprecedented meeting between the MPD, WP&cS, and the WSA. The officers commented that the bombings had polarized the students, turning most against violent revolutionary groups and detaching from the mainstream those who would still be violent. Radicals and police debated several issues and reached compromises on points such as the abusive treatment of long-haired hitchhikers and the use of house fellows as informants. Both parties reported that the rapprochement enabled them to see the other side as "more human" and emphasized the importance of thought before deed.

Later that year, the *Cardinal* ran an entire Monday Magazine devoted to the police. The editorial board, rather than spending twenty pages libeling the "pigs," solicited input from various law enforcement officials. The edition featured serious discussions on racism, violence, organization, training, and reform within the different agencies involved on the Madison campus. Dane County Sheriff Wilbur Emery analyzed the events of the past year under the heading, "Rights in Conflict," and a deputy sheriff reminded students, "We have families, too."

The issue's goal was not to be "a handbook containing specific police problems or sure-fire solutions." Rather, its

---

221 Soglin interview.
intention was to further dialogue between student protesters and the police who enforced the law, so that they might reduce the violence and misunderstanding between the two communities.227

Resisting the "establishment" had not been successful, so radicals learned to work within established organizations to effect desired changes through rational debate, politics, and civil disobedience. A November editorial in the *Cardinal* reminded readers:

We must first face the fact that trashings and bombings do not make a revolution. And when these actions occur, they bring down repression... until there is a large popular movement that understands some of the fundamental evils of the system we are fighting—that understands militarism, environmental pollution, worker oppression, and its own racism and sexism....

And we must realize that joining a movement... means building and creating lifestyles and institutions that enable us to be happy and fulfilled....

We must organize food coops, living coops, and educational collectives that can offer an alternative.228

Popular New Left community projects that fall included the quest to place students on the board of the local YMCA,229 the establishment of drug-abuse resource centers,230 and the lobbying of legislators to enfranchise eighteen-year-olds, legalize the sale of birth control to unmarried women, and liberalize Wisconsin's abortion laws.231 Students also aided local welfare mothers who were fighting the school district to receive their rightful Title I money so that they could purchase winter clothing for their children.232

On campus, radicals sought reform of the WSA,233 worked to strengthen the Teaching Assistants Association,234 and unionized resident advisors, cafeteria employees, and Memorial Union workers.235 Some even talked of forming an all-campus labor union that would include both students and non-students.236 Feminists negotiated with the Regents to abolish the policy of *in loco parentis*, which placed many restrictions on female residents of the dormitories, and pushed to pilot a coed residence hall.237 Even the *Kaleidoscope* toned back its rhetoric for a time, filling several editions that fall with a

---

228 "Where Do We Go From Here: II."
236 "Student Workers: All-Campus Union?" *The Daily Cardinal*, December 1, 1970, 1.
series about drugs, safe sex, birth control, and abortion rights. No longer was “the system” the exclusive domain of “Old Left” liberals and sellouts.

The school year’s first act of intentional “revolutionary” violence did not occur until December when, on the first anniversary of the Chicago Police Department’s assassination of Black Panthers leader Fred Hampton, several students trashed T-16, the same ROTC building that Karleton had torched the previous winter. Radical response to the incident was negative. A scathing *Cardinal* editorial titled “Thanks A Lot” asked the looters,

What were you trying to accomplish? Were you trying to help Fred Hampton or his friends? Well, in case you didn’t know it, Fred is gone and his friends and followers won’t benefit one bit by your few broken windows....

If you knew very much about how things are run in this country you would realize that ROTC is not about to slink away when you throw rocks at it.... However, if you people wanted more hatred, more repression, and more blind, useless violence, then you may well have succeeded.

The editorial board’s rhetoric had done a 180 degree rotation from that of the previous year. Some of the same students who had carried “SMASH ARMY MATH” signs a year earlier now chided the crazies that such petty demonstrations of wrath would not change anything. Radicals no longer talked of overthrowing the system, but instead focused on changing it from within.

---

238 For example, a column called “Narc Busting” premiered that fall, unmasking a different undercover drug officer each week. The recipes for Molotov cocktails and ANFO bombs were notably absent. For articles on safe sex, birth control, and abortion rights, see the *Kaleidoscope’s* op/ed sections for the entire month of October.


CAUTIOUS RHETORIC

"Due to lack of interest, tomorrow has been cancelled."

Slogan found scrawled on a wall after a night of Crazies' looting.

Radical community movement aside, the crazies still existed. Continuing to use the cover of crowds to trash and loot, they chastized their former cohorts for selling out to the system. Though they were disappointed when the masses failed to rally for the revolution, they explained it with the same logic used by apocalyptic cults: the time had not yet come, and the people were not yet sufficiently prepared. The devout crazy would not abandon his quest. Privately, however, Mother Jones' aggravation grew. Ken Mate stated it bluntly: "I think that after the bombing, y'know, things pretty much disintegrated."

The first tear gassing of the year occurred in February of 1971, when the crazies came out for a speech by the Greek anti-totalitarian politician Andreas Papandreou. Radicals and crazies alike had been suppressing rage since January, when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had cancelled a speaking engagement to the UW faculty. When students, upset that they would be denied a chance to question him about foreign policy, announced plans to "Meet Laird" outside the Faculty Club after his speech, the Secretary bailed out and sent a deputy in his place. Papandreou, who happened to be speaking on the tactics of overthrowing a totalitarian regime, became a rallying point for the release of the crazies' tension. They attempted to trash buildings and smash windows, and some in the MPD resorted to old intimidation tactics. The demonstration then broke up quietly, and one police officer even apologized to a young coed who had been harassed by a colleague of his, saying, "We're all under a bit of stress, here."

Crazies hoped for a repeat of the Cambodia/Kent State riots after the Nixon-ordered invasion of Laos in February, 1971. Activist organizations like YSA persuaded the United Front, a new umbrella group for all campus anti-war organizations, to call a non-disruptive strike in protest. Their plans, as announced in the Cardinal, included "in-class discussions of the Indochinese war... the widespread use of University facilities for community-wide anti-war organizing activities... [and] mass canvassing of the entire city in an effort to pull people from different walks of life into the protest." They

241 Schneider interview.
242 Many historians and radicals of the time compared crazies' logic to that of apocalyptic cults. Gitlin writes of his quest to comprehend the Weather Underground: "Casting about, I turned to When Prophecy Fails, the classic of social psychology published in 1956. Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter investigated a millenarian cult which believed that on a certain date a great flood would engulf the land, but they would be carried off in time by flying saucers. When the great day came and neither flood nor saucers materialized, many believers fell away, but some devotees found a way to make sense of the 'cognitive dissonance.' The absence of saucers became a signal that they were coming later—and so the believers redoubled their commitment." Gitlin, 398.
243 Mate, The War at Home.
cautioned students against obstructing business as usual. The Kaleidoscope responded with an editorial condemning the student body's inaction. The Five Lakes Gang (the paper's editorial board) wrote:

We have the inevitable bullshit walk into the tear gas trap, we pathetically confront the pathetic pigs and split. We salve our consciences somehow by the stinging on our eyes....

We vote for a NON-DISRUPTIVE STRIKE and somehow manage to reconcile the inherent contradiction in those terms by sticking our heads in the quicksand of parliamentary procedure.... This is not rhetoric. This is revolution. We are all in this together and we better get it on, not for a week but for the rest of our lives. 248

Despite their repeated editorial pleas, most students failed to answer the crazies' call. As the Kaleidoscope reported on the editorial's same page, there had been a concerted lack of revolutionary interest in the preceding week. Wednesday had featured an "abortive semi-takeover of the Social Sciences Building" and the Memorial Union, but both crowds dispersed at the first sight of UP&:S. On Thursday the MPD encountered little resistance when breaking up a disruptive march across campus. On Friday there was "nothing... strike cancelled due to lack of interest." On Saturday the police stopped another potential riot, this time at the Capitol, and on Sunday, again nothing happened. 249

Radicals, who had regained some legitimacy in the eyes of peaceful activists, also feared that the campus was settling into an apathetic rut. A few weeks after the strike, an affinity group submitted a lengthy editorial, "Critical Reflections on the Strike," to the Cardinal under the pen name Malcolm Montesquieu. It read:

You must realize that the war is business as usual, and vice-versa. If you're unwilling to disrupt business as usual, you're unwilling to stop the war.... ALL TACTICS OF PEACEFUL PETITION HAVE OBVIOUSLY FAILED. It is not necessary... to attack police or break windows, but to fail to avail ourselves of all possible means of civil disobedience and extralegal means of nonviolent disruption is criminal. Everything possible must be done to disturb the administration and capture public imagination....

So, a few modest proposals to chew on: next time we try to have a mass march and the pigs break it up, break off into small groups of friends you trust and disrupt in any ways your creative imagination can figure out—trash a bank or paint a wall... or if that's too violent for your philosophy, get together with a larger group of friends to take a building and really hold it, or burn some draft files, or if all that is too extreme, write a leaflet explaining the actions of others or run a workshop. We need to work on all levels. 250

The most telling portion of Montesquieu's editorial is the way he distinguishes between small-scale destruction of property and actual violence that could harm people, with the former being permissible, but the latter remaining out of the question. This was part of an overall radical trend to make more careful use of rhetoric. Soglin recalls that even the most moderate radicals had felt complicit in the Sterling Hall explosion because they had engaged in rhetorical escalation. Their culpability derived from never having condemned large-scale destruction of property that could endanger human life. 251

As preparation for

248 The Five Lakes Gang, "We're All In This Together," The Madison Kaleidoscope, February 18, 1971, 2.
251 Soglin, Tradition.
May Day's anti-war protests commenced, Montesquieu resurfaced in the *Cardinal* with a call to action:

> Around the country, recognizing the urgency of the situation, the anti-war movement is uniting to take strong, effective, disruptive action. 73 percent of the people already want immediate withdrawal. The problem is no longer to convince people the war is wrong, but to show them how to use their power to end the war—their power to shut the country down. Plans are being made for nationwide action the first week in May to stop business as usual through massive civil disobedience, strikes, etc. 252

A few months later, plans gelled for three days of lobbying officials on all levels of government, followed by a National Moratorium on Business as Usual for several days at the beginning of May. The May Action Coalition, a United Front delegation from Madison to the Ann Arbor Student Youth Conference on a People's Peace, elaborated:

> The tactic of non-violent civil disobedience was picked for Washington not because most participants are pacifists or because we oppose armed struggle or people’s war.... [the Conference] simply decided that this was the most valid tactic for this particular time and place....

> The aim of the Mayday actions is to raise the social cost of the war to a level unacceptable to America’s rulers. To do this we seek to create the specter of social chaos while maintaining the support or at least toleration of the broad masses of American people. It is felt that given the current political climate of this country, it is suicidal to isolate ourselves from the 73 percent of the American people who wish an immediate end to the war....

> Nonviolent civil disobedience... is widely misunderstood and the extent of most people's knowledge is inaccurate characterizations. We need to be clear that we are not talking about an exercise in martyrdom; we are not talking about negotiated arrests; we are talking about using a tactic to obtain an objective. The tactic is nonviolent disobedience. The objective is to close down the federal government sections of Washington, D.C. by blocking traffic arteries during the early morning rush hours of May 3 and 4....

> No matter what laws we break, we are going to reach our target. We will be mobile—constantly dispersing and reforming; and we will be militant—defending our sisters and brothers from arrest. We will do most things we normally do in the streets except initiating trashing and street fighting. 253

Note that the emphasis on nonviolent civil disobedience follows the preemptive denial of charges of pacifism or opposition to the “movement.” Radicals' rhetorical savvy was increasing. They could not afford to abandon their fellows who had been absent from the conference, but they came to realize that the more national exposure they sought, the more careful they had to be to avoid alienating their audience. As they rallied Madisonians to attend the activities in Washington, they constantly reminded their radical constituents that civil disobedience would be more effective than destruction of property. The former did not entail the mess of broken glass or the danger of potential injuries to protestors and innocent bystanders that could turn public opinion against the New Left cause. 254

---

This is not to say that the spring was riot-proof. A repeat of the 1969 Mifflin Street Block Party occurred in April when the Youth International Party's New Nation Conference celebrated with Mifflanders despite the mayor's having denied them a party permit.\footnote{Mike Rothe and George Hesselberg, "Music & Tear Gas Greet Spring," \textit{The Badger Herald}, April 5, 1971, 1.} And for all the public insistence on nonviolent protest, May Day did bring riots and tear gas to Madison. However, the course of protest followed an entirely different pattern than it had in the pre-bombing era. Before, rallies of several hundred people would convene on Bascom Hill or Library Mall. Protestors would march from there to the Capitol, Sterling Hall, the Old Red Gym, or another offending edifice, and the crowd would grow in size along the way. After the Sterling Hall bombing, however, the rallies became the high points of demonstrations. During the Madison May Day activities, rallies numbered in the thousands, but the crowd would dissipate to only a few hundred people as the marching began.\footnote{"Local Anti-War Demo: Police Cloud Issue," \textit{The Daily Cardinal}, May 6, 1971, 1. Dan Lazare, "Dorms Gassed in Local Action," \textit{The Daily Cardinal}, May 5, 1971, 1.} Activists Tim Higgins, a WSA senator during the 1970-71 school year, and Tom Schneider, the WSA president, both recall that many students did not want to be associated with violence of any sort. Before the bombing, they would stay in the demonstrations and remain silent. After the bombing, they knew better than to give the crazies the crowd cover they needed to initiate violence. When trashing started, most students would simply leave.\footnote{Higgens and Schneider interviews.}

In the spring of 1972, Richard Nixon ordered the resumption of bombing sorties in North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. Desiring the mass turnout that had packed the streets of Madison during 1969-70, radicals and activists joined forces to keep the crazies at bay. Anticipating that any police activity might incite a riot, the United Front contributed an insert into a \textit{Cardinal} rally announcement:

> The Madison United Front suggests that it is important for people who will be involved in future anti-war demonstrations to form affinity groups with a small number of people whom they both know and trust. The reasons for this are:
> 1. It is important not to become isolated within the crowd.
> 2. Group members can look out for one another in the event of imminent danger (police).
> 3. If there is an attempted arrest, members of the group can act to prevent it by diverting police attention or by pulling the group member away from the police.
> 4. In the event of arrest, affinity group members take responsibility for the quickest possible release (on bail).
> 5. There is a great potential for creative action with a small group of people thinking and implementing ideas as the time and place demand them.
> 6. Affinity groups help to effectively stifle provocateurs.

In Madison, provocateurs were sometimes undercover policemen, but more often they were just crazies looking to cause trouble.\footnote{The United Front, "Affinity Groups," \textit{The Daily Cardinal}, April 19, 1972, 1.} The increasing use of affinity groups that spring helped prevent trashing and looting, resulting in city-wide protests ranging in size from 2,000 to 10,000 individuals.\footnote{Patrick McGilligan, "3000 in Anti-War Protest Here," \textit{The Daily Cardinal}, April 18, 1972, 1; Henry Rohlich and Douglas Johnson, "Kent State Moratorium: 2000 Gather to Protest War," \textit{The Daily Cardinal}, May 5, 1972, 1; "Nixon Orders Haiphong Blockade," \textit{The Daily Cardinal}, May 9, 1972, 1; Dan Schwartz, "Two Shot in Albuquerque, City Protests Rage in Streets—Local: 10,000 Gather at}
Higgins led a line of marchers through the banks on the Capitol Square. The protestors, marching in silence, scattered deposit slips in each lobby, but in no other way did they destroy property or obstruct business. Later that night, marchers ran down State Street, throwing toilet paper and hollering, "NO MORE SHIT!"

That month, it became clear that "bringing the war home" was no longer a radical-approved strategy. The night of May 11, three Madison police on a routine patrol through the isthmus were shot near Miffland, and students were immediately suspected. The next day, four crazies were arrested. An editorial in the Cardinal was as harsh in its criticism of the shooters as it would have been supportive of the same actions three years earlier. Instead of praising the shooters for "dealing with pigs," it accused them of sabotaging the greater cause by shifting public attention from the injustices of America's war of imperialism in Vietnam to the protesters' personal war at home.
NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

"In the illumination of that bomb, the movement knew sin."

Todd Gitlin, The Sixties

There is no way that the AMRC bombing could not have affected the national New Left movement. Radicals at Columbia and Berkeley, the First and Second Coasts, had no more of an idea than those in Madison that this specific act of violence was in the making, but generally speaking, the student leadership at every campus knew what its national counterparts were up to. Early in the nineteen-sixties, the New Left established its own wires, the Liberation News Service and the Pacific News Service, which allowed underground newspapers all over the country to print articles from each other's presses. Radicals on all three campuses kept tabs on each other's activities in a spirit of good-natured competition. After the three days of rioting that followed the Mifflin Street Block Party in May of 1969, Soglin recalls, the headline of the underground newspaper The Berkeley Barb read like a scoreboard: "Madison, 1. Berkeley, 0." Student newspapers all over the country had endorsed violent measures when nonviolence failed to produce immediate, tangible results. Just as everyone knew the national score, everyone would have to pay for the bombing, a national disaster.

Though mainstream politicians across the country denounced radical violence in general and the Sterling Hall bombing in particular, perhaps the explosion also shocked them into action. Not three weeks after the end of the Cambodia/Kent State riots, the Senate repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, taking away the blank check with which Johnson and Nixon had funded their escalation. In December, 1970, the same senators banned the presence of American ground troops in Laos and Cambodia, and in early 1971 both houses of Congress began serious debate of the proposed Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which would enfranchise eighteen-year-olds. Appropriate legislation passed simultaneously in both houses, and the Constitutionally required thirty-four states ratified it in under three months. If Madison is any indication, the amendment's passage did not reduce the New Left's actions in non-electoral arenas, but merely gave younger radicals one more place to voice their opinions.

Certain states (Georgia and Kentucky) had been lobbying for eighteen-year-old suffrage since the nineteen-forties, but the amendment's expedited passing suggests some external catalyst. Liberals are notorious for their faith in the electoral process, and the enfranchisement of college students, who amounted to a majority of the nation's radical protesters, is a classically Old Left solution to a New Left problem. The bombing also affected White House policymakers, who ordered a sharp crackdown on those with the audacity to use bombs five thousand miles away from Vietnam. A section of Nixon's 1971 crime bill authorized U.S. Attorneys to seek the federal death penalty for anyone convicted of a fatal bombing. In contrast to the legislation on Capitol Hill, White House

263 Gitlin, 407.
264 Soglin interview.
265 Officially, there were never American ground troops in Laos, and the country's inclusion in the ban was spun as a preventative measure.
senior staffers were well aware and made no secret of their legislative muse: they dubbed that particular clause the "Armstrong Act." 268

Though the New Year's Gang had avoided criminal prosecution for a time by fleeing to Canada, they could not escape the court of public opinion. Just as the Cardinal had attributed to the New Year's Gang bombings which were not theirs, so did the national movement attribute Sterling Hall to the rash of Weather bombings perpetrated that fall—a connection aided, of course, by the New Year's Gang's adoption of the Marion Delgado byline. 269 The media, always eager for a whisper or shadow of conspiracy, spent the early half of 1970 hyping the dramatic increase in bombings nationwide. 270 By the time of the Army Math bombing, the media counted Karleton and his cohorts as one peculiarly nefarious incarnation of the numerous Weather collectives plaguing the country. The Vanguards had made international news with their slipshod winter offensive, so it cannot be surprising that Sterling Hall bombing was on the front page of newspapers across the globe. Even one of UW's liberal oracles, retired history professor Harvey Goldberg, followed accounts of New Year's Gang in the International Herald Tribune from the quiet balcony of his Paris flat. 271

The New York Times continued to run stories about Madison, the New Year's Gang, the bombing, and the subsequent investigation for weeks. The identity of the victim made it impossible for the radicals to claim that he had it coming. Fassnacht was not a police officer, nor was he at all affiliated with the army or the government. His death was consistent with the results of Karleton's other offensive attempts: misplaced, misguided, and unfortunate. In an interview with the New York Times that ran the day after Fassnacht's death, the researcher's father said that Robert "didn't like the war any more than the next fellow," and that he was "sympathetic to many of the discontents here on campus." 272 The article itself was buried on page thirty-three of the paper, but its location beside the continuation of a front page article about the bombing guaranteed that no one would miss it.

The fact that Fassnacht himself was not a radical did not affect the subtext of the Times' message: "Those crazy doves just killed one of their own." The Times called extra attention to the white student movement's first innocent victim, confirming the public's negative perception of the New Left and making their cause that much more difficult to champion. Margery Tabankin, who had graduated from WSA vice presidency to the presidency of the National Student Association, was uniquely placed to comment on the bombing's national effect:

Nationally I think that it was becoming clear to a lot of radical people that the choice of violence and destruction of property was not an effective tool. It was just that the radical movement was so divided amongst itself. The Left, the radicals, were turning on themselves and each other. It really did cast a large shadow on the rest of the radical movement. On the one hand, these were people they knew and at the time many didn't

269 Sale, 653-654.
271 Bates, 166.
want to come out and criticize them, but on the other hand, in the general public’s eyes [what the New Year’s Gang had done] was way out of bounds.273 Radicals all over the country could do nothing but find some other, less offensive way to express their desire for social change. According to Chafe, the national movement split along lines similar to those at Madison, focusing on more specific issues, such as the war, women’s rights, poverty, racism, the environment, labor, and health care.274

274 Chafe, 430-450.
BUSTED

"The first duty of a revolutionary is to get away with it."

Abbie Hoffman

Canadian Mounties apprehended Karleton Armstrong in Toronto in the spring of 1971, but he fought extradition for eighteen months on the grounds that he was a political refugee. His fight was unsuccessful, and the Mounties delivered Karleton to the MPD in February, 1973. Paul Soglin, by that time the mayor of Madison, attempted to capitalize on the trial’s publicity and introduced a resolution condemning AMRC to Madison’s city council, where it failed by a narrow margin.275

Radicals’ reaction to the bombing had pushed so many leaders into the mainstream that by 1973, they could support the movement’s ideals while condemning Karleton’s actions, and do so without fear of losing their hard-earned legitimacy.276 Soglin and Rowen felt obligated to assist in his defense and publicly supported him.277 Soglin explained:

My feeling was that those of us still standing had a responsibility to see that Karleton got a fair trial... Karleton was misguided and wrong in what he had done, but the anti-war movement had produced him. So on the one hand we had to take responsibility for what he did, but on the other hand we had to protect him because his flaw was our flaw.278

Using their connections, the pair secured testimony of everyone from Oregon Senator (and UW alumnus) Wayne Morse to Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda. The latter couple hesitated to speak out in public defense of Karleton, which earned them a late-night visit from Mother Jones. Ken Mate and Mike Fellner appeared at the door of Soglin’s home, where the former revolutionary and his wife were staying. When they confronted him, Hayden told them bluntly, “Face it. You don’t have the mass line; the masses can’t relate to your politics. Karl has nothing to do with what the masses will relate to.” The argument lasted until 5:00 A.M., at which point Hayden went up to bed. Soglin told the Mother Jones types that he did not appreciate their bullying his houseguest and asked them to leave.279

Realizing that there was no chance of his acquittal, Karleton pled guilty to manslaughter. The sentencing mitigation hearing lasted for a week and gave radicals their long-awaited chance to put the war on trial. Karleton was sentenced to twenty-three years in prison, in a sense taking the fall for the entire student movement.280 After his sentencing, crazies rioted.

During Karleton’s incarceration at the Waupun State Penitentiary, he refused to participate in group therapy but provided a lengthy commentary in The War at Home just before he became eligible for parole. Confronted again with images of the destruction he had caused, he reflected:

I had in mind that eventually we would give ourselves up and have a political trial. Then I found out that a man had died in the bombing and there was no way we could give

276 Soglin interview.
278 Soglin interview.
280 He was also sentenced to ten years of federal time, to be served concurrently. Karleton’s sentencing took place before Wisconsin’s truth-in-sentencing laws, so his early parole was possible.
ourselves up for a trial. I just felt that the bombing was very stupid at that time... I felt morally a sense of shame for taking someone's life. I didn't think it was justified.\footnote{Armstrong, \textit{The War at Home}.}

After the endorsement of the Madison City Council and Senator Nelson, Karleton was granted parole and released on January 31, 1980. Many Madisonians believed that he had paid his debt to society, but a few still harbored resentment. While in prison, Karleton had spent copious amounts of time in solitary confinement, a consequence of his organizing prisoners to protest for more humane treatment. To pass the long hours, he designed windmills with which he hoped to solve the energy problems of the Third World. He also took trumpet lessons.\footnote{Bates, 434-435, 441.}

After working for a time at a friend's produce stand, the reclusive bomber started a juice stand of his own on State Street in the late nineteen-eighties, where he named a smoothie flavor after black activist Angela Davis.\footnote{Durhams and Maller, section 5 paragraph 9.} He eventually opened a sandwich shop on State Street and named it the "Radical Rye." A few years later, he expanded upstairs, adding a coffee shop called Che's Lounge, which has etchings of the Cuban revolutionary in its windows. Both establishments are now quite popular; the former consistently wins "Best of Madison" awards from Madison's weekly newspaper, \textit{The Isthmus}.\footnote{\url{http://www.thedailypage.com/features/favorites/odds.php}, cited on February 20, 2003.} The reclusive Karleton remains somewhat of a Madison legend and continues to do his part in local activism: hiring students, using organic produce, encouraging recycling, and endorsing progressive candidates for school board, alderman, and mayor.

The FBI apprehended David Fine in San Rafael, California in 1976. Upon his return to Madison, he was released on $50,000 bail and stayed in the home of Jim Rowen and Susan McGovern throughout his trial. He pled guilty to third degree murder and was sentenced to seven years. When he was released, he moved to Oregon and attended law school in Eugene, but was denied admission to the bar on the basis of his involvement in the Sterling Hall bombing. He is now a paralegal for a large firm specializing in patent law.

Mounties arrested Dwight Armstrong in Toronto in the spring of 1977. He waived his right to an extradition hearing in exchange for the same plea bargain that David had received. Immediately upon his parole, he moved in with Karleton and began working at a produce stand, but he did not remain free for long. Plagued with addiction since his summer at Uncle Paul's, where everything from alcohol and tobacco to mescaline and cocaine was readily available, he soon found himself re-arrested on drug charges and was quickly convicted of possession, production, and distribution of illegal narcotics. Never successfully conquering his addictions, he has spent the time since his release from Waupun in and out of the Indiana and Wisconsin penitentiary systems.\footnote{Bates, 431-432, 437-438; Soglin, \textit{Tradition}.}

Leo Burt remains at large.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Armstrong, \textit{The War at Home}.}
\item \footnote{Bates, 434-435, 441.}
\item \footnote{Durhams and Maller, section 5 paragraph 9.}
\item \footnote{\textit{The Isthmus Daily Page}, "Best of Madison, Odds & Ends," \url{http://www.thedailypage.com/features/favorites/odds.php}, cited on February 20, 2003.}
\item \footnote{Bates, 431-432, 437-438; Soglin, \textit{Tradition}.}
\end{itemize}
GROWING UP

"Though I could not caution all, I still might warn a few:
Don't lend your hand to raise a flag atop no ship of fools."

The Grateful Dead, "Ship of Fools"

Many Madison radicals chose to spend the better part of their careers making change for their cities within the structure of the once-hated establishment. Paul Soglin, Miffland's hippie alderman, challenged Bull Dyke for a second time in the mayoral race of 1973, and this time he succeeded. Though eighteen-year-old suffrage did help him in the student districts, Soglin did not win the election by getting out the hippie vote. Instead, he relied on the popular support he had begun cultivating on Dow Day and the pragmatism for which he had become known during his time on the Madison City Council. Madison re-elected him six times, and he has gone down in history as the city's most accessible and progressive mayor. From his office, he continued to put the AMRC on trial by endorsing The AMRC Papers, an indictment of the AMRC and its position in the community that was published in 1973 by an independent think-tank. 286 History is not without its ironies: during his failed 2003 bid for a third stint as Madison's mayor, Soglin was the most conservative candidate in the race.

Jim Rowen, who cut his investigative journalistic teeth on the Cardinal staff while revealing the secret operations of the AMRC, left Madison in 1970 with a master's degree in English. He and his wife, Susan McGovern, spent the next year touring the country in support of Susan's father's presidential candidacy. In 1972, at the behest of his comrade Paul, he returned to Madison and took charge of the Soglin for Mayor campaign. After the inauguration, Rowen became chief-of-staff, and the pair ran the city for six years. Denied Soglin's office after he came down on the "wrong side" of a newspaper strike, he moved to Milwaukee, where Susan had taken a professorship at the UW extension, and began writing for the Milwaukee Journal. In the nineteen-nineties he served as chief-of-staff to the mayor of Milwaukee, and since then has been sought after as a commentator on Wisconsin municipal politics and journalism. 287

Cardinal editor Rena Steinzor left Madison upon receiving her bachelor's degree in 1971. She returned to New York and earned her J.D. from Columbia University in 1976, after which she served as a consumer protection attorney for the Federal Trade Commission. From there she went on to be staff counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives' Energy and Commerce Committee Subcommittee, which has primary jurisdiction over the nation's laws regulating hazardous substances. In 1987, she entered private practice in environmental law. Since 1994 she has been on the faculty of the University of Maryland's School of Law and now directs its Environmental Law Clinic. She is an expert on unfunded mandates, environmental federalism, and the EPA. 288

WSA vice president Margery Tabankin graduated from UW in May, 1970 and returned home to New Jersey for a year with her family. The AMRC bombing shocked her. She remembers:

Clearly we had made AMRC a major point and topic politically. We'd called for the ending of the university's relationship with the government, and I remember very well

287 Maraniss, 511-512.
288 University of Maryland School of Law, "Faculty Bios: Rena I. Steinzor,"
that we targeted AMRC as something specific and local that we could get our hands around. As we participated nationally, this was something we could get our hands around in Madison. So I felt personally incredibly conflicted about the situation because I had participated in what I thought was a really good thing to do, chose an organizing tactic that was close to home, approachable and winnable. When the building was blown up, I felt culpability in having raised the issue, but over the years that's faded as I've realized that people made their choice to act the way they did.

She served as president of the National Students Association from 1971-72, where she continued to raise issues about the war. After her term as NSA president ended, Tabankin remained in Washington, D.C. and worked for the Youth Project, an organization that used foundation monies to make grants to organizations doing community work in low-income areas. She served as the national director of Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA, later AmeriCorps) under President Carter and now resides in California, where she is a member of the Hollywood Women's Democratic Caucus and director of the Barbra Streisand Foundation.289

In November 1971, the Kaleidoscope published its last issue and closed its doors for good. In its place emerged a new underground newspaper, Take Over, edited by Ken Mate.290 Take Over differed from the Kaleidoscope in several ways, the most noticeable of which is Take Over's lack of an opinions and editorials page; it was, in fact, nothing but one big op/ed piece. With this change in format came a change in role, and Take Over made less of an attempt to rekindle action in Madison than it did to report action throughout the world. Its reporters traveled to places like Northern Ireland and Palestine to write about the “people's movements” there. Mate continued to edit underground newspapers, dress the part of the Crazy, and spout the rhetoric of the revolution well into the late nineteen-eighties.291 By that time, most Madisonians saw him as an anachronistic fixture in the city, a throwback to a very different and irrelevant era.292 He eventually moved to Los Angeles, where he won an Emmy™ for investigative journalism, and his contribution to the university's film society was recently featured in On Wisconsin, the UW alumni magazine.293

289 Tabankin interview.
290 Mate, The War at Home.
291 The War at Home.
292 Higgins, Soglin, and Schneider interviews.
Many times, Soglin has told the story of the 1989 New Left Reunion. The occasion was the twentieth anniversary of the Mifflin Street Block Party. Nineteen years after the bombing that changed the face of the Madison anti-war movement, grown-up versions of the same radicals who danced in fogs of tear gas, who fought with police on Dow Day, who wrote for the *Cardinal*, the *Kaleidoscope*, and *Take Over*, gathered again on the Madison campus. The group was two hundred strong, and among their numbers were Karleton Armstrong and David Fine, the planner and the scout, one-half of the New Year's Gang. The festivities lasted for three days and culminated with a lavish dinner in the upstairs dining room of a State Street eatery. As the plates were cleared and the reunion drew to a close, Karleton stood up and asked for his comrades' attention.

“I’ve apologized to a lot of people over the years,” he began, “but I’ve never apologized to the Left, to all of you who had to deal with the aftermath of what I did. What I did was wrong, and I shouldn’t have done it.” The crowd sat for a moment in what Soglin called a comfortable, contemplative silence as Karleton retook his seat among them. Suddenly, Ken Mate jumped out of his seat. “Karleton, you can’t apologize!” he exclaimed. “You’re our hero. You did nothing wrong.” Karleton did not respond. Silence settled again on the group, but this time, Soglin thought, it was uncomfortable and edgy. Most members of the group later acknowledged that Karleton’s apology to his comrades was a brave and appropriate gesture, and many went further to say that they found Ken’s response highly inappropriate. “Talk about the one thing that destroyed the feeling of the crowd that night,” said Soglin.294

Mate’s outburst and the crowd’s response underscore the enduring nature of the crazies’ post-bombing isolation. Before the bombing, radicals considered crazies to be a strange, but important element of the movement. Many might even have said that, while regrettable, violence was necessary to bring about real social change. This sentiment rang clear in Madison and all over the country before the bombing, but everything changed with the Econoline’s explosion. Suddenly the radicals were faced with the realization that even the death of innocents would not bring down the establishment. If they did not change their strategy, more people would die senselessly. Many radicals regretted that they had ever considered or condoned violence, and they eschewed all association with crazies in the hope of assuaging their guilt and regaining a sense of legitimacy for their cause.

By 1989, the radicals felt, Karleton had paid his debt to society. Most would say that he had done time for all of them. His apology, on top of his prison time, gave the now-mainstreamed radicals political and social cover to welcome Karleton back into the fold while shunning the likes of Ken Mate. Mate’s ability to alienate the crowd with the same rhetoric that once flowed like poetry from their own lips shows that radicals’ immediate post-bombing tendency to distance themselves from crazies’ rhetoric remained an equally strong and unanimous reaction nineteen years later.

294 Soglin interview; Bates epilogue; Durhams & Maller, section 5 paragraph 9.
In March, 2004, UW sponsored a panel discussion called "The Tradition of UW Student Protest & the Institutional Response." Paul Soglin, David Tarr, Paul Ginsberg, and Karen Hanson represented the New Left era. The moderator allowed each panelist fifteen minutes to discuss his or her experiences with protest at UW, followed by a Q&A session. Before the moderator could call on anyone, an older woman jumped to her feet and proclaimed:

I was a protestor, I am a protestor, and it's too bad you don't have protestors up there on the dais. Soglin's not a protestor. He's a politician. In 1966 he was on the student government. The Committee for Direct Action wanted to be recognized as a student group. Well, they ask you what you're going to do, and you say, "teach-ins, demonstrations, and other creative actions." They were all in a tizzy, worried terribly about "other creative actions." Soglin defended the right of our committee to be a group by saying, "We don't want to have a Berkeley here."

The overwhelming majority of you are white and male. I want an explanation for the apologia that we've been hearing for the last hour! I tell you that until you can change the people on the stage, you won't have changed anything, and I think that's very, very regrettable. We've learned nothing.

Soglin, hands folded on the table in front of him, listened to this tirade with a bemused smile and an occasional chuckle. When the moderator invited his response, Soglin shook his head and answered:

You are precisely what's wrong in this discussion. You are trying to rewrite history. You are not telling the truth. In 1966, I made observations. I turned to the conservatives in the student government and I told them that the consequences of suppressing free speech and preventing the CDA from being represented would cause another free speech movement. The difference between you and me, Lee Zelbin, is that I have learned something and you have learned nothing.

When people were learning how to fire weapons and talking about violence, it created the ambience that allowed the New Year's Gang to think that when they blew up a building, they had the endorsement of a movement. Well, we were wrong not to speak up against that. We were wrong to draw the line in the sand and say, "If you're not for us, you're against us." I have learned something, and you have learned nothing, and I stand behind my actions.

Zelbin attempted a rejoinder, but was drowned out by thunderous applause. In Madison today the Army Math bombing is an urban legend, part of a countercultural apocrypha with its roots in the collective memory of those who lived those tumultuous years. Though that memory fades, the lessons of Sterling Hall are even more applicable now, in an age of globalization and terrorism. In the nineteen-sixties, the New Left often accused the U.S. government of terrorism. Then four men committed an act of terror in the name of their peaceful cause. The explosion of a truck and the death of an innocent man changed the face of protest across the entire country and taught a generation of protestors to think before they acted. The experience of the New Left has shown the world the truth of Gandhi's motto. We must be the change we wish to see in the world.

---

295 Tradition.
296 Durhams and Maller, section 6 paragraphs 4-5.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are so many people to thank for their role in this project that I cannot possibly name them all, but I would be remiss if I did not express my gratitude to the following individuals:

I am deeply indebted to the Lawrence University Department of History, which has nurtured me as I learned to “do history.” Michael Hittle taught my very first history class at Lawrence. His encouragement and praise of my early work inspired me to greater endeavors. Ed Kern, taught me to see myself first and foremost as a storyteller. For four years he has shared his own work, praised my insights, and listened to my worries. Paul Cohen, chair of the department, counseled me through the rough spots of the first incarnation of this project and remained interested in the second. By arranging for me to present my work in public, he helped me appreciate the power of sharing history. Finally, Jerald Podair has been my academic advisor and mentor at Lawrence for the past five years. He has helped me find my path and never allowed me to get discouraged. He showed great confidence in me by agreeing to sponsor my work, and I hope to have done him proud.

Gretchen Revie, Lawrence reference librarian and research goddess, pointed me in the right direction on my hunt. David Null, head archivist at the University of Wisconsin, made sure that I always had access to the documents that I needed, whenever I needed them, and went the extra mile to provide me with sources. Their excitement over my project fueled my excitement and made the process more enjoyable.

Tom Howe turned me on to the study of history many years ago. In addition, it was he who first told me the story of Sterling Hall in 1998, which incubated in my brain for many years before manifesting itself in this work. Paul Soglin, Jim Rowen, Tim Higgins, Tom Schneider, Margery Tabankin, Karen Hanson, David Tarr, Paul Ginsberg, and Lee Zelbin, in interviews and panel discussions, gave me insight, candor, and laughter. Their time and memories have been invaluable.

And of course, I would be nowhere without my friends and family, who were there with sympathy, praise, and occasionally, a much-needed butt-kicking. Mom taught me how to read analytically and write lyrically; Dad taught me how to argue a point and helped me make valuable contacts; A.J. allowed me to monopolize the computer for research and writing; and my cat, Leo, kept me company during late-night editing sessions.

My comrades in arms, Clare Kelley and Heather Warner edited and critiqued the project in its early stages. In addition to being a helpful editor and faithful friend, Polly Shoemaker listened to my incessant rambling on the subject and remained interested throughout. Jenna Stone kept me sane with humor, puppies, The West Wing, and Ben & Jerry’s. Laura Blegen, Erin Boland, Karina Hunt, Mark Swartz, Andria Helm, Eric Traband, Kendra Whittier, John Enters, Jessy Enters, Margaret Hadley, Heather Greening, Tim Hadley, Carlisle Kraft Webber, Chris Schmidt, and Amber Lucasay all listened to my venting and gave me honest opinions, moral support, e-hugs, feline therapy, and backrubs throughout the lengthy process.

Final appreciation goes to Corey Singletary, who, in addition to being my technical support, motivational guru, and crisis counselor, maintains steadfast faith in me even when I have lost faith in myself.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources


Beal, Dana. "Marijuana War Goes On... And On... And On..." The Daily Cardinal, September 24, 1971, 7.


"Berkeley May Make Peace With the NLF." The Daily Cardinal, December 1, 1970, 8.


---. "Food Strike and Fight: One Side Calls it Failure, the Other Calls it Success." The Badger Herald, May 6, 1971, 1.


Biossat, Bruce. "UW Bombing is Linked to 'New Barbarians.'" The Racine Journal-Times, August 30, 1970.


Bruce, Dix; Pinsley, Elliot; Sloman, Larry; Reutman, Rob; McGilligan, Patrick; and Wolman, Jonathan. “3000 Mass at Capitol, Roving Protestors Skirmish With Police.” The Daily Cardinal, April 20, 1972, 1.


Cooper, Leo, Richenberger, Alfonse; and Soglin, Paul. “Would-be Mayors Discuss the Issues in Own Words.” The Badger Herald, February 2, 1971, 1.


—. “Pros Outnumber Cons at Birth Control Hearing.” The Badger Herald, February 18, 1971, 1.


Duston, Diane; Gans, Bruce; Daniell, Tina; and Svoboda, Ron. “U Budget Debated in Hearing.” The Daily Cardinal, April 2, 1971, 1.


McCann, David W. "We Have Families, Too..." *The Daily Cardinal*, April 5, 1971, 8.


—. "Vietnam Science to be Supported at Local Meeting." *The Daily Cardinal*, May 19, 1971, 2.


“Over University Discipline Role: Regents, Faculty Clash.” The Badger Herald, January 7, 1971, 1.


"The Struggle is Yours!" *The Daily Cardinal*, April 18, 1972, 6.


— "Huey Newton May Speak Here in April, in Madison Church." The Daily Cardinal, March 29, 1971, 1.


— "Non-Resident Enrollment Increase is Seen for Fall." The Daily Cardinal, February 2, 1972, 1.

- "Lawrence Blacks Sit-In." The Daily Cardinal, April 18, 1972, 1.

- "Two Quiet Marches Follow Friday Arrests." The Daily Cardinal, May 16, 1972, 1.


- "Where Do We Go From Here?" The Daily Cardinal, Registration Issue—Fall 1970, 6.


Wisconsin Student Association Student Senate Minutes. University of Wisconsin Archives: University History Project, uncatalogued.


- "Rally on Mall at 1:00 Today, Protests Spread Across the Land." The Daily Cardinal, April 19, 1972, 1.


Secondary Sources


