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# On Multiethnic Schools in Consociational Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Brčko District and Bosnia-Herzegovina

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On Multiethnic Schools in Consociational Democracies:  
A Comparative Analysis of Brčko District and Bosnia-  
Herzegovina

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## **Acronym List**

<b>BiH</b>	<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>
<b>CCC</b>	<b>Common Core Curriculum</b>
<b>DPA</b>	<b>Dayton Peace Agreement (Dayton Peace Accords, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina)</b>
<b>FBiH</b>	<b>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>
<b>GEI</b>	<b>Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research</b>
<b>IEBL</b>	<b>Inter-Entity Boundary Line</b>
<b>IGO</b>	<b>Intergovernmental Organization</b>
<b>INGO</b>	<b>International Non-Governmental Organization</b>
<b>MoCA</b>	<b>Ministry of Civil Affairs</b>
<b>MoE</b>	<b>Ministry of Education</b>
<b>NGS</b>	<b>National Group of Subjects</b>
<b>OHR</b>	<b>Office of the High Representative</b>
<b>OSCE</b>	<b>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to BiH</b>
<b>PDHR</b>	<b>Principal Deputy High Representative (Brčko Supervisor, the Supervisor)</b>
<b>PIC</b>	<b>Peace Implementation Council</b>
<b>RS</b>	<b>Republic of Serbia</b>
<b>SFRY</b>	<b>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</b>
<b>VRS</b>	<b>Army of Republic of Serbia</b>



Map 1: Canton Map of FBiH.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Croats In Bosnia And Herzegovina*. Digital image. *European Parliamentary Research Service Blog*. N.p., 8 Jan. 2014. Web. 28 Apr. 2016.  
<<https://epthinktank.eu/2014/01/08/croats-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/bosnian-croats2/>>.



Map 2: City Map of BiH.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> *Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina political.* Digital Image. *Onestopmap.* N.p. Web. 9 May 2016. < <https://www.onestopmap.com/product/printable-vector-map-bosnia-and-herzegovina-political-65/> >

## Introduction: Fikreta's Story

It's another hot day. Well over a hundred degrees and the air is absolutely stagnant. A small, rickety Volkswagen bus labors its way up the steep foothills surrounding Mostar. The doors on the bus have been pulled open to allow air into the cabin because there's no air conditioning. The destination is Potkosa. It's a tiny village where my mom's aunt and uncle live. Fikreta, my mom's aunt, is a sixth grade history and geography teacher in Stolac, which is another town about fifteen minutes away.

The purpose of the visit is two-fold. For starters, I haven't had a chance to visit them during my field research in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), so it was long overdue to visit some extended family. It is also a chance for me to interview a grade school teacher in an ethnically divided school. So, over Turkish coffee, for the next two hours she explains to me what it means to teach and attend a Two-in-One school, or an ethnically divided school.

Bosnian Croat<sup>3</sup> and Bosniak<sup>4</sup> students will enter the school building through opposite sides, while the teachers and school administrations enter through a joint entrance.<sup>5</sup> The interaction between Bosniak and Croat students is limited to before

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<sup>3</sup> Bosnian Croats are Croatian by descent, but were born in Bosnia. They typically adhere to Catholicism. Going forward I will only refer to them as Croats to identify Bosnian Croats for the purpose of simplicity.

<sup>4</sup> Bosniaks are Bosnian Muslims. This group maintains an ethnic plurality in BiH. Going forward I will only refer to them as Bosniaks to identify Bosnian Muslims for the purpose of simplicity.

<sup>5</sup> Zaklan, Fikreta. "Stolac School Teacher Interview." Personal interview. 17 Aug. 2015.

and after school.<sup>6</sup> Each ethnicity has its own curriculum, textbooks, classrooms, teachers, administrations, lunch periods, recesses, and custodians.<sup>7</sup> “There are two different schools under one roof,”<sup>8</sup> said Fikreta. She clarifies that her school is not the only one that has this particular program, but also that each of the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs<sup>9</sup>) has their own education system with curriculums, textbooks, and teachers.<sup>10</sup>

As we continued talking about the education system in BiH, she became increasingly frustrated with how the political elites have been treating the matter. She explains that “increasingly education has become a political issue and it is the children who are suffering.”<sup>11</sup> When I ask her to explain why education is a political issue, she simply responded with “that’s just the way it is.”<sup>12</sup> Now, I am the kind of person who doesn’t really question people, but I couldn’t leave it at that. For the remainder of our conversation I would try to get her to explain her response, but she felt very content with her answer. She just kept saying, “That’s just the way it is.”<sup>13</sup> Her response left me feeling very uneasy and dissatisfied about the whole interview.

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Bosnian Serbs are Serbian by descent, but were born in Bosnia. They typically adhere to Orthodox Christianity. Going forward I will only refer to them as Serbs to identify Bosnian Serbs for the purpose of simplicity.

<sup>10</sup> Zaklan, Fikreta. "Stolac School Teacher Interview." Personal interview. 17 Aug. 2015.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

After we finished, I gave my great aunt a big hug, a kiss on the cheek, and thanked her for her time. She wished me well and made me promise I would call when I got back to Mostar safely. I headed out the door and into the scorching late afternoon heat to catch the next rickety bus back into town.

Many days passed by until Fikreta's uneasy answer finally settled in my mind. It all came down to thinking critically about how the education systems came to be and why each ethnic group maintains autonomy over their education system. It is the result of a consociational government, or an ethnic power-sharing democracy, created by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). Consociationalism is a form of proportional power-sharing government that emphasizes ethnic autonomy within the greater decentralized federal state.<sup>14</sup> For example, in BiH the state is responsible for matters related to international politics and trade, taxation, and the military.<sup>15</sup> All other responsibilities are reserved for each of the three constituent peoples, so responsibilities like education, police, agriculture, and tourism.<sup>16</sup>

So when I asked Fikreta why education is a political issue and she responded with "that's just the way it is,"<sup>17</sup> she was being very sincere with me. Ethnicity and politics are so closely linked together within a consociational democracy because

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<sup>14</sup> Lijphart, Arend. "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy." *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*. Ed. Andrew Reynolds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.

<sup>15</sup> *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Annex 4, Article 3, Section 1. 30 Nov. 1995. Web. July 2015.  
<[http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA\\_951121\\_DaytonAgreement.pdf](http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf)>.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. Annex 4, Article 3, Section 3, Point A.

<sup>17</sup> Zaklan, Fikreta. "Stolac School Teacher Interview." Personal interview. 17 Aug. 2015.



ethnic groups are the source of sovereignty.<sup>18</sup> In Stolac, and almost all of BiH, there is no unified education system where all students of all groups learn together from a single unbiased textbook and curriculum because there is ethnic autonomy within the state. Naturally, coordination between ethnic groups is encouraged, but is not mandated. If they want to work together they can and if they don't want to then they don't have to.

This is why in the short-term a consociational government has a better likelihood at stopping ethnic conflict because it is more likely for the various ethnic groups to agree on a system where they are able to self-govern. However, consociational governments in the long-term do not promote political moderation, as there are little institutionalized incentives to do so.<sup>19</sup> There are no real incentives for political parties to gain votes outside of their ethnic group.<sup>20</sup> The result is institutionalized extremism and what academics like Valery Perry call, a "frozen conflict."<sup>21</sup>

In the case of BiH, this institutionalized extremism has manifested itself in the country's education system. The political elites have no incentives to unify their

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<sup>18</sup> Ghai, Yash Pal. "Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy." *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*. Ed. Andrew Reynolds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 149. Print.

<sup>19</sup> Hulse, John. "Electoral Accountability in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Framework Agreement." *International Peacekeeping* (2015): 1-16. 30 Oct. 2015. Web. 14 Mar. 2016. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1100081>>.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Perry, Valery. Policy Note 10: *Countering the Cultivation of Extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Case for Comprehensive Education Reform*. Democratization Policy Council, Sep. 2015. 15-16. Web. Jun. 2015. <<http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/DPC%20Policy%20Note%2010%20Extremism%20and%20Education%20in%20BiH.pdf>>

education systems, so they try to make their own education system unique from the others.<sup>22</sup> As a result, the educational content severely diverges when it comes to the national group of subjects (NGS), which includes history, geography, language, and the arts. Every child has a right to an education; they have a right to learn in their own ethnicity's language, and to learn their own ethnicity's courses in the NGS.<sup>23</sup> As a result of the institutionalized autonomy and lack of incentives to gain electoral support across ethnic lines, it makes sense that each group would have their own education system. However, it is interesting that one district in northeastern BiH, Brčko, has a multiethnic education system with a unified curriculum in which all three languages are utilized in the classroom along with the three different ethnically biased textbooks, and students belonging to all ethnicities utilize the classroom together.<sup>24</sup>

The guiding question for this project is: why does Brčko District have multiethnic schools while other parts of the country do not, despite the shared context of a consociational government? The answer lies in a different approach to international intervention that took place in Brčko District and not in the rest of BiH. The international intervention provided a clear and direct mandate of responsibilities that needed to be fulfilled by the international community in Brčko that did not occur anywhere else in BiH. International intervention moderated the political system in Brčko District, which allowed for the creation of multiethnic

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<sup>22</sup> Anonymous. "Employee of Federal Ministry of Education and Science." Personal interview. 13 Jul. 2015.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Anonymous. "Education specialist of large IGO in BiH." Phone interview. 10 Nov. 2015.

schools that pride themselves on the principle of multiperspectivity<sup>25</sup>. The rest of BiH did not experience this type of clear and directed international intervention, so political extremism has become deeply rooted in the voting booth and in the education system. This extremism can be seen in the monoethnic schools, the Two-in-One School program, and the continued election of the four major ethnonational political parties, which will be discussed in greater depth later on.

The following discussion will focus on initially developing a better theoretical understanding of consociationalism, and the importance of a moderate education system. This paper provides an interesting dialogue by bridging the divide between two very relevant fields of academic literature. There has been little work done on how education systems are created in consociational democracies, which is what this project hopes to bring to the table. The theoretical discussion will be used to build a strong foundation for understanding how the theories have manifested themselves within BiH. By understanding the theoretical framework in a complicated political system like Bosnia it will be much easier to understand the importance of this project. The analysis itself will show why a clear and direct mandate issued by the international community was successful in moderating the consociational government in Brčko District. Furthermore, it is also incredibly important to acknowledge other existing claims on the discussion and other possible solutions to the question, which have come about through individual research and other academic research.

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<sup>25</sup> Multiperspectivity is defined in this paper as the process of utilizing a plurality of discrepant viewpoints to achieve a well-informed understanding of any topic.

The discussions on consociationalism and the importance of education for moderation are nothing new to the academic field of post-conflict statebuilding. However, few attempts have been made to bring the two bodies of literature together to see whether and when a consociational democracy can produce a multiethnic education system. This is because inherently it is illogical for multiethnic education systems to exist in consociational democracies. By drawing from two large academic fields the scope of the project is further narrowed into a much smaller and far less discussed field that relates the importance of international intervention in moderating the political and social extremism that develops within the consociational model.

Much of the research that was gathered for this project was from field-research in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the summer of 2015, which was funded by the Senior Experience Mellon Grant from Lawrence University that I was graciously awarded. The field research took me to Mostar, Sarajevo, Potkosa, Stolac, and even Srebrenica. In addition, the grant also helped me get to Germany to visit the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (GEI), which is an international non-governmental organization (INGO) that has helped support, initiate, and monitor many post-conflict textbook reform processes. I had the privilege of gathering research and utilizing BiH textbooks during my time there. In addition, I was able to interview a retired director at GEI, who explicitly worked in Bosnia on education reform. This experience was crucial and invaluable for the completion for this project and for that I am incredibly grateful.

During my time in BiH, I interviewed many high-ranking members of local intergovernmental organizations (IGO), international organizations, civil society groups, and even an interview with a member of the Federal Ministry of Education all helped cultivate very large amounts of crucial information required for this project. An education specialist for a regional IGO, Fikreta, and a local academic researcher were also interviewed to gather much of the information related to education. A local law professor also helped to solidify my understanding of the Dayton Agreement, which proved to be incredibly helpful. Many of these individuals have chosen to remain unnamed, so I am respecting their wishes by not providing that information.

An immense amount of information, interviews, and data was gathered to make this project possible; however, without the help of my project advisor, Ameya Balsekar, none of this would have been possible. His wisdom was clear and ever present, so thank you.

To begin, I want to set the stage and talk about the historical background of former Yugoslavia and how the death of a leader led to the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## **A Brief History**

### ***The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia***

On November 29<sup>th</sup>, 1943, Josip Broz or Tito founded the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).<sup>26</sup> Under his rule Yugoslavism<sup>27</sup> was readily present

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<sup>26</sup> Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. *The Death of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin Books, 1996. 28. Print.

and all ethnonationalism<sup>28</sup> was suppressed. He dictated the country until his death in 1980.<sup>29</sup> Following his death the economy went into a free-fall, which comes with widespread public dissatisfaction for the political system. Additionally, many people demanded individual identity and shied away from Yugoslavism, which paved the way for extreme nationalism in the respective countries that made up the SFRY. As a result, this destabilized the political system with complete collapse in 1991 with the secession of Slovenia and Croatia.<sup>30</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina quickly followed in 1992.<sup>31</sup> Yugoslavia still remained with only Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.

### ***Turmoil in Bosnia and Herzegovina***

In January 1992, Serb politicians in BiH declared a portion of Bosnia as the “Republika Srpska” and voted on a referendum against Bosnia’s independence from Yugoslavia.<sup>32</sup> On April 6<sup>th</sup>, 1992 peace protests in Sarajevo against the conflict were stopped by gunfire from the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), and the Siege of Sarajevo began.<sup>33</sup>

For the next three-and-a-half years a brutal conflict unfolded, which was largely fought between the Bosniaks (Muslims), Croats (Catholics), and the Serbs (Orthodox). After numerous failed attempts at diplomatic negotiations, NATO became involved via concentrated airstrikes in late 1995 and a Bosniak-Croat land

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<sup>27</sup> Yugoslavism is national pride in Yugoslavia or brotherhood in socialist states.

<sup>28</sup> Ethnonationalism is pride in one’s own ethnic identity, which divisive in a state that wants equality and uniformity for all.

<sup>29</sup> Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. *The Death of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin Books, 1996. Print.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 114-130.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 205.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 220.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 222-224.

offensive finally forced the Bosnian Serb forces to concede.<sup>34</sup> This was all not without the loss of over 100,000 people and the displacement of over 2,000,000 people.<sup>35</sup>

### ***The High Representative and Dayton***

Thankfully in November 1995, the U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement by representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro).<sup>36</sup> The purpose of the DPA is to promote peace and stability within BiH. In order to achieve implementation of the DPA, the position of High Representative was created. Their office, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), is responsible for supervising and assisting in the peacebuilding process in BiH. It is “an ad hoc institution overseen by a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) consisting of more than fifty member states.”<sup>37</sup> Initially, it had a very limited scope of powers until 1997<sup>38</sup> when the PIC granted the OHR the “Bonn Powers,” which are “binding powers,” such as the dismissal of politicians<sup>39</sup> and the implementation of legislation<sup>40,41</sup> The OHR is

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 370-380.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 380.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 364-378.

<sup>37</sup> Moore, Adam. *The Localized Dynamics of Peacebuilding*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2013. 53. E-Book.

<sup>38</sup> The powers of the OHR were expanded because the international community wanted to speed up the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Local politicians were blocking attempts by the OHR to implement the Dayton Agreement, so the international community wanted to bypass this issue.

<sup>39</sup> Politicians can be dismissed from their role without due process based on the design of the Bonn Powers, which has been a serious issue of contention within BiH. However, the OHR can also lift the ban on politicians, which has been occurring in recent years.

<sup>40</sup> The Assemblies can be bypassed by the OHR to implement legislation that is consistent with their mission of implementing the Dayton Agreement.

the primary international political presence in BiH, so for the purposes of this paper whenever international community or international intervention is utilized this office is what is being referred to.

In order to get all parties to agree to the terms of the DPA there had to be some level independence since that was really what the conflict was about, independent identity and self-identification. An agreement was made within the DPA called the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL)<sup>42</sup>, which essentially solidified the military fronts to create two autonomous entities within the borders of BiH. Map 1 illustrates the decentralized Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH, the “Bosniak-Croat Federation”), which comprises about 51% of the territory and it is further broken down into ten cantons that maintain almost all governmental and financial responsibilities autonomously (5 Bosniak majority cantons<sup>43</sup>, 3 Croat majority cantons<sup>44</sup>, and two are mixed<sup>45</sup>). The centralized Republic of Serbia (RS, the Serb entity) comprises the other 49% of the territory where the entity government is responsible for most tasks. BiH has one capital city, which is Sarajevo; however, Sarajevo is also the de facto capital of the FBiH as the entity government is there, while Banja Luka is the de facto capital of the RS for the same reason. In the end, one final piece of land remained after the entities were created.

Brčko District, in northeastern Bosnia, was seriously argued over due to its

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<sup>41</sup> Office of the High Representative. *PIC Bonn Conclusions*. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Dec. 2015. <<http://www.ohr.int/en/pic-bonn-conclusions/?lang=en>>.

<sup>42</sup> *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Annex 2. 30 Nov. 1995. Web. July 2015.

<sup>43</sup> Una-Sana (Bihac), Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnia-Podrinje (Gorazde) and Sarajevo

<sup>44</sup> Posavina, West Herzegovina, and Canton 10 (known locally as Hercegbosanska Canton)

<sup>45</sup> Central Bosnia (Travnik) and Herzegovina-Neretva (Mostar)



prime location in the country, as it would conjoin the two halves of RS and the two halves of FBiH. It was agreed in the DPA<sup>46</sup> that Brčko would be placed under the authority of an International Arbitration Tribunal. Their responsibility would be to reach a final decision on the status of the District of Brčko. During that year the international community was tasked with bringing security to the region and when the Tribunal finally did convene, neither side could agree on a final status.

The 1997, Rome Award, established an international supervisory body, which would be led by the Principal Deputy High Representative<sup>47</sup> (Brčko Supervisor, the Supervisor) for one year.<sup>48</sup> The Supervisor was given "binding regulations and orders," which would "prevail as against any conflicting law." Furthermore, the 1998 Supplemental Award explained the justification for the continued international intervention and confirmed the continued supervision by the Supervisor.<sup>49</sup> It also solidified the strength of the Supervisor and gave them power equal to the Bonn Powers, which was awarded the year before<sup>50</sup> to the High Representative.

The Final Award in 1999 established the District of Brčko as a special political unit within BiH. Neither entity would exercise political authority within the

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<sup>46</sup> *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Annex 2, Article 5, Section 1. 30 Nov. 1995. Web. July 2015.

<sup>47</sup> The Principal Deputy High Representative is the second-in-command at the OHR.

<sup>48</sup> *Lessons from Education Reform in Brcko*. Rep. OSCE Mission to BiH Education Department, Oct. 2007. 6. Web. 15 Jan. 2016.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> The Bonn Powers were issued in 1997 and the Supplemental Award was issued in 1998.

District.<sup>51</sup> Brčko District is a jointly administered region by the entities, but remains autonomous much like the cantons of the FBiH. The District's roles, responsibilities, and autonomy have been described as similar to that of Washington D.C. in the United States.<sup>52</sup> The OHR's regime would continue until the District Supervisor notified the Brčko Tribunal that the District's institutions are "permanent."

In the analysis, more detailed information will be discussed on how Brčko District's education system came into existence. In addition, the role and powers of the OHR will be extensively discussed because it will be important to further the point that different kinds of international intervention led to the different education systems. Specifically, a clear and direct international mandate to the OHR Brčko led to moderation of the education system, while no clear direction or mandates were issued for the High Representative to extend to the rest of BiH.

Now that a strong historical base of events has been developed, a theoretical framework can be built upon that base. This will serve as a model for how consociationalism and moderate education theories fit together in the context of BiH.

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<sup>51</sup> *Final Award. Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute Over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brčko Area.* Article 2, Section 6. 5 March 1999. Web. April 2016. <[http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/990305\\_arbiter\\_brcko.html#\\_Toc444751801](http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/990305_arbiter_brcko.html#_Toc444751801)>

<sup>52</sup> Anonymous. "Former high ranking governmental figure for international organization." E-mail. 26 Apr. 2016.

## Theoretical Underpinnings

### *The long and the short of it*

After violent ethnic conflict the short-term goal is peacekeeping. This is achieved through the design of political institutions and electoral systems. Getting the various ethnic groups to agree on something is beneficial to promoting peace in the region. This is why consociational models are typically used and are easier to negotiate, as each group typically wants autonomy after conflict. The long-term goals of statebuilding include stability and reconciliation amongst all people. This can be achieved through the design of local institutions like the education system.

### *Design of consociational governments and the electoral system*

As coined by Arend Lijphart, a consociational democracy is a power-sharing democratic system or a fragmented system that is broken up along lines, such as, ethnic, religious, or linguistic.<sup>53</sup> The system is designed around proportional power-sharing and ethnic autonomy.<sup>54</sup> In order to achieve the proportional sharing of power, Lijphart recommends institutional changes like a proportional representation electoral system, governing coalitions comprised of all major ethnic factions, mutual group vetoes on major political issues and allocation of financial resources, and civil service positions in proportion to ethnic membership in the

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<sup>53</sup> Lijphart, Arend. "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4.1 (1971): 1-14. JSTOR. Web. 1 Oct. 2015.

<sup>54</sup> Lijphart, Arend. "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy." *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*. Ed. Andrew Reynolds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.

country.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, ethnic autonomy can be created through local institutions like separate educational systems (schools, textbooks, curriculums), independent cultural affairs councils, ethnically-based courts with jurisdiction over family or religious laws and language rights policies such as separate broadcast networks for different linguistic communities, or territorially, through the use of ethnofederalism as in the case of Bosnia.<sup>56</sup>

The consociational approach encourages cooperation and coordination between elites representing ethnic parties to achieve any legislation in the assembly because no group has a majority.<sup>57</sup> However, they do not need to do this, as groups are autonomous within the greater state, so they may or may not choose to work together. The whole system rests on the belief that the political elites will work together, which will moderate the political system through their compromises and creation of grand coalitions across ethnic lines. Countries like Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria are all success stories of consociationalism.<sup>58</sup>

However, this system severely struggles if inter-group political parties refuse to work together. It creates debilitating gridlock to the point of governmental shutdown because if groups refuse to work together and no coalitions can be created to achieve a majority rule then no legislation will be passed. Countries like

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<sup>55</sup> Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics* 21.2 (1969): 207-225. *JSTOR*. Web. 3 Apr. 2016. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009820>>.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Hulsey, John. "Electoral Accountability in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Framework Agreement." *International Peacekeeping* (2015): 1-16. 30 Oct. 2015. Web. 14 Mar. 2016. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1100081>>.

<sup>58</sup> Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics* 21.2 (1969): 207-225. *JSTOR*. Web. 3 Apr. 2016. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009820>>.

Cyprus and Nigeria have had to abandon the consociational model because cooperation and moderation could not be achieved.<sup>59</sup>

Now, each of these ethnonational parties believes that they are “best” representing their ethnic group. As Yash Pal Gai explains, “the system creates incentives for parties and their leaders to intensify appeals to narrow ethnic interests, linked to their kinfolk in other states, which does little for the unity of the country.”<sup>60</sup> Simply, the political parties only have incentives to become the most extreme as the proportional representative system guarantees a one-third share of seats in government. If there are fifteen seats available in an assembly and five are reserved for Serbs then the ethnonational parties will only appeal to their ethnicity because they are guaranteed those five seats. From the voter’s point of view, there is no incentive to electing moderate, multiethnic parties because citizens believe that moderate parties will not fight for their ethnicity and individuality like an extremist, ethnonational party might.

According to Hulseley, consociational democracies are constantly evolving because newer, stronger parties replace old, weak ethnonational parties.<sup>61</sup> Since voters are more likely to vote based on how hard that particular party will fight for

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<sup>59</sup> Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics* 21.2 (1969): 207-225. *JSTOR*. Web. 3 Apr. 2016. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009820>>.

<sup>60</sup> Ghai, Yash Pal. "Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy." *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*. Ed. Andrew Reynolds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 149. Print.

<sup>61</sup> Hulseley, John. "Electoral Accountability in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Framework Agreement." *International Peacekeeping* (2015): 1-16. 30 Oct. 2015. Web. 14 Mar. 2016. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1100081>>.

their constituency it makes sense then that they will want fresh, new political parties replacing their old ones.

Political institutions are important in achieving immediate compromise and post-conflict peacekeeping in the short-term. That's why power-sharing democracies are typically implemented post-conflict, which is why consociational governments have been created in countries like BiH, Nigeria, and Cyprus. However, the traditional consociational model does not provide any institutionalized incentives for ethnonational parties to gain support across inter-group parties nor to gain voters outside of their own ethnic groups. The question now is: how can consociational governments achieve long-term stability?

### ***Designing a moderate education system***

Long-term stability and reconciliation between previously warring parties can be achieved through a multiethnic, and multiperspective education system. Educational systems are designed to help socialize children into society; a moderate education system is expected to instill political moderation. This is because if children are learning to celebrate differences rather than to highlight and discriminate against them then the political elites may see more opportunities for compromise and coordination between inter-group parties. In a study by Padilla and Ruiz, they explain that ethnic attitudes are formed early on in a child's development, so whether it is positive or negative prejudices then they will only increase with time.<sup>62</sup> With children being so impressionable it becomes extremely

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<sup>62</sup> Padilla, Amado M., and Rene A. Ruiz. *Latino Mental Health: A Review of Literature*. Rockville: National Institute of Mental Health, 1973. Web. <<http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED088246.pdf>>

important to nurture civic values early on in a child's development.

Education can be used in a constructive fashion and old methods of marginalization of the "other" need to be abandoned. Bush and Saltarelli offer plenty of ways that education can be used positively. They discuss topics like conflict-dampening, desegregation of the mind, linguistic tolerance, cultivating inclusive citizenship, and the disarming of history.<sup>63</sup> These are all tools that can be used to help the education system once again rebuild past relationship, be the source of proper socialization for children, and be the moderating force in a consociational government. These processes can be used to create a positive image of the "other" and create a sense of trust between groups.

Multiperspectivity is another incredibly important idea within the classroom.<sup>64</sup> This technique utilizes a plurality of views and opinions in addressing any topic, so that all sides from the conflict are represented to help foster the open dialogue and reconciliation process.<sup>65</sup> Multiperspectivity is also the process of thinking deeply and critically about all possible viewpoints. K. Peter Fritzsche has explained it as a "development of tolerance...able and willing to regard a situation

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<sup>63</sup> Bush, Kenneth D., and Diana Saltarelli. *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict*. N.p.: United Nations, 2000. *UNICEF-IRC*. Aug. 2000. Web. 7 July 2015. <<http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/insight4.pdf>>.

<sup>64</sup> Perry, Valery. Policy Note 10: *Countering the Cultivation of Extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Case for Comprehensive Education Reform*. Democratization Policy Council, Sep. 2015. 15-16. Web. Jun. 2015. <<http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/DPC%20Policy%20Note%2010%20Extremism%20and%20Education%20in%20BiH.pdf>>

<sup>65</sup> Pingel, Falk. "From Ownership to Intervention – or Vice Versa? Textbook Revision in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Transition and the Politics of History Education in Southeastern Europe*. Ed. Augusta Dimou. Gottingen: V&R unipress, 2009. 285. E-book. <<http://www.gei.de/fileadmin/gei.de/pdf/publikationen/Schriftenreihe/fulltext/SRfulltext124.pdf>>

from different perspectives...[and] a strategy for understanding.”<sup>66</sup> This particular approach in education can help to achieve a plural society that is accepting and tolerant of all views, which is important for all societies as communities are becoming more globalized. By incorporating this technique in the classroom it will offer more ways for students to view their politicians and community leaders, outside of what is being expressed at home, which is crucial in developing critical thinking skills.

Education is invaluable in post-conflict communities because it can be used to help reframe psychological trauma, help rebuild relationships by having all ethnic groups together, help to create a common history and truth, and it can even be used to help socialize children and adults back into the communities “new” value system. These are all incredibly valuable assets that if not promoted through a strong education can lead to what some call a “frozen conflict,” where the violence may have come to a halt and animosity towards one another is still strong.<sup>67</sup> When the system is not fostering a positive outlook on other groups then there can be no further advancement towards sustainable peace.

### ***Tying consociational and educational theory together***

Education is an extremely sensitive topic post-conflict. Especially when

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<sup>66</sup> Fritzsche, K. Peter. "Unable to Be Tolerant?" *Podium-International Tolerance Network* (2000): 4. Web. Dec. 2015.

<sup>67</sup> Perry, Valery. Policy Note 10: *Countering the Cultivation of Extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Case for Comprehensive Education Reform*. Democratization Policy Council, Sep. 2015. 15-16. Web. Jun. 2015. <  
<http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/DPC%20Policy%20Note%2010%20Extremism%20and%20Education%20in%20BiH.pdf>>



education is so closely tied to national identity like history, language, and the arts. As a result, it is very difficult to implement moderate education practices into post-conflict communities. It becomes even more difficult in consociational governments because each ethnic group is guaranteed a high-level of autonomy within the political system. Each ethnic group has a right to have their own autonomous education system under the consociational model. However, if for some reason there is a desire to unify all the different education systems in a country then this is possible through the creation of a grand coalition that must maintain a majority control over the legislature to pass legislation.

So the historical base has been constructed along with theoretical framework that has been developed on top of that base. Now, the two will be merged in the discussion on how the consociational and educational theories have come to fruition in BiH.

# A Look into Bosnia and Herzegovina

## Consociational Design




Figure 1. Levels of Government<sup>68</sup>

The DPA identifies the people of BiH as “Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others).”<sup>69</sup> It is built around the idea of autonomous ethnic communities.<sup>70</sup> When arrangements are made for representation within the government, the ethnic communities are used as the pieces that represent groups.<sup>71</sup> These communities are the municipal level of government, which can be seen in Figure 1. In BiH, the ethnic communities are the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

<sup>68</sup> *Bosnia Levels of Government*. Digital Image. GlobalSecurity.org. Web. 29 April 2016. < [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call\\_98-18\\_figure1.gif](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_98-18_figure1.gif) >

<sup>69</sup> *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Web. July 2015. < [http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA\\_951121\\_DaytonAgreement.pdf](http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf) >.

<sup>70</sup> Ghai, Yash Pal. “Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy.” *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*. Ed. Andrew Reynolds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 149. Print.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the entire political system in both the FBiH and RS. Each ethnic group is equally represented by a one-third proportional representation at the cantonal, entity, and national levels. Each ethnic group is guaranteed a minimum proportional representation at the local or municipal level, which is based on a complicated mathematical formula that combines percentage vote share and the 1991 census results. Each of the three Presidencies between the national, FBiH, and RS have three Presidents that rotate through terms. For a country of four million people, at any given time there are three Presidents and six Vice-Presidents.

Since there is autonomy and no cooperation between each ethnic group, there are a lot of redundancies across all levels of government. For example, there are twelve different Ministries of Education (MoE) and another Education Department in Brčko District. By design, these redundancies are institutionalized to promote ethnic autonomy; however, “it is not sustainable”<sup>72</sup>.

### ***Political parties***

Each of the three ethnic groups in BiH has a dominant ethnonational party that has been consistently winning elections since before the war. The Bosniaks have the SDA. The Croats have the HDZ. The Serbs actually have two, the SDS and SNSD. The SNSD has risen in power over the last ten years, which follows the consociational design of poorly performing parties being replaced by newer, stronger ones. The SDS is the old and poorly performing, but SNSD is the new strong party that will go to more extremes to fight for their constituents. For example,

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<sup>72</sup> Anonymous. “Employee of Federal Ministry of Education and Science.” Personal interview. 13 Jul. 2015.

SNSD leader, Milorad Dodik, has been trying to have the RS secede from the FBiH to join greater Serbia.<sup>73</sup>

### ***Design of educational system***

In the case of Bosnia, when it comes to education there is no national level MoE, so each entity has an entirely different education policy and in the case of the FBiH each canton has its own policy. In the two ethnically mixed cantons<sup>74</sup>, the education policies are further devolved to individual schools and municipalities.<sup>75</sup> Bosniak and Croat majority cantons will press a one-sided monoperspective curriculum much like how the Serb majority, RS, will as well. The FBiH has an entity-level MoE that has no real power, as education is an issue that is left up to the cantons, so it serves only a coordination role between all the cantons.<sup>76</sup> As a result, the country has a total of 12 different MoEs along with a separate Education Department in Brčko and with 13 distinctly separate curriculum (each canton, FBiH, RS, Brčko) for a total of about 167,000 primary school students.<sup>77</sup>

Furthermore, the cantons are allowed to have “special relationships” with other countries, so Croat cantons can have a relationship with Croatia and the same goes for the RS and Serbia.<sup>78</sup> This has been used for the importation of textbooks

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<sup>73</sup> Zuvella, Maja. "Biggest Serb Party in Bosnia Threatens 2018 Secession." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 25 Apr. 2015. Web. 09 May 2016. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-serbs-secession-idUSKBN0NG0NB20150425>>.

<sup>74</sup> Central Bosnia (Travnik) and Herzegovina-Neretva (Mostar)

<sup>75</sup> Anonymous. "Employee of Federal Ministry of Education and Science." Personal interview. 13 Jul. 2015.

<sup>76</sup> Anonymous. "Employee of large IGO in BiH." Personal interview. 28 Jun. 2015.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Anonymous. "Employee of Federal Ministry of Education and Science." Personal interview. 13 Jul. 2015.

from those countries for their respective constituency.

Of the three major ethnic groups, every citizen has a right to learn in their “mother tongue” and to learn “their” constituent people’s NGS education.<sup>79</sup> Well, if each school has an “ethnic flavor” then what happens to the student who is not a part of that constituent group? Well, they can choose to go to a different school where they fit the flavor better or they can choose to be assimilated to that particular flavor. This has become an increasingly important issue with the introduction of religion classes into the public school curriculum. For example, there is an entirely Bosniak school near Stolac and a Serbian boy attends that school because he is in that school district and his family cannot afford to drive him to another school. He is assimilated into the entire school system, except for the theology course. As this is a Bosniak school, Islam is the theology class where students will learn various prayers, how to pray, and how to practice their religion. The boy being an Orthodox Christian sits outside for 45 minutes until the class is over, on a daily basis.<sup>80</sup> Some may say that this is simply an act of respect for the religion, which it could very well be. Although, could the time be better spent? Could the class be more about world religions and learning about all different cultures, as opposed to learning scripture?

Over time there have been some reform efforts that have taken place to consolidate responsibilities, increase coordination, create a standardized

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Anonymous. “Family with several children in Stolac.” Personal interview. 18 Aug. 2015.

curriculum and textbook for the NGS, and to help integrate schools.<sup>81</sup> For example, the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) has a small education agenda that serves as a coordination role between all ten cantons, Brčko District, and the RS.<sup>82</sup> The MoCA has the power to implement legislation across all municipalities, cantons, and entities; however, there is no political support or resources to allow for this to happen.<sup>83</sup>

The Conference of Ministers of Education was designed to help the coordination between all the ministers and so there could be more standardization of textbooks, curriculum, and teacher training across cantons.<sup>84</sup> Then there was the state-level Education Agency that “was established to set basic curricular standards based on learning outcomes”.<sup>85</sup> The GEI created the “Common Core Curriculum,” (CCC) which is a checklist of topics that teachers have to cover for each grade for NGS topics.<sup>86</sup> This is something that has managed to continue existing, as it serves as a syllabus and not a manual on how to teach the material.

There are the numerous civil society organizations who have independently sought to create teacher-training programs, textbook reform initiatives, programs that “bridge the divide” between ethnic groups, before-and-after school programs, and peace education studies. Valery Perry best summed up the state of all these

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<sup>81</sup> Anonymous. “Employee of large IGO in BiH.” Personal interview. 28 Jun. 2015.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Perry, Valery. “The Permanent Interim: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Ongoing Educational Crisis.” *E-International Relations* (2014): n. pag. 24 Dec. 2014. Web. July 2015. <<http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/12/the-permanent-interim-bosnia-and-herzegovinas-ongoing-educational-crisis/>>

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Anonymous. “Retired employee of NGO and worked extensively on education reform in BiH. Responsible for creation of CCC.” Personal Interview. 12 Aug. 2015.

programs when she said, “in the absence of the political will to make such bodies work, not one of these bodies are truly independent, all suffer a lack of resources and, most importantly, enforcement power.”<sup>87</sup> The terrible truth is that “they only work, while they are actively being implemented.”<sup>88</sup> This is important because it shows the reliance on the international intervention in training teachers, changing textbooks, and curriculum, but the problem is that because there has been little support to unify the education systems. Once the international involvement stops then ethnic groups go back to being autonomous, which is entirely permissible under the DPA. However, there is one program that has stood the test of time and has been vigorously enforced by all levels of government.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to BiH (OSCE) was responsible for BiH’s most well-documented program, which was the Two Schools Under One Roof Program (2-1 Schools).<sup>89</sup> The purpose of the program was to help facilitate refugee return in divided communities, such as, Stolac and most of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton as it is a “mixed canton.”<sup>90</sup> The mentality was that even if the students are not in the same classroom or learning the same material then they will at least be in the same building and it is a start to the reconciliation process.<sup>91</sup> It was supposed to be the first step in a much longer

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<sup>87</sup> Perry, Valery. "The Permanent Interim: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Ongoing Educational Crisis." *E-International Relations* (2014): n. pag. 24 Dec. 2014. Web. July 2015. <<http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/12/the-permanent-interim-bosnia-and-herzegovinas-ongoing-educational-crisis/>>

<sup>88</sup> Anonymous. “Retired employee of NGO and worked extensively on education reform in BiH. Responsible for creation of CCC.” Personal Interview. 12 Aug. 2015.

<sup>89</sup> Anonymous. “Employee of large IGO in BiH.” Personal interview. 28 Jun. 2015.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

overhaul of the education system, but the system has continued to linger around with no end in sight. Civil society groups like the Nansen Dialogue Centre (NDC) have created “extra classes” to add between the passing periods of the two ethnic groups, so both groups are together learning about a particular topic like peacebuilding or citizenship. These programs can only do so much until there needs to be a major overhaul of the education system to the extent that classrooms become multiethnic.

Textbooks have also been a well-documented problem in BiH. They have received significant help and many positive reforms have taken place. In 2004, the Minister of Education and Culture of the RS, all the cantonal MoEs, and Education Department of Brčko District adopted the “Guidelines for Writing and Evaluation of History Textbooks for Primary and Secondary Schools in BiH” (The Guidelines).<sup>92</sup> Its goal was to provide everything necessary that a textbook should do for children. It included points like using BiH as a main reference point, having all peoples represented in an impartial manner, having the objective of reconciliation and peace in BiH, and even including a multiperspective approach.<sup>93</sup>

A study published in 2008 by Dr. Heike Karge of the GEI looked at seven different textbooks to see if they were meeting The Guidelines and they were met with varying results. For instance, two textbooks utilized “hate speech” when talking about events related to WW2 and these same two books utilized a “predominantly Serbian history”, while another used Croatia as the main reference point, and

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<sup>92</sup> Anonymous. “Retired employee of NGO and worked extensively on education reform in BiH. Responsible for creation of CCC.” Personal Interview. 12 Aug. 2015.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.



another was using “hidden messages” throughout the text to incite an inflammatory response from readers with opposing viewpoints about historical events.<sup>94</sup> All hope was not lost though as two of the books came close to the standard, while another was also close, but “lacked consistency”. The problem of importing textbooks from Croatia or Serbia has been a noted issue because those texts will naturally use their host country as the focal point, even though it is permissible under Dayton.

### ***The Unique Case of Brčko***

Following the arbitration process, Brčko District started the multiethnic unification of its schools in 2001.<sup>95</sup> The integration process was completed in 2004 when all schools in Brčko District became multiethnic. This meant that going forward all schools would be multiethnic and would have a diverse group of students and teachers from all the constituent peoples teaching and learning together. What are the implications? Simply put, Brčko has the only multiperspective curriculum, multiethnic classrooms, and moderate educational system in all of BiH.

The teachers will lecture in all three national languages, and they use at least three different textbooks to present a multiplicity of perspectives to their students.<sup>96</sup> This is all regardless of the demographics of the classroom, so if there

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<sup>94</sup> Karge, Heike. *20th Century History in the Textbooks of Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Analysis of Books Used for the Final Grades of Primary School*. Georg Eckert Institute. Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Apr. 2008. Web. June 2015. <[http://www.gei.de/fileadmin/gei.de/pdf/abteilungen/schulbuch\\_und\\_gesellschaft/Suedosteuropa/BiH\\_Schulbuchanalyse\\_Englisch.pdf](http://www.gei.de/fileadmin/gei.de/pdf/abteilungen/schulbuch_und_gesellschaft/Suedosteuropa/BiH_Schulbuchanalyse_Englisch.pdf)>.

<sup>95</sup> Moore, Adam. *The Localized Dynamics of Peacebuilding*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2013. E-Book.

<sup>96</sup> Anonymous. “Education specialist of large IGO in BiH.” Phone interview. 10 Nov. 2015.

are no Serb students in the class then the teacher will still lecture in Serbian along with Bosnian and Croatian. Additionally, there is still a theology course much like the rest of the country, but at the end of each academic year the parents have the option to select what class their child will take.<sup>97</sup> For instance, a Catholic family could select an Orthodoxy course for their child. The OSCE has also created a peacebuilding and citizenship course that can be taken in place of the theology courses, which a lot of students have been taking.<sup>98</sup>

Now the entire foundation has been constructed from the discussions on the theoretical underpinnings of consociationalism and education theory along with how those theories have manifest themselves within BiH. Additionally, the historical timeline is important to understand the sequencing of how everything occurred in BiH. The following will solidify the question of: why does Brčko District have multiethnic schools while other parts of the country do not, despite the shared context of a consociational government?

## **Answers to the Guiding Question**

### ***How did Brčko's education system come to be?***

The role of the international community in the first years after Dayton was reconstruction and peacekeeping. The education reform efforts were largely left to civil society groups. An annex to the 1999 Final Award quickly changed that role. It mandated that:

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

"...the Supervisor will integrate the District's educational system, harmonise curricula within the District, and ensure the removal of teaching material which the Supervisor considers to be inconsistent with the objective of creating a democratic, multi-ethnic society within the District."<sup>99</sup>

This clear and direct mandate issued by the international community is what has set Brčko District's long-term stability on a more effective path than the unclear and lack of mandates for the rest of BiH. This is because education is only mentioned in the Dayton Agreement in the context of education being a right of every citizen. Outside of that there has been no direction given to the OHR except for making sure that Dayton is successfully implemented. If by those standards then Dayton has been successfully implemented.

Furthermore, the Final Award went on to sanction the formation of the Brčko Law Review Commission, which sought to revise existing legislation to unify the existing educational systems together.<sup>100</sup> Between 1999-2001, the commission drafted 40 laws, by-laws, and regulations.<sup>101</sup> One of which was the Law on Education, which effectively lays down a platform for integrating the schools.<sup>102</sup>

The Law on Education was not well received by the students, their families, and the community. Serb students and adults reacted violently against the Bosniaks

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<sup>99</sup> *Annex to Brčko Final Award. Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brčko Area. 18 Aug. 1999. Web. April 2016. <  
[http://www.ohr.int/?ohr\\_archive=annex-to-brcko-final-award&lang=en&print=pdf](http://www.ohr.int/?ohr_archive=annex-to-brcko-final-award&lang=en&print=pdf)>.*

<sup>100</sup> *Lessons from Education Reform in Brčko.* Rep. OSCE Mission to BiH Education Department, Oct. 2007. 7. Web. 15 Jan. 2016.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

because of this.<sup>103</sup> Thousands of Serb students took to the streets to demand that the schools be separated, while the Bosniaks demanded increased security.<sup>104</sup> It even saw 13 Bosnian Serb delegates walk out of the Assembly during the voting,<sup>105</sup> which can be expected because each ethnic group is entitled to a vast amount of autonomy within the consociational system. However, the Supervisor exercised his power to impose the law because it was consistent with the mandate by the international community to integrate the school system. Both the Law on education and the newly developed curriculum were signed into effect on July 5, 2001.<sup>106</sup>

### **What happened in the rest of BiH?**

It is important to understand that there has been international intervention in the rest of BiH, but not as aggressive as it has been in Brčko District. Earlier the international intervention in the education system in BiH was explained with the role of the OSCE, the creation of the Guidelines for textbooks and curriculum, and the creation of various councils to help increase the coordination between all the different Ministers of Education.

Additionally, the OHR in Sarajevo extensively utilized their powers in the beginning, but recently they have been utilizing their powers less and less. Between 1998-2004 there were 139 different politicians who were dismissed from public

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<sup>103</sup> Arnaut, Almir. "Bosnian Serb Students Protest Muslim Presence in Brčko." *Amarillo Globe-News*. N.p., 19 Oct. 2000. Web. 09 May 2016. <[http://amarillo.com/stories/2000/10/19/usn\\_serb.shtml#.VzB7xRUrKRs](http://amarillo.com/stories/2000/10/19/usn_serb.shtml#.VzB7xRUrKRs)>.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> *Lessons from Education Reform in Brcko*. Rep. OSCE Mission to BiH Education Department, Oct. 2007. 7. Web. 15 Jan. 2016.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

office.<sup>107</sup> There were 21 dismissed in 2002 and 7 in 2003, which is a sizeable decrease in the dismissal of politicians.<sup>108</sup> Additionally, between 1997-2004 there were 67 laws imposed, but in 2002 only 28 laws were imposed and half as many in 2003.<sup>109</sup> This pattern is consistent with the OHR's philosophy of creating more "ownership" from the local population.<sup>110</sup> The international community believes that the locals have no sense of ownership over their government if laws and politicians are being imposed or dismissed. As a result, a more "hands-off" approach has been taken over the recent years by the OHR for the rest of BiH.

### **Why are the education systems different?**

The difference between Brčko District and the rest of BiH is that the international community provided a clear mandate (the Final Award and its Annexes) for the Supervisor to follow and execute. To achieve this mandate, things like the unification of the law occurred in order to achieve a unified education system. The OHR in Sarajevo did not have any clear mandate outside of making sure the Dayton Agreement was being effectively implemented, which did not give any clear direction of responsibilities, or mandates. As a result, fruitless attempts have been made with the existing institutions to unify the curriculum, textbooks, and subsequent education system, which have no incentives to unify their education systems. In Brčko, the Supervisor bypassed the Assembly to impose the unification

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<sup>107</sup> Shakhtakhtinskaya, Naira, and Laszlo Surjan. *Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Issue brief no. 10200. Council of Europe. 2004. Web. < <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=10559&lang=en> >

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

of the education system because the mandate that was given required this to happen and was legally binding.

## **Competing Solutions**

### **What are other possible explanations for the different education systems?**

Going forward the purpose of the following section is to show other possible arguments for the reason that Brčko District has a different education system compared to the rest of BiH.

#### ***Different levels of Yugoslavism***

To revisit the terminology that was introduced earlier on that Yugoslavism is the strong anti-ethnonational support. More simply, it is citizen's belief in the former communist system. This is what academics like Adam Moore believe is the reason why Brčko District's education system is moderate, multiethnic compared to the rest of BiH.

SDP (moderate, multiethnic political party) grew out of the former communist party, SKBiH-SDP. Since SDP has been consistently gaining a plurality of votes in Brčko District municipal elections and the particularly high levels of Yugoslavism, then Brčko District has a moderate, multiethnic education system due to more widespread social moderation.

The idea behind Moore's argument is that if before the war there was strong Yugoslavism, so strong support for SDP, and then it is more likely that a moderate political system will emerge in those areas with the highest levels of pre-war Yugoslavism. If SDP is likely to win in an area as a moderate party then they can help to create multiethnic schools.

According to the 1991 census,<sup>111</sup> 6.54% of citizens in Brčko District identified themselves as Yugoslavs.<sup>112</sup> In the 2012 municipal elections, SDP gained a plurality of votes with a 15.41% vote share.<sup>113</sup> In addition to high levels of Yugoslavism and a plurality election of SDP, Brčko District has multiethnic schools.

However, according to the 1991 census, 16.71% of citizens in Tuzla identified themselves as Yugoslavs.<sup>114</sup> In the 2012 municipal elections, SDP gained a plurality of votes with a resounding 30.72% vote share.<sup>115</sup> Compared to Brčko District, Tuzla has a much higher level of pre-war Yugoslavism and SDP has gained a large plurality of votes, but Tuzla has monoethnic schools. As a result, the presence of pre-war Yugoslavism and a moderate political party like SDP gaining a plurality of votes do not appear to have a large effect on the presence of a moderate education system.

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<sup>111</sup> The last recorded census in BiH was in 1991. There was one conducted in 2013, but the results have yet to be published due to disagreements amongst ethnic parties on how to count particular residences.

<sup>112</sup> Ethnic Characteristics of the Population. Oct. 1993. Raw data. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.  
<<http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/Etnicka%20obiljezja%20stanovnistva%20bilten%20233.pdf>>

<sup>113</sup> 2012 Municipal Elections. Nov. 2012. Raw data. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.  
<[http://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati/RezultatiPotvrđjeni/files/Lista\\_opstina\\_trka\\_9.html](http://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati/RezultatiPotvrđjeni/files/Lista_opstina_trka_9.html)>

<sup>114</sup> Ethnic Characteristics of the Population. Oct. 1993. Raw data. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.  
<<http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/Etnicka%20obiljezja%20stanovnistva%20bilten%20233.pdf>>

<sup>115</sup> 2012 Municipal Elections. Nov. 2012. Raw data. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.  
<[http://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati/RezultatiPotvrđjeni/files/Lista\\_opstina\\_trka\\_9.html](http://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati/RezultatiPotvrđjeni/files/Lista_opstina_trka_9.html)>

### ***Different institutional designs***

Moore argues that the design of local institutions in Mostar (severely ethnically divided community in the HNK canton) and Brčko District have resulted in different peacebuilding outcomes.<sup>116</sup> He argues that the institutional framework in Mostar solidified ethnic divisions, while the integrative model designed in Brčko District has been more effective in mitigating conflict and attaining a multiethnic government.<sup>117</sup> Moore explains that the international community intervened in Mostar to try and mediate negotiations by creating six different municipalities within Mostar, but it ended up creating an even more divisive consociational government than the rest of BiH.<sup>118</sup> The difference between the institutional design of Brčko District and Mostar is that Mostar is divided into six smaller municipalities, while Brčko is one large municipality. They both maintain a consociational government that prides itself in proportional representation and power-sharing.

The OHR was heavily involved in the creation of institutions within Mostar much like in Brčko District; however, there were no clear or direct mandates that were created to direct the peacebuilding processes of the OHR in Mostar like there was in Brčko. There was heavy involvement by the OHR and the international community in Mostar, Brčko District, and all of BiH. The reason why Brčko District was able to achieve multiethnic schools is because the OHR had a clear and direct mandate that they were legally obliged to follow unlike the rest of BiH.

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<sup>116</sup> Moore, Adam. *The Localized Dynamics of Peacebuilding*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2013. E-Book.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid*, 57.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid*, 57-64.



### ***Different financial influences***

Moore posits the argument that different financial resources affected the peacebuilding efforts between Brčko District and the rest of BiH. However, Moore does a great job of explaining that this is not the case. Moore explains that the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, in 2006 estimated that “Bosnia had received \$16 billion in aid since the end of the war. He calculated Brčko’s share to be only \$70 million while Mostar had received an estimated \$300–\$400 million.”<sup>119</sup>

It was not the amount that Brčko District received, but how they received those funds and how they were utilized. The funds were used in many ways one of which was to implement a moderate and multiethnic education system.

### ***The ethnic breakdown of Brčko***

Another possible answer as to why Brčko District has a moderate education system and the rest of BiH does not is because certain ethnic groups have better reconciled their differences. Perhaps the larger population of Bosniaks in Brčko District could be the reason why they have been able to succeed in creating a moderate education system, while Croats and Serbs have not been able to. It’s an interesting idea that is based on the principle that particular ethnic groups are more extreme than others, which is why the rest of the country is being held back. Perhaps for the fear of losing power if the consociational, power-sharing model were to be abandoned. However, this idea also proves to be a mistake.

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid, 5.

According to the census conducted in 1991<sup>120</sup>, the ethnic breakdown of Brčko District was Bosniaks (44.07%), Serbs (20.69%), Croats (25.39%), and rest is comprised of smaller ethnic groups ranging from Montenegrins to Italians. Compare that ethnic breakdown to another municipality in BiH like Tuzla and it will quickly become apparent that this idea is not the answer. Tuzla was composed of Bosniaks (47.61%), Serbs (15.40%), Croats (15.50%), and the rest like Brčko is also composed of many smaller ethnic groups. Clearly, the ethnic breakdown in Tuzla is very similar to that of Brčko District, but Tuzla still has monoethnic schools. This is important to understand because it again shows that it is probably not likely due to certain groups being more moderate than others.

## **Conclusion**

In summary, this paper opens by highlighting the vast history associated with the topic to show a strong understanding of the necessary information required to speak about a complicated topic. The powers of the OHR and how Brčko came to be were very diligently discussed. Then the discussion broadened into the literature on consociationalism and the importance of moderate education systems. This serves the purpose of developing a better understanding of the political theories associated with the topic, so topics can be discussed later on in the paper. For example, the discussion on the theory opens into a discussion of how the theory actually works in BiH.

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<sup>120</sup> Since there was a large amount of displacement during the war, this could be particularly difficult to test. However, once the newest census is released then the results will be updated to reflect that new ethnic breakdown.

Lastly, the paper shows why a clear and directed mandate issued by the international community is able to manifest itself into a multiethnic and moderate education system. Then the opposing arguments are discussed to show their relevance to the academic field and how they could certainly be plausible, but are nowhere near as likely as this thesis.

To echo the words of Fikreta, “that’s just the way it is,”<sup>121</sup> as they guided us into the discussion by showing that monoethnic education systems are simply commonplace in the consociational model; however, it is important to understand that they don’t have to be. We have just seen that if the international community really takes a strong hold of the peacebuilding and statebuilding processes then very positive outcomes can develop.

## **Epilogue**

In 2012, OHR suspended their supervisory powers in Brčko District and now serve in an advisory capacity. All the institutions that were created through their involvement still exist and a mass exodus has not happened. More importantly, multiethnic schools still exist in Brčko. This is important because it shows that the consociational government that exists in Brčko has been moderated by the international intervention. Their intervention allowed for the creation of all these wonderful institutions, which still exist after they left. A purely consociational government, like the rest of BiH, cannot exist in moderation because there are no incentives to do so; however, with the help of the international community it can.

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<sup>121</sup> Zaklan, Fikreta. "Stolac School Teacher Interview." Personal interview. 17 Aug. 2015.




Figure 2. Attitudes to Dayton, by ethnicity, 2005-2015<sup>122</sup>

Looking forward, the citizens of BiH are not happy with their current government and are not happy with Dayton, which can be seen in Figure 2. The citizens feel as though “Dayton was necessary to end the war but now BiH needs a new constitution to prepare for the EU”<sup>123</sup>. Something has got to give in BiH because there is rampant unemployment, the youth are leaving the country, and the economy is stagnant. Even if it is for selfish reasons to save one’s *own* group, but the country and people will continue to suffer if something does not change.

<sup>122</sup> Maraniss, David, and Robert Samuels. "20 Years after Dayton, Here's What Bosnians Think about Being Divided by Ethnicity." *Washington Post*. The Washington Post, 2 Feb. 2016. Web. 18 Mar. 2016.  
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/02/20-years-after-dayton-heres-what-bosnians-think-about-being-divided-by-ethnicity/>.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

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