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The Passage of the Volstead Act: A Study of the Legislative Process

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THE PASSAGE OF THE VOLSTEAD ACT:
A STUDY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

by

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A Thesis Submitted in Candidacy for Honors
at Graduation from Lawrence College
June, 1962

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INTRODUCTION

In the past decade there have been numerous attempts to make a science of the study of politics. These attempts have largely consisted of creating theoretical models which purport to epitomize the nature of politics, and, hopefully, to utter non-obvious deductions that can be empirically verified. Several of these models have been partially successful in their purpose and today the student of politics has available to him a number of reliable models which he may use to comprehend the nature of a particular political situation. This scientific approach to the study of politics is still in its infancy, however, and thus the student of politics is often faced with a particular situation which does not conform to any of the theoretical models available to him. Such was the case in the historical situation that I studied. Hence, the primary purpose of this paper is to explain this historical situation in terms of a theoretical model that I have devised, a model that explains the particular phenomenon in this situation better than any other existent model. Although instances of the phenomenon that I am concerned with are seldom seen in the realm of politics, yet I suggest that this model is applicable to all political situations which meet the requirements that I have stipulated in my model. And the rare,

phenomenon of this type are of overwhelming significance when they do occur.

Thus this paper will have a twofold purpose. It will be an empirical study of a particular political situation--namely the passage of the Volstead Act in 1919; and it will present a theoretical model which purports to explain the nature of a particular political phenomenon--namely the concept of the passionate majority. By this paper I hope to make a contribution, however small it may be, to the study of politics.

A MODEL

In the politics of a democratic society a situation may arise in which one particular issue transcends the traditional boundaries of the system and in which a substantial majority of the voters espouse one side of the issue. Such a situation may be defined as one in which a passionate majority exists. Given this situation the student of politics faces the problem of accommodating this concept to contemporary theories of political behavior. My theoretical model will attempt to relate the concept of the passionate majority to models of coalition-building which have not heretofore had room in them for very large coalitions. In this model I will not speculate about historical and sociological origins of the passionate majority; instead I will simply accept the origins as given in order to concentrate on the problem of defining the position of the passionate majority in a democratic society.

In beginning this model I must first briefly describe the nature of the process of coalition-formation. Imagine a decision-making body composed of seven members^s (For our purposes these seven members may be seven persons, seven n-person groups, or any combination of individuals and groups.) Each member of the body has one vote and these seven votes are equivalent--that is to say no~~z~~ individual vote counts any "more" in the decision-making process than any other. All decisions in the body are made by a simple majority vote--any proposal which can obtain the affirmative vote of at least four members is

passed and any proposal is allowed. (Including a motion to kill the losers or a motion to establish a constitution which prohibits killing any of the members of the body.) Since we have assumed that each of the seven votes of the members of the body is equivalent we will further assume that the majority can coerce the minority into agreement on any motion which they (the majority) pass. Also, it will be assumed to be impossible for any member to resign from the body.

In order for a proposal to be enacted it must pass two requirements of form: 1) it must be guided by a leader (leadership will be defined as the ability to influence voters to adopt certain views as expressing their own will--thus leaders are voters who influence other voters,)¹ whose leadership may be merely that he introduced the bill, or that he used his position to actively influence voters with some type of bribe or side-payment (which will be defined later), and 2) this leader must gain a sufficient body of followers in order to enact the proposal. In the operation of our body, then, any one of the seven members (A,B,C,D,E,F,G) may make a proposal P. Let us say that voter A has made proposal P. Assuming that A desires this proposal to pass (e.g. it is not a part of a legislative strategy in which he is merely trying to block the passage of another proposal P' etc.) he must approach at least three other members of the body in order to form a coalition. (A coalition will be defined as a body which has the capacity to win. In terms of

¹Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957), p. 87

my model, then, a coalition must have at least four members [the minimum requirement for the passage of a proposal]. Anything less than a coalition will be termed a proto-coalition. By definition, then, a coalition may be composed of several proto-coalitions which have merged in order to win; however, a proto-coalition may never be a coalition. A proto-coalition may be composed of one, two, or three members. For the sake of simplicity we will require that every member of our body vote on each proposal and thus if we represent a coalition as X and proto-coalition(s) as Y then $X \neq Y = 7$.) Once A has made his proposal P each of the members of the body has two alternatives--he may support A's proposal or reject it (possibly by proposing an alternative proposal P' or by amending A's proposal). Member A then has two alternatives. He may accept the initial decisions of the members of the body (if A sees that he can form a coalition he will stop here). Or, if A believes that his proposal might fail, he may try to influence a sufficient number of voters through means of bribes or side-payments.

A side-payment will be defined as any thing of value (e.g. material value such as a vote or a sum of money or non-material value such as prestige) which one voter (A) can transmit to another voter (B) in hope that the receiver (B) will join with (A) in supporting P. Thus a side-payment is made when member A offers member B \$10.00 if he (B) will vote for A's motion. Or, a side-payment is made if B agrees to vote for A's motion if A will support another motion which B intends to propose at some future time (log rolling).

Having introduced the central notions of coalition-formation, we must now define the various possible types of leaders and side-payments made to prospective followers. There are three basic types of political leaders: political parties, favor buyers, and interest groups. A political party will be defined as a body of voters who vote together over an extended period of time (that is to say a political party is not the product of a particular issue)^{in order to win or keep something which} might possibly be lost to another similar body. Even though the individual motives of the party members may vary (e.g. power, prestige, the "thrill of the game"), yet the total motivation of the party is the immediate gain, envisioned by party members, from being able to form a coalition and thereby to win something of value.

A favor buyer will be defined as a particular voter who promotes a particular proposal in the political sphere because he expects immediate gain from the enactment of that proposal. A favor buyer differs from a political party in two respects: 1) a favor buyer is an individual seeking profit as opposed to a group seeking profit in a political party, and 2) a favor buyer promotes a single proposal for acceptance whereas a political party promotes a body of proposals (called an ideology). Thus a favor buyer is by definition a proto-coalition and in himself alone lacks the capacity to become a coalition. He may, however, by the use of bribes or side-payments influence a sufficient number of voters to enact his proposal.

An interest group will be defined as an organized body of voters who promote a particular proposal in the political sphere of which they are members. The motivation of an interest group is, again, envisioned

immediate gain from the successful enactment of the proposal they desire. The interest group differs from the favor-buyer only in the fact that the favor-buyer is one person while the interest group is an organized body. The interest group differs from a political party in that the group is concerned with only one (or with only a narrow range) of proposals while the political party is concerned with winning on a wide range of proposals.

Let us now return to our seven member body and examine the possibilities which arise from our definition of these three types of political leaders. There are 5,040 possible ways in which the seven members of our body can arrange themselves on any given issue ($7! = 5,040$). By far the greatest majority of these possible arrangements, however, are minor permutations of the seven members and are not of particular interest to us. The questionable permutations are those which involve the merging of the different types of possibilities of leadership. Let us imagine that the seven members of our body are arranged as follows: an interest group is composed of members A, B, and C who desire the enactment of proposal SIGMA; a favor buyer D desires the enactment of a quite unrelated proposal EPSILON; and a political party composed of members E, F, and G desires the enactment of proposals PHI and OMEGA. Given this situation we have three proto-coalitions but nothing will be passed since we have no coalition. Now let us further suppose that the members of the interest group (A, B, and C) approach the favor buyer (D) and the four agree to vote together and that all the desires of the two proto-coalitions (SIGMA and EPSILON) be enacted. This is

agreed to by the favor buyer and the bargain is completed. The question then arises: has the favor buyer formed a coalition and thus violated our previous definition of a favor buyer (i.e., a particular voter who promotes a particular proposal), and, since the interest group has widened its appeal (two proposals) is its definition destroyed (i.e., a group promoting a particular proposal)? The answer to this is ~~negative~~ since by joining the interest group the favor buyer has lost his identity as a favor buyer and becomes a member of an interest group. Also, this new body has become a political party since it is now promoting unrelated issues--SIGMA and EPSILON. Thus our body now has two political parties, one composed of members A, B, C, and D who are promoting proposals SIGMA and EPSILON and one composed of members E, F, and G who are promoting proposals PHI and OMEGA. Of these two parties one (A, B, C, and D) is a coalition and the other (E, F, and G) is a proto-coalition. (This illustration raises the question of how a favor buyer as such can ever pass his proposal. The answer is that a favor buyer may get a proposal passed if the coalition is composed of at least four members--at least three of whom are voting independently [as opposed to the organized voters in an interest group or political party] for this proposal because they have been bribed to do so by a favor buyer, who forms the final member of the coalition.)

There are also three basic types of side-payments or bribes which a political leader may use in his attempt to form a coalition: payments coming from prospective gain, payments out of working capital, and

payments made from fixed assets.² The first type of bribe, payments out of prospective gain, are promises which a political leader offers which can be realized only upon the successful formation of his proposed coalition. Such offers are costless in the event that the coalition does not form. These bribes are very common in democratic societies and include promises of jobs, tax advantages, direct monetary payments, etc. which can be realized if the leader's proposal is enacted. Thus leader A approaches voter B and offers him a job (which will result if his proposal is passed) if he (B) will vote with him (A). Or, leader A promises voter E that if E votes for the proposal and if the proposal passes then A will ensure E some tax benefit from the new proposal.

The second type of side-payments, those payments made from working capital, are certain cost payments which must be made by the leader win or lose. These, too, are common types of bribes used in coalition-formation and included under this heading are payments ranging from financial aid in elections to picking up the bar tab of prospective followers. Thus leader C approaches voter D and offers to give him a campaign contribution in exchange for which D is expected to support C's proposal. Or, leader C gives a party and invites voters E, A, and F hoping that this gesture will encourage them to think that he (C) is a "good Joe" and thus will support his proposal. Or, leader A promises voter C that he (A) will give C \$100.00 if C will support A's proposal.

The third type of side-payments used in coalition formation are

² William H. Riker, A Theory of Political Coalitions, (New Haven, 1962), Forthcoming

those payments made from fixed assets. This type of payment involves a total gamble of success on the part of the leader and hence this type of bribe is seldom seen in the political world. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this type of bribe can be seen in the life of Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi, from the age of about 30, clearly desired to become a saint in the eyes of the Indians people while politically he sought Indian independence. His every action from this time shows his rejection of physical comfort and pleasure (e.g. his inner struggle as to whether or not he could morally condone having sexual relations with his wife) in his fanatical drive for a free India. In this drive Gandhi would fast for days until some concession would be granted to him (interestly enough those fasts were usually directed toward the Hindus rather than the British). Gandhi gambled his fixed assets (his very life) to achieve a coalition (a free India).

Given these possibilities for leaders and side-payments in coalition-formation the task remains to ascertain which of these choices is best suited for situations involving a passionate majority. I have asserted that the politics of a democratic society allows three basic types of leaders: political parties, favor buyers, and interest groups. I would suggest that political parties are not well suited as the primary leaders in situations involving a passionate majority. My reasoning in this respect is as follows: political parties are organized to win something--namely, that which their opponents possess or have the possibility of possessing. Since a passionate majority transcends traditional political boundaries, its program is espoused by a substantial

majority of the members of all political parties; hence a political party lacks the conflict which characterizes its existence--that is to say it has little or nothing to win since all voters will be satisfied (will win) if the issue at hand passes. Thus I would eliminate political parties as the primary leaders in situations involving passionate majorities.

Let us now return to our hypothetical body and describe such a situation. There is a proposal P which is desired by all seven members of the body. Let us suppose that P states that all members will receive some value V. In the body we have a political party composed of members A, B, and C; an unattached voter, D; ^{and} another political party composed of members E, F, and G. The question then is who is to assume leadership in this proposal and attempt to pass P. I suggest that no one of the political parties has a special reason for trying to get the vote of member D and form a coalition. Each member of the body wins V no matter who is in the coalition and thus there is no unique reason for either party to bribe member D and attempt to form a coalition. In fact, since a bribe will most likely be offered to D to obtain his vote and since the rewards of P are equitable among all members there is a common sense reason why no party will want to form a coalition--each party would rather sit back and hope that the other party formed the required coalition. Neither party wishes to pay the cost of coalition-formation.

I would also eliminate favor buyers as leaders in situations involving passionate majorities. Favor buyers are particular voters

espousing particular issues in order to receive immediate gain from the enactment of their goals. In the case of a passionate majority we are by definition dealing with the desires of a substantial percentage of the voters in a given society and thus the benefits therefrom involve much more than the desires and rewards of a particular favor buyer. (Also, I believe this reasoning to be self-explanatory and thus I will not demonstrate this in terms of our hypothetical body.)

The remaining type of leader I have considered is the interest group and this, I would suggest, is the logical leader in situations involving passionate majorities. By definition the interest group allows a body of voters to promote a particular proposal. A passionate majority is concerned with just this--a body of persons who desire a particular entity. At this point one might inquire as to the unique motivation of an interest group in such situations. This motivation stems from the fact that the passage of the issue at hand is the primary concern of these voters. While the issue is one of the many desires of the members of political parties, to the voters of interest groups it is the only issue. These voters espouse the issue more passionately than others. Hence, this is the logical (perhaps the only) origin of leadership in situations involving passionate majorities.

In terms of our hypothetical body this is easily demonstrated. No matter how the members of the body are originally constituted it is an easy matter for at least four, and perhaps all seven, of them to unite on this particular issue. In the case of a passionate majority it will be unnecessary for any bribes to be used since the majority

exists by definition. It is only necessary for a proposal to be made and a vote to be taken--everyone benefits and thus the proposal will be passed with little effort.

However, what if the situation arises in which a vote is desired before the passionate majority has matured and thus the danger exists that the proposal might fail. This is possible in a democracy, especially since not everyone votes on all issues. Or, what happens if the small minority in such a situation actively oppose the possible majority and try to obstruct the voting process in some way that creates the danger that the proposal might fail? In these cases side-payments may be utilized and thus we must consider the place of bribes in a situation involving a passionate majority.

I suggest that all three types of side-payments I have suggested are possible in situations involving passionate majorities. Interest groups are usually in possession of financial resources and thus the first two types of bribes (payments out of working capital and payments coming from prospective gain) may be utilized. Although the third type of bribe (payments made from fixed capital) is unlikely (seldom is such a total gamble involved in any issue). In any case this possibility should not be excluded in considering passionate majority situations.

In order to understand the nature of the passionate majority as it exists in the American democratic system this paper will now trace the history of one particular bill. It will take into account the issue, the decision-making process, and the final accounting of the Volstead Act of 1919. To my knowledge the prohibition movement is one

of the best examples of instances in the history of the United States when passionate majorities have existed. Passionate majority situations are involved in the adoption of most Amendments to the Constitution. (They are also common in the simple procedural requirements of extraordinary majorities both to propose and pass certain types of legislative business.) This can be seen by investigating the circumstances in which they were passed: e.g. the abolitionist sentiment resulting in the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments; the women's suffrage movement resulting in the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment; the state's rights sentiment involved in the passage of the Eleventh Amendment; and the mixed degrees of sentiment regarding Franklin Roosevelt's term of office resulting in the passage of the Twentieth Amendment.

Before this investigation begins, however, two points must be clarified, two apologies made. First, the Volstead Act was passed forty-three years ago. Although I have had access to most of the pertinent materials that exist concerning this bill, yet there is one vitally important source that I could not, with undisputed accuracy, take into account; that source is the human aspect of the Congress of 1919. It is too late to ask the Congressmen and lobbyists involved in the passage of the Volstead act why they said or acted as they did in the summer of 1919--they are now dead and their names all but forgotten. So we must engage in a certain degree of speculation when we consider the fate of H.R. 6810--speculation which will, however, be as qualified as is possible.

Second, this investigation is concerned primarily with the activities of the House of Representatives with regard to the Volstead Act. There are three reasons for limiting the investigation in this manner: (1) The major activity centering around the Volstead Act took place in the House. In the Senate the bill was discussed for only three days and was concerned mainly with amendments rather than the bill itself; it then was passed without the formality of a roll call vote. Hence in the Senate one can not grasp the real issues involved in the bill, nor does one ever clearly see the coalition forming around it. (2) The summer and fall of 1919 was the period when President Wilson was engaged in a bitter dispute with the Senate over settlement of World War I. This situation created forces of complex nature which, I would suggest, confused the domestic prohibition question. Therefore it would be folly to attempt to separate the true sentiment concerning the Volstead Act from a complex of bitterness over the Versailles Treaty. (3) My final reason for limiting discussion of the Volstead Act to the House of Representatives is that the system of representation by which Senators are selected conceals the real issues concerning the Volstead Act. That is, inferences from statistical analysis of characteristics of the population of Senatorial districts are much less reliable and much less informative than inferences from such analysis about Congressional districts. Therefore, I will only occasionally and briefly discuss the Senate in this investigation.

With these points in mind we may now examine the issue of prohibition enforcement as it existed in 1919.

THE PASSAGE OF THE VOLSTEAD ACT

The Issue

Legislative issues do not drop onto the floor of Congress out of the void, there awaiting recognition and consideration. Rather, behind each proposal is a body of sentiment which has been forming and growing somewhere in the nation. When an issue comes to the Congress it is probable that its fate has been carefully planned by a person or group because this bill offers immediate gain to those who espouse it. Behind the simple act of submitting a bill to the Congress are weeks or months of careful planning and consideration, writing and rewriting, debating and pressuring; and the origins of this act may go back years or even centuries. Such was the case with the Volstead Act.

Prohibition was by no means an innovation in the United States when the Eighteenth Amendment was passed in 1918. In fact, before the Eighteenth Amendment was passed 90 per cent of the townships and rural precincts of the country were already under prohibition through local and state provisions. Also, 75 per cent of all village and 85 per cent of all counties were prohibition territory, mainly by virtue of state laws. Indeed, 32 of the 48 states had state-wide prohibition laws. In total, 70 per cent of the population of the United States lived in prohibition territory in 1918 and prohibition laws covered

ninety-five per cent of the area of the nation.³ With regard to Congress, two-thirds of the Senators were from dry states in 1918 and a majority of the people in two-thirds of the Congressional districts of the nation lived in prohibition territory. Thus prohibition, far from being an innovation in 1918, was clearly espoused by a substantial majority of the American public. It was, in fact, the desire of a passionate majority.

Statutory prohibition is generally thought to be the outgrowth of a plea for temperance (here meaning self-restraint or moderation) which has long characterized the American moral tradition. The Puritan ethic, an integral part of the American moral tradition, has consistently urged some degree of temperance in all of man's actions. (By this I do not mean that the Puritans were necessarily void of desire for personal comfort or luxury; rather I mean that the concept of Puritanism is generally believed to include the idea of restraint in one's actions and that this restraint was extended to include abstinence from, or at least moderation in the use of, alcoholic beverages.) Throughout the history of the United States this plea for temperance has led to varying degrees of public sentiment opposed to the use of alcohol for beverage purposes. In the nineteenth century there were two primary waves of prohibition sentiment. The first of these waves occurred about 1845-1855 and resulted in thirteen states adopting prohibition legislation. (Maine, Vermont, Michigan and Nebraska adopted state-wide prohibition while New Hampshire, Delaware, Rhode Island, New York,

³Ernest H. Cherrington, Anti-Saloon League Year Book 1922 (Westerfield, Ohio, The American Issue Press, 1923), p. 5.

Connecticut, Massachusetts, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota adopted local option for prohibition.) The second major wave of prohibition sentiment in the Nineteenth Century started about 1880 and, aided by the Prohibition Party (organized in 1869) and the Women's Christian Temperance Union (organized in 1874), led to several additional prohibition states. (Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Iowa adopted state-wide prohibition while Rhode Island, having repealed earlier prohibition legislation, tried prohibition again.) By the turn of the century, however, most of these states had repealed their prohibition legislation and in 1905 only three states (Maine, Kansas, and North Dakota) retained state-wide prohibition. By the First World War a new spearhead for the prohibition movement has been organized in the form of the Anti-Saloon League. With the birth of the League (organized from a parent organization in Ohio about 1893) came the leadership force needed to cause the temporary demise of John Barleycorn.

The Anti-Saloon League based its operation on four pillars:

(1) paid professional officers and workers giving their entire time to League activity; (2) a financial system based upon monthly subscriptions; (3) political agitation directed toward the defeat of wet and the election of dry candidates; (4) concentration upon the liquor question--refusal to be sidetracked by other issues.⁴

The goal of the Anti-Saloon League was the total prohibition of intoxicating beverages in the United States. This prohibition was to be based upon and supported by a strict legislative code. The main point of attack of the League, as the name of the organization suggests, was the saloon. By damning the saloon and its associates (all liquor manufacturers, dealers,

⁴Bertram M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle: A study in Social Combat (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1953), pp. 9-10.

etc.) the League hoped to crush liquor business and consumption completely. No longer was the liquor problem an individual one in which each man was urged to be temperate. The Anti-Saloon League labeled liquor a disease which had to be completely cured and the only effective medicine would be strong legislation.

In mobilizing public support for prohibition legislation the League utilized a gigantic national organization. The national League was organized in a federal system. Each state had its own organization composed of representatives from local units. The national League consisted of an elaborate hierarchy of permanent and appointed officials and representatives from the state organizations. Heading this national organization ^{was} ~~were~~ a small group of men who actually held the power in the League. (It was felt by the founders of the League that if the League were to become too democratic ~~that~~ it would lose its effectiveness and would get bogged down with domestic matters.) In practice, then, the crucial activities and decisions of the League were directed by an aristocracy of national officials while the local and state organizations existed primarily to raise money and mobilize public support behind the League.

Politically the Anti-Saloon League was non-partisan in the sense that it did not restrict its attention to a particular party--it was not concerned with Democrats and Republicans as much as it was interested in wets and drys.

The League has no politics. It works as effectively in Democratic as in Republican communities. All parties look alike to the Anti-Saloon League.⁵

⁵Quoted in: Peter Odegard, Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League (New York, Columbia University Press, 1928): from The Pittsburg Liquor Dealers Journal, Feb. 26, 1908

It is interesting to note that the Anti-Saloon League also opposed the Prohibition Party. Although many supporters of one organization would belong to the other, yet the League and the Prohibition Party fought each other as well as alcohol. As one Prohibition Party pamphlet said:

We have got to kill the Anti-Saloon League and then lick the Republican and Democratic Parties.⁶

The hostility which separated these two groups stemmed from several quarrels among which the chief was a rivalry over which organization was to be the primary beneficiary of the prohibitionist sentiment.

The political strategy of the League was generally to support the dominant party in one-party states. Hence in Pennsylvania, Kansas, Wisconsin, Michigan, Maine, and Ohio the League tended to be Republican while in Texas, the Carolinas, Georgia, and Alabama the League was closely aligned with the Democratic Party.

In the appeal of the Anti-Saloon League to public opinion there was a noticeable reliance on the Puritan tradition of the United States. In this appeal the League pursued two basic lines of approach. The first was a moral appeal based on the premise that in the Puritan ethic to label something immoral is to damn it.⁷ The League called the saloon and liquor business immoral and in this way attempted to damn it in the eyes of America. An example of this technique may easily be seen in an excerpt from a pamphlet entitled The Texas Roundup on the Saloon. In this pamphlet the author draws a sharp line between those people for and against prohibition.

The wine dealers, brewers and distillers, wholesale liquor dealers, saloon keepers and bartenders, gamblers, prize fighters, horse racers and reckless sports, houses of ill fame, highway robbers, burglars and counterfeiters, drunken bums, corrupt

⁶ American Issue, Maryland edition, (Westerfield, Ohio, The American Issue Press) Feb. 26, 1910.

⁷ Peter Odegard, Pressure Politics (New York, 1928), p. 100

politicians, vote sellers and vote buyers, toughs and thugs, anarchists, low-class foreigners...that is to say all persons who are opposed to decent government...Standing opposed to these are the Church, philanthropists, Masons, Oddfellows, Knights of Pythias, Foresters, Locomotive Engineers, all the higher class order of Brotherhoods, clean salesmen, manufacturers and merchants, railroads, Mothers, Wives and Daughters... all men and women who stand for sobriety and good citizenship.⁸

Another example of League propaganda goes even further than this in "defining" the saloon.

The saloon is the storm center of crime, the devil's headquarters on earth; the schoolmaster of a broken decalogue; the defiler of youth; the enemy of the home; the foe of peace; the deceiver of nations; the beast of sensuality; the past master of intrigue; the vagabond of poverty; the social vulture; the rendezvous of demagogues; the enlisting officer of sin; the serpent of Eden; a ponderous second edition of hell, revised, enlarged, and illuminated.⁹

The second line of attack also related to the American moral background was an economic appeal which purportedly demonstrated the wastefulness of the liquor industry. League propaganda used this theme frequently and, owing to public concern over conservation of resources such as alcohol in the war, it became a highly effective weapon of the drys. An example of this type of economic appeal in the League propaganda is seen in a chart printed in a pamphlet called Brewery vs. Labor.¹⁰

wet	employed	dry	employed
Ranier Brewery	156	Now a tannery	1,600
Portland Brewery	100	Now a furniture factory	600
Pacific Coast Brewing Company	123	Now a shoe factory	2,500
TOTAL	379		4,700

⁸Quoted in Odegard, p.43; from The Texas Roundup on the Saloon

⁹Quoted in Odegard, p. 39: from American Issue, Kentucky edition (Westerfield, Ohio, The American Issue Press), April, 1912

¹⁰Quoted in Odegard, p. 51: from Brewer vs. Labor

An examination of propaganda materials profusely distributed by various organs of the Anti-Saloon League¹¹ shows that the League appealed to roles covering nearly all facets of American life. To the role of "parent" was directed the following "want-ad" in one League periodical.

WANTED - BOYS FOR CUSTOMERS¹²

Most of our old customers are rapidly dropping out, ten committed suicide last week, twenty are in jail--eight in the chain gang, fifteen were sent to the poor house, one was hanged. Most of the rest are not worth fooling with; they have no money.
WE NEED FRESH YOUNG BLOOD!!!!

In demonstrating the effect of liquor on education the Kentucky League organization published a comparison of two towns--one wet and the other dry.

Norfolk - wet - pop. 6,025 - had 158 high school students.
York - dry - pop. 6,235 - had 315 high school students.

When the saloon comes to town the children are forced to stay out of school to work in support of a drinking father.¹³

One of the popular propaganda themes of the Anti-Saloon League was the effect of alcohol upon health.

Dr. Bertillon, the famous statistician, says that from the ages of 35-45 he finds that Tuberculosis is twice as prevalent among drinkers of alcohol as it is among abstainers.¹⁴

¹¹An incomplete listing of propaganda materials distributed by the League from 1909 to 1923 shows the following: Books- 1,925,463; Pamphlets - 5,271,715; Leaflets - 114,675,431; Window Cards - 2,322,053; other cards, tickets, etc. - 18,522,471; misc. - 21,553,032; General printing, not strictly propaganda - 80,512,296; Total - 244,782,296. Odegard, p. 75.

¹²American Issue, Ohio edition (Westerfield, Ohio, The American Issue Press), June 8, 1912

¹³American Issue, Kentucky edition (Westerfield, Ohio, The American Issue Press), April, 1912

¹⁴American Issue, National edition (Westerfield Ohio, The American Issue Press), Nov. 12, 1912

The license states of New York, Delaware, California, Wisconsin, Nevada, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Connecticut showed 26.9 per cent of their insane as due to alcohol. In Maine, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas, where the sale of liquor is prohibited or severely restricted, only 5.9 per cent of the insanity was due to alcohol. The states having prohibition--Maine, North Dakota, Alabama, Georgia, Oklahoma, and North Carolina--had one insane person to every 873 persons. The average for the United States as a whole was one insane person for every 490 persons.¹⁵

With its powerful national organization and prolific propaganda presses the Anti-Saloon League soon established a strong body of public sentiment favoring prohibition legislation on a national level. With this backing the League moved into politics as a pressure group, turning this public sentiment into political action. When the League discovered that a man was running for public office, its officials would send him a form to be completed and return to the League. The answers that the candidate returned to League headquarters would determine whether or not he would be endorsed by the League.

ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE OF AMERICA¹⁶

Dear Sir:

We receive many inquiries requesting information in relation to the attitude of candidates for public office on the question of prohibition, its modification and its enforcement.

That we may the more intelligently answer these inquiries, and give the same such publicity as may be deemed advisable we respectfully submit the following question:

- 1) Do you believe in prohibition as a public policy?
- 2) Do you favor a repeal of state prohibition statutes similar to the act on taken by the legislative Assembly of New York?
- 3) Do you favor an ammendment to the Volstead Act, or to the state prohibition law, to legalize the manufacture of beverages with an alcoholic content in excess of that provided in Initiate Measure No. 3 adopted by the people of the state of Washington November 3, 1914?

¹⁵Filmore Conditin, Preceedings of the Fourteenth Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1911

¹⁶Odegard, p. 91

- 4) Do you believe the prohibition law should be observed as conscientiously and enforced as rigidly as any other laws on the statute books?
- 5) If nominated and elected, will you pledge of the observance and enforcement of the prohibition law, and to support such additional measures as in the light of experience may be deemed advisable to suppress the beverage use of intoxicating liquors?

Signed.
 Candidate for
 Affiliated with. party
 Address.
 Date

Yours very respectfully
 The Anti-Saloon League of Washington
 By. State Superintendent

It is interesting to note that the League was not concerned with the candidates personal stand on prohibition--they were concerned only with his vote. Once the League had determined a candidate's stand on prohibition they had two primary weapons (bribes or side-payments) with which to aid or oppose him. The first weapon was the offer of financial aid in a candidate's campaign for office (payments out of working capital.) The League had become a powerful agent in financing campaigns and in this way could 1) offer great help to a candidate by giving him a campaign contribution, or 2) prove to be a great obstacle should they decide to aid his opponent. The League's second weapon was to exploit its public support by endorsing certain candidates at election time (also out of working capital.) An example of this endorsement is the following excerpt from a report of the Anti-Saloon League of Wisconsin in 1920.

Senator: Irving L. Lenroot, rep.: must be reelected. Next to Volstead perhaps the most important man in Congress for the drys. Defeat might mean repeal of the Volstead Act.

Congressmen:

First District: H.A. Cooper; voted for Eighteenth Amendment; no statement on wine and beer.

Third District: James W. Murphey, democrat: openly opposed to legalizing beer and wine. John M. Nelson, rep.: voted for the Eighteenth Amendment: refused to state position on beer and wine: receiving support of beer and wine advocates.

Fourth District: Gerald P. Hayes, democrat: bone-dry, declares against legalizing beer and wine.

Seventh District: Joseph B. Beck, rep.: opposed beer and wine.

Eighth District: David G. Classon, rep.: voted for Volstead Act. Andrew R. McDonald, democrat: endorsed by Farmer-Labor Party; bone-dry, union labor leader.

Tenth District: James Frear, rep.: has dry record.

Eleventh District: Adolphus P. Nelson, rep.: dry, floor leader.¹⁷

A third type of side-payment which the Anti-Saloon League used in obtaining Congressional votes for their campaign was the promise of jobs in prohibition enforcement (payments out of expected gain.) The prohibition enforcement would entail a large body of permanent officials and those positions could be used to bribe Congressmen. Volstead, himself, received a position in prohibition enforcement following his retirement from Congress as legal advisor to the Northwest prohibition enforcement district.

Using techniques such as these the Anti-Saloon League became the spearhead of a wave of public sentiment which swept across the nation in the years surrounding the passage of the Volstead Act. The League became a powerful political leader whose wrath was known to every man on Capitol Hill.

The issue of prohibition had been a perennial one in most of the state legislatures across the nation at this time. Every year prohibition

¹⁷Report of the Anti-Saloon League of Wisconsin, Nov. 4, 1920

legislation would be introduced, discussed, and accepted or rejected. Backed by interest groups such as the Prohibition Party, the W.C.T.U., and the powerful Anti-Saloon League the prohibition question became a pressing issue in American politics. In 1918, Congress passed the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution providing for nation-wide prohibition of intoxicating beverages.

1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

2. The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided by the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

The Eighteenth Amendment was ratified by the several States within fourteen months after its passage by the Congress and was scheduled to go into effect on January 16, 1920. The problem now facing the proponents of prohibition was to ensure "appropriate legislation" with which to enforce the Amendment. The Volstead Act, as introduced by Andrew Volstead (Rep., Minnesota) on May 27, 1919, was to become this "appropriate legislation."

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The Volstead Act, as introduced in May, 1919, was divided into three parts: Title I, "To provide for the enforcement of war prohibition"; Title II, "Prohibition of Intoxicating Beverages"; and Title III, "Industrial Alcohol." Before considering the committee hearings and House debate on the Volstead Act it is necessary to comment on the three parts of this bill. Title I (war prohibition) of the bill was an attempt to enforce the War Prohibition Act (passed purportedly to conserve alcohol for defense purposes and scheduled to be effective July 1, 1919) at the same time that the Eighteenth Amendment was being enforced--as the saying goes "to kill two birds with one stone." In reading statements, testimony, and literature of this period one can sense the feeling of both the wets and the drys that there might well be a period between the War and the date set for the Eighteenth Amendment to be effective when liquor would be distributed and sold. References were made to "warehouses of liquor waiting to be sold" and "stocking up for prohibition" at this time, a stocking up which would be possible unless the War Prohibition Act could be strongly enforced. Title I, then, seems to be a strategic move of the drys to close this gap and sustain prohibition until the Eighteenth Amendment could be enforced.

Title II (prohibition of intoxicating beverages) was concerned with enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment by providing controls to outlaw the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors" within the United States. This was "common man's" prohibition--the bootlegger, the seven-mile limit, and bathtub-gin. The issue which was to arise in regard to Title II was the degree of severity of the controls provided in this section of the bill.

Title III (industrial alcohol) was designed to allow, yet control, alcohol used for industrial purposes. Any controversy concerning this section of the National Prohibition Act dealt with the question of whether or not the bill did in fact outlaw some legitimate business enterprises.

Congressional Committee Hearings form a ^{NECESSARY} segment of the legislative process. It is here that much of the work of Congress is done and here rests the fate of many bills. Congressional Committees can be very human bodies. An aura of informality is seen here that is generally lacking on the floor on Congress. In Congressional Committees, I would suggest, can often be seen the reality which exists in the Congress concerning an issue. By this I mean that Congressional Committee Hearings, which generally pass either unnoticed by the public or with very little publicity, lack the bravado and "vote-getting speech-making" which characterizes floor debate on the same issues.

Hence, in Committee Hearings one can often gain insight into the true nature and future of a bill.

The Committee Hearings on H.R. 6810 opened in the House Committee on the Judiciary on Tuesday, June 3, 1919, and concluded on Saturday

June 14. During this time the Committee heard 34 witnesses* of which, in general, four were satisfied with the bill as it was presented to the Committee and the rest (30) wanted it altered in some way. The Committee itself consisted of 21 members (including the chairman, Andrew Volstead) of which there were 13 Republicans and 8 Democrats (the Congress of 1919 had a Republican majority in both Houses.)

Rev. Edwin C. Dinwiddie, legislative superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League, was the first witness to appear before the House Committee on the Judiciary. In his testimony, which was mainly concerned with the necessity of adopting the Volstead Act, is contained an implication that Andrew Volstead was not the author of the bill which he had introduced.

Mr. Dyer (representative from Missouri): Which bill, if any, of those that are pending before the committee was prepared by you or by the officials of the Anti-Saloon League:

Dr. Dinwiddie: I would not say that this was prepared by us, but I think probably the basis of the bills--even the one introduced by the Chairman--was prepared after much collaboration with our people all over the country. That is what you mean, I presume?

Mr. Dyer: I understand from the Chairman, if I am not mistaken--and if I am I hope he will correct me--that you are the representative of the Anti-Saloon League who prepared and submitted to him for introduction in the House some bill. I do not know whether this is the one or not.

The Chairman (Volstead): No; this is not the one, but it practically carried out the same ideas. Most of it has been redrawn, although the general character of it is the same.¹⁸

*2 Congressmen, 13 men representing labor unions, 9 men representing commercial enterprises involving the manufacture or use of industrial alcohol, 4 representatives from pressure groups such as the Anti-Saloon League and the W.C.T.U., 4 businessmen who wanted to be allowed to sell their stock of liquors which were already manufactured, and 2 internal revenue agents.

¹⁸Enforcement of Prohibition, (privately printed by the Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1921), Hearings of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 6810, U.S. House of Representatives, 66th Congress, p. 4

This brief excerpt from the Committee Hearings on H.R. 6810 raises the question of the actual origin of the Volstead Act and the reasoning behind its authorship. The Volstead Act, as was later shown,¹⁹ was written by Andrew Volstead--based on similar legislation in Ohio, which was written by officials of the Anti-Saloon League. Prohibition legislation was a perennial issue in State Legislatures at this time. As both a lawyer and onetime county prosecuting attorney Volstead was familiar with this type of legislation and, therefore, capable of writing such a bill. The interesting thing to note in this respect is how he came to do this.

Volstead, himself, was not a prohibitionist.

I want to say to you that I never made a prohibition speech in my life. I never belonged either to the Prohibition Party or to the Anti-Saloon League.²⁰

Personally I have never been a prohibitionist. I never belonged to the Anti-Saloon League.²¹

As nearly as I can determine the reason why Volstead wrote the bill was that he, as Chairman of the House Committee, had the right to do so and because he was recognized by his party as being talented in drafting legislation.

He (Volstead) had a hand in drawing or assisting drawing a good many laws of Congress during the years he served in Congress--and had especial talent along such lines--His ability along that line was so recognized by members of Congress.²²

¹⁹Congressional Record, Vol. 58, Part 3 (July 12, 1919), p. 2463

²⁰Congressional Record, Vol. 58, Part 3 (July 8, 1919), p. 2296

²¹Enforcement of Prohibition Hearings of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 6810, U.S. House of Representatives, 66th Congress, p. 97

²²Letter from Mrs. Carl J. Lomen (the former Laura Volstead, daughter of Andrew Volstead), August 8, 1961

Along with those qualifications Volstead was a friend of Wayne B. Wheeler-- general counsel of the Anti-Saloon League. Also, I can find no evidence of any other comprehensive prohibition legislation which was introduced at this time; a fact which leads me to believe that arrangements had been made as to who would introduce such legislation. Thus it seems natural that Volstead, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary and a respected member of the majority party with a background in law and a special talent in drafting legislation should be asked, probably by a party leader or by Wheeler himself, to write what is known as the National Prohibition or Volstead Act. In a sense, then, to Volstead fell the vote of Congressional leadership on this particular issue.

Following the testimony of Dr. Dinwiddie a series of labor union officials appeared before the Committee and expressed the same basic point of view which was that the proposed bill was too severe in that it denied the American workman of beer and light wines. They asserted that a glass of beer or wine after work was part of the workman's way of life and to deprive him of this was unfair. They also said that this restriction was unenforceable and that the bill would in fact make criminals of honest men.

They (the American labor force) claim it is a privilege that they enjoy and they do not want it taken away from them.²³

I have come out of the mine on days like this, after working in bad air, with vapor and gases, working as hard as I could drive, with every bone in my body calling for some stimulant. Now, if I could get a bottle or a glass of light beer, it would give me that stimulant.²⁴

²³Enforcement of Prohibition, Hearings, p.20

²⁴Ibid., p. 17

Much of the time of the Committee Hearings was consumed by the testimony of representatives from business enterprises who believed that the Volstead Act would interfere with their legitimate activities. These men appeared before the Committee to : 1) clarify questions they had in regard to the bill or 2)ask that the bill be amended if they felt that it did in fact restrict their business enterprises. An example of this type of testimony can be seen on June 5 when William A. Schlobohm, representing the Fleischmann Company of New York, appeared before the committee. The Fleischmann Company, then the nation's largest producer of vinegar, asked that an amendment be made to allow the lawful production of the company's product.

Mr. Schlobohm: . . . On page 4, line 20, if the words "manufactured from cider" be stricken from the bill it would be possible for this company to go on with the manufacture of vinegar.

The Chairman: I do not think it would interfere with you even as it is, but I think that is a good suggestion and it will be recommended to the committee that they make that change.²⁵

Two Congressmen appeared before the House Committee on the Judiciary with regard to H.R. 6810--John F. Fitzgerald of Massachusetts and Adolph J. Sabath of Illinois. In both cases the main issue was the inclusion of war prohibition enforcement in this bill. Both men maintained that, since the War was over, war prohibition should be repealed and not enforced further. In both cases the Congressmen (Fitzgerald and Sabath) were given reasons for believing the war was not over (no treaty had as yet been signed, there were still large numbers of troops in Europe) and in both cases the testimony ended with no acceptable solution being reached by either the Congressmen or the Committee members.

²⁵Ibid., p. 106

In viewing the Committee Hearings on the Volstead Act as a whole there are two observations which help to understand the process of the passage of this Bill. The first observation concerns the relatively small number of witnesses who appeared before the Committee. The Volstead Act was by no means a minor piece of legislation. To pass this Bill would mean putting thousands of men out of work at a time when unemployment problems were growing because of closing war plants and of men returning from Europe back into the labor force. This Bill would also cause the Gross National Product to drop sharply as millions of dollars worth of liquor and related products sales were cancelled. This was also the triumph of a moral cause and the abrupt ending of a way of life which had existed for centuries in this country; yet only 34 witnesses appeared before the Committee Hearings and in some cases their testimony could not have lasted more than twenty minutes (e.g. Mr. Schlobohm of the Fleischmann Company and Mrs. Ellis Asby Yost of the W.C.T.U.).

Secondly, there seemed to be a feeling of disinterest which ran throughout the Hearings and gave the Hearings a mechanical atmosphere. Not fifty per cent of the Congressmen on the Committee entered into the discussion and questioning of the witnesses. At no point did anyone on the Committee strongly defend or criticize the pending Bill. Also, there is reason to believe that the Committee Hearings were hurriedly scheduled and held merely as a formality. (As a rule this is not usual in Congressional practices.)

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I had no knowledge of this meeting until little prior to 10 o'clock this morning.²⁶

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am a little mite in the air as to just what is before the committee at the present time, but I assume, of course, that there is some legislation pending, or that there are bills pending, which have in view the carrying out of war-time prohibition.²⁷

The point is that the Committee Hearings on the National Prohibition Act demonstrate the feeling of Congress in the summer of 1919 that the passage of the Bill was a foregone conclusion. The Hearings were short and the testimony repetitious. Quite possibly the only reason why men such as the labor union representatives appeared before the Committee was that they would one day have to report to the body they represented that they had tried to block the legislation. The only group which actually gained something by their testimony were the representatives of industries using alcohol industrially or utilizing distilling techniques and they merely called the Committee's attention to areas of the bill which were vague and needed amending in order to allow legitimate businesses to continue to operate. It is interesting to note the ratio of those witnesses supporting the Bill to those opposing it (as previously stated 4 in favor and 30 desiring change.) Considering the passage of the Volstead Act as a foregone conclusion and these Hearings as a mechanical formality, it is logical that few men desired hearing at the Committee to support the bill. It was not necessary to defend the Volstead Act because by this time it did not need a defense. By the time that the Committee Hearings started the drys knew that they would have the congressional majority needed to pass the Volstead Act.

²⁶Ibid., p. 14

²⁷Ibid., p. 86

It was later charged that the Volstead Act was being "ram-rodged" through Congress. The men who said this could look at the Committee Hearings and cite them as proof of their claim--short, unpublished meetings at which no time was allowed for a comprehensive examination of the bill, its full implications and consequences. This charge might also be answered with what now appears to be the real situation; that it was not necessary to debate the Volstead Act in committee because the Committee Hearings were a mere formality. The important question, success or failure of the bill on the floor of Congress, was already answered; therefore it seemed senseless to rehash what had been discussed for years and what had been basically settled by the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. By this time it was clear that the supporters of prohibition were a passionate majority and it was senseless to try to block the bill. If Congressmen had something more to say about prohibition they were waiting to say it where it might help their careers and win them votes--on the floor of Congress.

House debate is generally not the place where real legislative issues rise and fall. Rather, House debate is the place where teams, already selected, show their strength and maneuver for position. If anything, it offers an opportunity for those Congressmen who are undecided to make their decisions on an issue, but there were certainly no Congressmen undecided on the issue of prohibition in 1919.

On July 8, 1919, Mr. Campbell of Kansas, chairman of the House

Rules Committee, moved to open for debate H.R. 6810. Mr. Campbell's motion was carried and specified twelve hours of initial debate of which six hours was to be controlled by those Congressmen favoring passage of the bill headed by Mr. Volstead (R., Minn.), and six hours to be controlled by those Congressmen opposed to passage of the bill headed by Mr. Igoe (D., Mo.). At this time the House dissolved into the committee of the whole and debate on the Volstead Act began. (The reason for ~~dissolving~~ using the committee of the whole is to eliminate lengthy roll call votes. It allows more time for discussion and prohibits time consuming formalities.)

House debate on the Volstead Act continued from July 8 until July 22. During this time the bill was loudly applauded and savagely denounced. Congressmen cheered and Congressmen booed. Yet underneath this parliamentary circus the crucial issues concerning the bill appeared and the all-important coalition process unveiled. Debate on H.R. 6810 opened with a display of bravado and pathos, nonsense and reason. Mr. Pou (D. N.C.) denounced the bill as being too harsh, unfair, and discriminatory. He asserted that it allowed the wealthy to store large stocks of liquor to be lawfully consumed during prohibition, while the poor people must go to jail for making a bottle of "blackberry brandy". Yet, maintained Mr. Pou, he was for temperance. Then Mr. Fess (R., Ohio) rose to defend the bill on the grounds that it was sorely needed to support the Eighteenth Amendment. In rapid succession Mr. Cantrill (D., Ky.) said that he opposed the Eighteenth Amendment but now thinks that it should be enforced; Mr. LaGuardia (R., N.Y.) yelled that the bill was being "ram-rodged" through Congress; Mr. Sabath

(D., Ill.) cried that he was from Chicago where the masses hate whiskey and love beer; and Mr. Caldwell (D., N.Y.) rose and said virtually nothing (he finally did not vote on the bill.)²⁸

In the midst of this organized pandemonium, however, Mr. Griffin (D., N.Y.) rose to oppose the bill and in his speech there are two observations concerning the Volstead Act which are of special interest and which are undoubtedly true. The first of these truths has already been discussed.

The gentlemen who are behind this prohibition proposition are pretty acute politicians.²⁹

Indeed, to call the men backing prohibition (led by the Anti-Saloon League) "pretty astute politicians" is an understatement. What Mr. Griffin is in fact acknowledging is the highly organized and powerful movement which brought prohibition to the United States.

Mr. Griffin's second observation concerns the principal Congressional division which characterized prohibition.

On any proposition of this character you do not get a fair representation of the people of this country. Take some of the States which are most conspicuous in clamoring for prohibition and you gentlemen who represent these States are elected to this House upon the vote of 10,000, 11,000, 15,000, or 20,000 constituents, whereas the representatives of the people of New York, of Illinois, California, all the great Northern States, the States that are opposed to this legislation, each represent from 60,000 to 80,000 constituents (applause).³⁰

The basic issue which Mr. Griffin uncovers here is the small town and rural-metropolitan conflict which dominated the prohibition controversy.

²⁸Congressional Record, Vol. 58, Part 3 (July 8, 1919), p. 2284.

²⁹Ibid., p. 2285.

³⁰Ibid.

(Not as important is a basic conflict between North and South which Griffin mentions because this was a conflict in which metropolitan Northern centers such as New York and New Jersey were opposing small town rural Southern areas in regard to prohibition.) This conflict extended throughout the prohibition debate in the House. The basic argument was that small town and rural representatives outnumbered the metropolitan representatives in the House and yet the metropolitan representatives were representing larger constituencies than were the small town and rural representatives. Since prohibition was largely advocated in small town and rural areas (as we shall later see), what was happening, said the metropolitan representatives, was that a small town and rural minority was dictating the personal and moral standards of a metropolitan majority. The small town and rural representatives would generally answer their protagonists by trying to prove that they did represent as many constituents as did metropolitan representatives (which in a few cases they could do) or they would try to show that they were representing the views of "true" America and not the views of "illiterate foreigners" and other "subversive agents" of our society (an assertion which will be discussed later.) In any case this conflict continued throughout House debate on the Volstead Act and no completely acceptable solution was ever reached by either side.

There were several other issues which consistently appeared in House debate on the Volstead Act. One such issue was the question of who should enforce prohibition. The Volstead Act provided for

concurrent State and Federal powers to enforce prohibition. As might well be expected this did not satisfy all the representatives of Congress. Their views clashed again and again throughout House debate with the basic position of the dries being to establish concurrent powers of enforcement while the wets fought to put prohibition enforcement in the hands of the several States. The wets were obviously of the opinion that should prohibition enforcement be kept in the States the chances for strict enforcement would be less than if the Federal government were to enforce such legislation. In the end the dries won the battle and prohibition enforcement was placed in the hands of both the States and the Federal government.

Another frequent issue in the debate on the Volstead Act was the question of whether or not to allow the sale of beer and light wines. This was forbidden in the bill but the proposal was advanced, as it had been in the Committee Hearings, by representatives from urban industrial centers. On this point the dries, led by the Anti-Saloon League, wanted no compromise and stood firmly opposed to any beverage containing more than one half of one per cent alcohol.

The manner in which war prohibition was coupled with the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment was also continually questioned in House debate on the Volstead Act. One of the chief critics of the Volstead Act, Warren Gard (D., Ohio), expressed the opposition viewpoint on this issue in a speech which he concluded by saying: 1) that there should be a separate war prohibition enforcement bill, and 2) that Title I of the bill is therefore unnecessary and should be removed.³¹

³¹Congressional Record, Vol 58, Part 3 (July 11, 1919), p. 2446.

It was on these grounds that President Wilson would later veto the bill.

Local economic interest was also evident as House debate on the Volstead Act progressed. One of the principle manifestations of this interest was the desire of Mr. Lea (D. Calif.) to protect the grape industry in his constituency.

Today there is a grape crop on the vines in California the value of which is estimated by the Viticultural Commission at \$12,000,000. If this Congress should adopt Section I of this Act it will prevent the farmers of California from using these \$12,000,000 of grapes that now hang upon the vine.³²

A basic issue concerning the nature of the Volstead Act was revealed by Mr. Upshaw (D., Ga.) in a speech made during House debate. In this speech Upshaw said that remarks made by Mr. Sabath of Illinois in regard to the wishes of the people of Chicago (on July 8 Mr. Sabath had stated that the people of Chicago were generally opposed to prohibition) could be disregarded on the grounds that Chicago had a large foreign population. Thus the "native-American" nature of the Volstead Act was revealed. Prohibition was basically a movement founded in small town and rural Protestant areas by small town and rural Protestant Churches. It was these Churches which had originally formed the organization which later became the Anti-Saloon League. Although the Roman Catholic Church was officially divided on the question of prohibition enforcement (one Church official would defend the Volstead Act while another would condemn it), yet in areas with a high percentage of Roman Catholics the trend of public opinion was generally to oppose the bill. Also, the foreign population to which Mr. Upshaw

³²Congressional Record, Vol. 58, Part 3 (July 14, 1919), p. 2563.

was referring would probably include Irish and Italian Roman Catholics. Thus Mr. Upshaw's remark reveals much of the true nature of the base upon which the Volstead Act was grounded, the base from which the bill received most of its followers.

Following general debate on H.R. 6810 the bill was subject to amendment. During the amending process the drys followed one general and all-inclusive rule--do whatever Volstead says. (Here Volstead's role as Congressional leader is evident.) The strategy of the wets at this point, however, is vague and confused.

As numerous amendments to the Volstead Act were submitted (there were 285 House amendments which were sent to the Conference Committee of the House and Senate) it became clear that Andrew Volstead's word could make or break an amendment.

Amendments were offered and voted down without ceremony, while those presented by the Chairman went through in rapid succession.³³

This was usually accomplished, not by Volstead attacking a proposed amendment, but by his getting the floor and approving one. Volstead's approval at such times amounted to only a few words, but these words would guarantee a favorable vote on a proposed amendment. In regard to an amendment by Mr. Venable (D., Miss.):

Mr. Volstead: I accept that.³⁴

In regard to an amendment by an opponent of prohibition, Representative Juul (R., Ill.):

Mr. Volstead: This proposition I do not think dangerous to anybody.³⁵

³³New York Times, July 18, 1919, p. 4.

³⁴Congressional Record, Vol. 58, Part 3 (July 17, 1919), p. 2777.

³⁵Ibid., p. 2778

Regarding a proposed amendment by Mr. Gard (D., Ohio):

Mr. Volstead: There is no objection to that.³⁶

Actually I can find no instance in which an amendment passed without being sanctioned either by Andrew Volstead himself or by other dry leaders. Certainly no amendment passed the House which was opposed by Volstead.

The wet forces were by this time clearly aware of the fact they were not going to defeat the Volstead Act; nor could they significantly modify it. This feeling of complete helplessness often led to emotional outbursts by the wets during the debate on amendments to the bill. Said one wet whose proposed amendment had been crushed:

I am opposing this bill today--although you have the votes to pass it--because it is unjust, unfair, and unAmerican, and the most malicious assault on personal liberty that could be made.

It will be denounced in every section of the United States before long, and the men responsible for this legislation will be driven from office and power (laughter). My friend from California (Mr. Randall), the Prohibitionist, is laughing at that statement. Well, he may laugh about it; he can afford to laugh, he was elected as a Prohibitionist; but let me remind the House that "those who laugh last laugh longest".³⁷

The fact that the drys were dominating the debate and decisions on H.R. 6810 led to further outbursts by frustrated Congressmen. After trying to get the floor during a session when the drys were busy passing some of their amendments, Representative Goldfogle (D., N.Y.) finally yelled:

Can not a man on this side be recognized once in a while?³⁸

³⁶Ibid., p. 2802.

³⁷Ibid., p. 2780.

³⁸Ibid., p. 2779.

The actual strategy of the wets appears neither unified nor clear at this point. Neither side of the prohibition enforcement question made a united effort to support or oppose the bill by being present on the floor of Congress. (In the case of the dries there was such a large majority that it was not necessary for all supporters to be present at this time.) In fact, an editorial in the New York Times entitled "What are They Paid For?" wondered if Congress really cared what happened.

Some seventy-odd Congressmen, one-sixth of the membership of the House of Representatives, are passing amendments to the prohibition enforcement bill touching such important matters as the refusal of the right of jury trial and search of homes and seizure of private property without pretext and without redress...two-thirds of the members of the lower house are absent.³⁹

At one point it was said that the wets were attempting to amend the Volstead Act to make it so drastic that it would be unacceptable.

Wets said today that they realized their only hope was to make the bill so drastic that it would invite a veto from the President.⁴⁰

Actually there is no evidence to prove that this was the case. Anything that the wets offered was doomed to rejection and, except in a few instances, (those concerning industrial usage of alcohol), regardless of its content.

What finally became the strategy of the wets was a program of criticism and complaint. Mr. Longworth (R., Ohio) charged that the Volstead Act was a poorly conceived piece of legislation:

³⁹New York Times, "What are They Paid For?", July 22, 1919

⁴⁰Ibid.

The bill, however, is a hodge-podge of all sorts of liberty-crushing legislation in no way connected with the Constitutional amendment.⁴¹

The wets also continued their charge that the Volstead Act was being forced through Congress.

The tactics now being employed by the Chairman of the Committee and the radical prohibitionists in jamming this legislation through the House is outrageous.⁴²

It is not proper to shut off debate on these provisions... there are capable lawyers in the House who in perfect faith are trying to perfect this enforcement measure so that the rights of property owners and innocent persons will be protected in a way they are not now protected under the bill.⁴³

On July 22 the wets made one last-ditch effort to block the passage of the Volstead Act. Representative Igoe (D., Mo.) moved that the bill be recommitted--sent back to the House Committee on the Judiciary. This motion failed, however, and on July 22, 1919, the House of Representatives passed the Volstead Act, and they passed it in almost the exact form in which it was first presented to the House on May 27.

On the same day that the House of Representatives passed the Volstead Act the Senate Committee on the Judiciary opened its Hearings on the bill. Following these Hearings (which as far as I can determine were very similar in substance to the House Committee Hearings) the bill was reported back to the Senate with amendments on August 18. Senate debate on the bill was very brief (debate opened on September 3 and lasted only three days) and the bill was passed by the Senate on September 5 without the formality of a roll call vote. In order to

⁴¹Congressional Record, Vol. 58, Part 3, (July 21, 1919), p. 2959.

⁴²New York Times, July 18, 1919, p. 4

⁴³Ibid.

correlate contradictory amendments on the bill the Senate asked for a Conference Committee with the House on September 5. Conference managers were appointed on September 9 and 10 and the Conference Committee began work. In this Committee many of the minor amendments were either dropped or further amended. One major concession was made at this time, however, in that the Conference Committee agreed to a Senate amendment which would allow the manufacture of "preserved sweet cider".

The report of the Conference Committee was submitted to the Senate on October 8 where it was ratified without discussion. In the House, however, both the wets and the dries took this opportunity to voice further sentiment on prohibition.

Mr. Caldwell (D., N.Y.): Mr. Speaker, little can be said in the last two minutes of debate--I am sorry I have not more time--in opposition to this bill. I want it distinctly understood that I remain now, as I have always been, an anti-prohibitionist.⁴⁴

Mr. Blanton (D., Texas): Mr. Speaker, in all the history of Congress in my judgement there has been no piece of legislation passed more important to the happiness of the homes in America than this bill.⁴⁵

After a short period of speech-making the wets, again, attempted to block the bill by moving to recommit it. This motion failed, however, and the House ratified the Conference Report.

On October 27, 1919 President Wilson returned the Volstead Act, without his signature, to Congress. In his veto message Wilson said that he could not approve "that part of this legislation with reference to war-time prohibition". For this reason he refused to sign the bill.

⁴⁴Congressional Record, Vol. 58, Part 3, (July 22, 1919), p. 6693.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 6695.

For a brief moment a spark of hope appeared for the wet forces. This hope quickly vanished, however, as both houses of Congress--without debate--overruled the President and passed the bill with the required two-thirds majority of the two houses of Congress. Thus the battle for prohibition enforcement ended; andst the final accounting of this battle we can at last see tangible evidence of those issues which have been discussed and debated. Here there is proof of who or what caused the passage of the Volstead Act--here there are votes.

THE FINAL ACCOUNTING

Unfortunately the American Congress does not provide a system of voting such as that envisioned by one representative who said:

It would be a great deal easier if only one could answer "fifty-five percent aye" or "seventy per cent no" or "I vote aye but with the reservation that I do not like section 3 of the bill" or "I vote no; but God have mercy on my soul if I am wrong, as I may very well be".⁴⁶

Because Congress lacks such a system of voting, on every issue each Congressman must make a decision, and in most cases a compromise. He must weigh his personal morality against public sentiment, he must decide what effect his yea or nay will have on his constituents, his local and national Party, his friends at home and in Congress, and his nation's future and well being. And, most important, he must try to assess the immediate gain or loss to him which will result from his vote.

⁴⁶ Jerry Voorhis, Confessions of a Congressman (Garden City, New Jersey, Doubleday, 1947), p. 233.

Within the maze of complex factors influencing an issue and a decision are certain patterns which appear on the final accounting of all Congressional issues. And, I would suggest, within each decision made by Congress is a fairly definite pattern of voting blocs. Within such voting patterns are a fluctuating number of clearly defined and closely knit proto-coalitions; a number of indecisive "fringe" proto-coalitions; and, unfortunately, a certain number of exceptions. These voting patterns change from one issue to another, yet in all issues there is evidence of a small number of "universal" proto-coalitions. These universal blocs or universal proto-coalitions can be in the form of associations such as political parties; in the form of general voting formulas such as "when in doubt, do right" or "vote for every appropriations and against every tax"; or in the form of regional or economic loyalties such as the Southern stand on civil rights or the labor union vote. In any case such universal proto-coalitions do exist and appear on the final accounting of all Congressional issues.

Along with these universal proto-coalitions, ^{Are a number of limited-life blocs. These are proto-coalitions} which form on a particular issue and disappear once that issue has been settled. In order to understand the operation of Congress one must be aware of the Congressional coalition-formation process--its base, operation, and consequences.

In investigating the voting pattern which formed on the Volstead Act we encounter the two basic types of proto-coalitions--universal and limited-life (temporary) proto-coalitions. Prohibition itself was largely a moral question. This aspect of the Volstead Act accounts for one type of temporary proto-coalition--those men who voted for the

Volstead Act primarily because they were opposed to alcohol for beverage purposes. This viewpoint is expressed in a speech by Representative Morgan (R., Okla.) in which he accounts for his vote on the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I shall vote for this bill with a great deal of pleasure. In the adoption of the prohibition amendment the American people have taken a great step forward...it will leave its impression upon the social, moral, and economic conditions of the Nation...through it a new Nation will be developed. It will be a better Nation. It will be a Nation with less crime, immorality and injustice...So I hail this as the harbinger of a greater Nation, a brighter day, and a better world.⁴⁷

Yet, because certain men voted together on the Volstead Act for this reason, it does not follow that they will consistently vote together on other issues. In short, this was a temporary grouping of men who sided on a particular issue because of similar beliefs on that particular question.

Another temporary proto-coalition formed on the question of the passage of the Volstead Act to protect particular areas and businesses which would be financially injured by the passage of the Volstead Act. This proto-coalition would include men such as Mr. Lea (D., Calif.) whose constituency was a great grape producing area and Mr. Hull (R., Iowa) whose occupation before entering Congress was that of buying grain, an enterprize which deals with supplying grain to distillers. So in this case two men representing two political parties and from two different regions of the country united on a particular issue and, with other Congressmen facing similar situations, formed a temporary proto-coalition.

⁴⁷

Congressional Record, Vol. 58, Part 3 (July 21, 1919), pp. 6695-6696.

There are numerous other examples of this type of temporary proto-coalition which formed in the prohibition controversy of 1919, but citing examples of two or three is sufficient to demonstrate their limited nature, extent, and position in the coalition pattern of the Volstead Act.

The crucial proto-coalition in the voting pattern of the Volstead Act was of a universal nature and requires more attention than the temporary proto-coalitions. In considering this type of proto-coalition we will examine several possibilities. The first of these possibilities is a proto-coalition based upon political party affiliation.

The House of Representatives of 1919 consisted of 236 Republicans and 192 Democrats (in addition there was one Prohibitionist, Randall of California, and one independent Congressman, Baer of North Dakota). Of the Republican Congressmen in the House 70.76 per cent voted in favor of the bill, 20.76 per cent voted against the bill, and 7.62 per cent did not vote. Of the Democratic members of the House 61.40 per cent voted in favor of the bill, 26.56 per cent voted against the bill, while 11.45 per cent did not vote.

When considering the final accounting of the Volstead Act as a whole there were 287 yea votes consisting of 58.58 per cent Republicans and 41.11 per cent Democrats;* there were 100 nay votes consisting of 48 per cent Republicans and 52 per cent Democrats; and there were 40 Congressmen who did not answer on this vote (several had been given

*Independent Baer and Prohibitionist Randall both voted yea which brings the total percentage to 100 per cent.

leaves of absence--the rest are either paired or, to my knowledge, unaccounted for) of which 45 per cent were Republicans and 55 per cent were Democrats.

In examining these figures it is evident that prohibition enforcement was not a truly partisan issue with regard to coalition patterns. A majority of both parties voted in favor of the bill (70.76 per cent of the Republicans and 61.40 per cent of the Democrats) while a similar minority percentage of both parties opposed the bill (20.76 per cent of the Republicans and 26.55 per cent of the Democrats). In neither the Republican nor the Democratic blocs is there a clear-cut display of sentiment which would separate the two groups into definite ideological camps. Although there is evidence that the Republicans generally favored the passage of the Volstead Act more than the Democrats, yet it will later be shown that this was due mainly to forces other than party loyalty. Thus we must discard the possibility of the coalition of the Volstead Act as being primarily a product of partisan ideology or loyalty. This is in keeping with my theoretical model in which I discarded political parties as the principle leaders in situations involving passionate majorities.

A second universal coalition pattern which might be considered as the basis of the coalition of the Volstead Act would be a voting bloc centered on regional groupings within the Nation--in other words regional interest. In calculating a regional pattern of interest in the Volstead Act I have used a standard regional grouping of the United States (New England, Atlantic, Midwest, Northwest, Southwest,

Pacific, Border, and South) and tabulated the votes of the Representatives from each of these areas. In examining these figures we are again faced with the lack of any substantial evidence with which to attribute this pattern to the coalitions involving the passage of the Volstead Act. In seven of the eight regional areas over 60 per cent of the Representatives voted in favor of the Volstead Act. In the Atlantic States only 48.2 per cent of the Congressmen in the House voted in favor of the bill, yet only 41.4 per cent of the Congressmen in the House opposed the bill. Seventeen of the State delegations to the House voted 100 per cent in favor of the bill and these States were distributed throughout the eight regional groupings I have listed. In only three of the delegations from the several States was there a majority of the Representatives opposing the bill. In general, then, we must conclude that regional groupings of States was not ^{the} primary base on which the coalition pattern of the Volstead Act rested.

A third universal pattern which might serve as the basis of the Volstead Act would be a pattern based on the occupational (hence to a degree the economic and social) background of the Congressmen in the House themselves. In doing this I have tabulated as nearly as I can determine the primary occupation of each Representative in the House prior to his election to Congress. I have then tabulated these findings with regard to the vote of each Congressman on the Volstead Act. (See Appendix). Here, again, we are faced with a lack of conclusive evidence with which to arrive at the primary base of the coalition pattern involving the passage of the Volstead Act.

By far the largest single occupational background of the Representatives in the House of 1919 was law. This group accounted for 48.78 per cent of the yea votes on H.R. 6810 and 48.00 per cent of the nay votes on the bill. On the whole 67.30 per cent of the lawyers voted yea while 23.07 per cent opposed the bill. Another large occupational grouping of the Congress of 1919 was what I have labeled general businessmen. In this group 61.19 per cent of the Representatives of the House concerned voted yea on the National Prohibition Act while 28.35 per cent of the group voted nay. In general, only two of the occupational groups had a majority opposing the Volstead Act (2 of the 3 military men and all of the 5 labor leaders.) We can not, then, find any reason for believing that this was the primary basis on which the coalition pattern on the prohibition enforcement issue formed. We may assert that labor was opposed to the bill and that several occupational groups were by and large for the bill, but this alone is not satisfactory. Rather, it is evident that we must find another base on which to account for the coalition pattern of the Volstead Act.

The actual basis of the coalition of the Volstead Act has been discussed earlier in this paper and now merely needs to be examined for the final accounting on the bill. It is a universal proto-coalition (in this case a coalition) of rural and small town Congressmen. This proto-coalition stemmed from a metropolitan-rural and small town conflict existing in the nation in 1919, and involves religion, ethnic composition, economic status, and other basic roles of the American people.

There were 109 nay votes on the final accounting of the Volstead Act. Of these 109 votes 74 were from Congressmen representing constituencies in which at least 75 per cent of the voters lived in urban areas (urban areas were then defined by the U. S. Census Bureau as those whose population exceeds 2,500 persons.) Ninety-one of the nay votes were from Congressmen from constituencies at least 50% urban. To further test this hypothesis I have made a correlation between those Congressmen voting nay and the urban-rural composition of their constituencies. The results of this correlation (see appendix) show a coefficient of correlation of 0.86 based on a hypothetical perfect score of 1.0, and a coefficient of determination of 0.75 based on a hypothetical perfect score of 1.0. This correlation was based upon the entire population of the United States in 1920 and thus when these results are tested as to the number of times an identical result will occur if this correlation is repeated I find that it will occur 99.99 + per cent of the time.)

In metropolitan centers it is only natural that the Volstead Act would be opposed. Centered in large industrial centers were the laboring populations which opposed prohibition because it would take from the factory or mill worker one of his daily pleasures--a glass of beer. Thus we can account for the opposing votes of the five labor leaders in the House. This explains the fact that the Atlantic regional grouping of the nation (including the highly industrialized areas of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) had the lowest regional percentage of favorable votes on the bill. This also accounts for some

Democratic Party opposition to the bill due to the high percentage of Democrats in metropolitan areas. In general, by basing our coalition pattern on a metropolitan-small town and rural conflict we can account for discrepancies and abnormalities which we observe in other coalition patterns, yet which can not be fully explained by those patterns. We can take this conflict as our base and, using it as a frame of reference, we can thus explain and understand the coalition which formed on the prohibition enforcement issue of 1919.

The metropolitan-small town and rural conflict also illuminates the Catholic-Protestant conflict concerning the Volstead Act. The United States Census Report of 1920 showed that in major population centers the Roman Catholic Church was, in most cases, the predominate religious group. It is also estimated that in 1920 about 85 per cent of all the Roman Catholics in the United States lived in major population centers. (see Appendix). Hence, in addition to the strong labor sentiment opposing the Volstead Act in metropolitan America was added the opposition of the dominant religious group in these areas--the Roman Catholic Church.

A third major force in metropolitan areas which opposed the Volstead Act was the foreign-born population. This is the group which some Congressmen said was unimportant and whose views could be disregarded. Yet this group was very important to one group of Congressmen--those from constituencies containing large numbers of foreign-born persons. If these immigrants had a reason for opposing prohibition ~~and its enforcement~~ which was uniquely theirs it was probably this: to these

people liquor was not an evil thing--a disease which must be cured. They did not share the Puritan ethic of rural and middle class America. Rather, to the immigrant, liquor (especially wines and beer) was a part of his traditional way of life and the Volstead Act would deny him of this tradition. Although many immigrants were not yet citizens with voting privileges in 1919, yet many were citizens with voting rights and many others would become citizens. In any case this was a population group whose desires could not be ignored by the Representatives in Congress from these constituencies.

Before leaving this discussion of metropolitan opposition to the Volstead Act one point must be made. Although I have described three major metropolitan forces which each had reason to oppose the Volstead Act this is not meant to imply that each of these forces was independent of the others. Rather, I would suggest, that these three groups overlapped and that this overlapping was the rule and not the exception. However, the importance of these groups lies in the fact that together they formed a large percentage of the population of metropolitan constituencies and because of such constituency composition Congressmen in these metropolitan areas opposed the Volstead Act.

Standing in favor of the Volstead Act were the small town and rural Representatives to the House--a group which was considerably larger than the urban Representatives, and which was solidly backed by the Anti-Saloon League, the Protestant Church, and a majority of nation-wide public opinion. On the side of the Volstead Act were the traditionally "respectable" elements of American society--white,

Protestant, native-born Americans. Here stood the "backbone" of America-- the small farmer. Here too was an arsenal of American public opinion-- the small, Protestant, country Church. These were the groups which founded and financed the Anti-Saloon League, and these were the groups which brought the Volstead Act to Washington and these are the followers whose influence and votes passed the Volstead Act.

Thus the Volstead Act exemplifies the nature of a passionate majority as it exists in American politics. As an issue the Volstead Act was clearly the desire of a substantial majority of American voters. Proof of this is seen in the large percentage of Americans that lived in prohibition areas prior to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. In the decision-making process a pressure group, the Anti-Saloon League, became the leader of the prohibition issue and organized followers whose purpose was to obtain legislation providing for prohibition enforcement. The Anti-Saloon League utilized a number of side-payments with which to attract voters in the final accounting and in this way formed a coalition. This coalition was composed of several proto-coalitions, the principle one being an association of rural and small town Congressmen, and was of sizeable dimensions. In the final accounting the magnitude of the passionate majority was clear and the coalition was recorded as such.

Thus the Volstead Act followed the traditional path of legislation: beginning as an issue, moving through the decision-making process, and becoming a tabulation of votes in the final accounting. This traditional path of legislation was altered, however, by the addition

of the political phenomenon known as the passionate majority. It is this phenomenon which makes the passage of the Volstead Act of special interest to the student of politics.

CONCLUSION

The preceding investigation has attempted to describe the nature, method, and influence of the passionate majority as it exists in American politics. At this time I shall not review the points that I have made in this paper since I believe this is unnecessary. Instead, I shall make one final observation about American politics, perhaps about politics in general, which is inherent in the preceding investigation.

The passage of the Volstead Act demonstrates the localism of American politics. At the crucial stage of this legislation, the final accounting, when all decisions had to be final, the Representatives in the House based their decisions on the sentiment within their constituencies. Once the legislation had been examined and discussed, its true nature uncovered and understood, then a vast majority of the Congressmen applied the real issues at stake to the voters who elected them. Metropolitan Congressmen considered the effect of the bill on their constituents, small town and rural Congressmen considered the effect of the bill on their constituents, and on this basis the Congressmen voted. After the bravado and show of the parliamentary circus was silenced, after the propaganda materials from various people and agencies had been discarded, after the decisions had been made and the inward searching and considering was over, then the game became a contest of numbers, of urban versus rural Representatives.

And the rural Representatives won the prize.

The universal significance of this study is that it epitomizes the nature of politics itself--it says that every vote is for sale, that every Representative has bought his place in the scheme of government and that he intends to maintain this position. This buying and selling of votes is clearly seen in the passage of the Volstead Act and is, I believe, the underlying nature of politics.

APPENDICES

Veto Message on H.R. 6810

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning, without my signature, H.R. 6810, "An act to prohibit intoxicating beverages, and to regulate the manufacture, production, use, and sale of high-proof spirits for other than beverage purposes, and to insure an ample supply of alcohol and promote its use in scientific research and in the development of fuel, dye, and other lawful industries."

The subject matter treated in this measure deals with two distinct phases of the prohibition legislation. One part of the act under consideration seeks to enforce war-time prohibition. The other provides for the enforcement which was made necessary by the adoption of the Constitutional amendment. I object to and cannot approve that part of this legislation with reference to war-time prohibition. It has to do with the enforcement of an act which was passed by reason of the emergencies of the war and whose objects have been satisfied in the demobilization of the Army and Navy, and whose purposes of particular legislation arising out of war emergency have been satisfied, sound public policy makes clear the reason and necessity for repeal.

It will not be difficult for Congress in considering this important matter to separate these two questions and effectively to legislate regarding them, making the proper distinction between temporary causes which arose out of war-time emergencies and those like the constitutional amendment of prohibition which is now part of the fundamental law of the country. In all matters having to do with the personal habits and customs of large numbers of our people we must be certain that the established processes of legal change are followed. In no other way can the salutary object sought to be accomplished by great reforms of this character be made satisfactory and permanent.

THE WHITE HOUSE
October 27, 1919

WOODROW WILSON

A Tabulation of Voting by Party
On the Volstead Act in
The House of Representatives

I

Party	Number Voting	%Yea	%Nay	%Not Voting
Republican	236	70.76	20.76	7.62
Democratic	192	61.40	26.56	11.45
Other*	2	100.00		

*One prohibitionist and one Independent

II

Vote	Number	%Republican	%Democratic
Yea	287	58.58	41.11
Nay	100	48.00	52.00
Not Voting	40	45.00	55.00

Regional Support of Volstead Act

New England States	60.8% of Representatives voted yea
Atlantic States	48.2% of Representatives voted yea 41.4% of Representatives voted nay
Midwest States	78.8% of Representatives voted yea
Northwest States	97.3% of Representatives voted yea
Southwest States	80.6% of Representatives voted yea
Pacific States	73.6% of Representatives voted yea
Border States	74.4% of Representatives voted yea
Southern States	80.6% of Representatives voted yea

State	Yea	Nay	Not Voting	%Yea
Alabama	8	-	-	100
Arizona	1	-	-	100
Arkansas	6	1	1	86
California	5	1	1	55
Colorado	4	-	-	100
Connecticut	-	1	1	0
Delaware	1	-	-	100
Florida	4	-	-	100
Georgia	11	1	1	92
Idaho	2	-	-	100
Illinois	15	3	3	57
Indiana	1	2	2	84
Iowa	10	-	-	91
Kansas	8	-	-	100
Kentucky	8	1	1	80
Louisiana	4	-	-	50
Maine	3	1	1	66
Maryland	3	-	-	50
Massachusetts	10	1	1	62
Michigan	12	1	1	92
Minnesota	10	-	-	100
Mississippi	8	1	1	80
Missouri	12	3	1	74
Montana	2	-	-	100
Nebraska	5	1	-	84

State	Yea	Nay	Not Voting	%Yea
Nevada	1	-	-	100
New Hampshire	2	-	-	100
New Jersey	2	7	3	16
New Mexico	1	-	-	100
New York	15	26	2	34
North Carolina	6	2	22	60
North Dakota	3	-	-	100
Ohio	15	6	1	68
Oklahoma	7	-	11	88
Oregon	2	1	-	66
Pennsylvania	15	14	5	41
Rhode Island	1	2	-	33
South Carolina	6	-	1	86
South Dakota	3	-	-	100
Tennessee	8	-	2	80
Texas	14	2	1	80
Utah	1	-	1	50
Vermont	2	-	-	100
Virginia	8	-	2	80
Washington	5	-	-	100
West Virginia	3	-	3	50
Wisconsin	6	3	1	60
Wyoming	1	-	-	100

Occupational Grouping of Representatives

Occupation	Number	%Yea	%Nay	%Not Voting
Law	208	67.30	23.07	8.65
Judge	48	79.16	12.50	8.33
General Business	67	61.19	28.35	10.44
Newspaper	22	81.81	9.09	9.09
Farm	18	61.11	16.66	22.22
Military	3	33.33	66.66	-
Civil Service	7	71.42	28.57	-
Politician	15	73.33	20.00	6.66
Labor Leader	5	-	100.00	-
Banker	18	55.55	27.77	16.66
Education	15	80.00	6.66	6.66
Medicine	1	100.00	-	-
Liquor Industry	1	-	100.00	-

Yea Votes			Nay Votes		
Occupation	Number	% Of Total	Occupation	Number	% Of Total
Law	140	48.78	Law	48	48.0
Judge	38	13.24	Judge	6	6.0
Gen. Bus.	41	14.28	Gen. Bus.	19	19.0
Newspaper	18	6.27	Newspaper	2	2.0
Farm	11	3.83	Farm	3	3.0
Military	1	0.33	Military	2	2.0
Civil Service	2	0.66	Civil Service	5	5.0
Politician	11	3.83	Politician	3	3.0
Labor Leader	-	-	Labor Leader	5	5.0
Banker	10	3.48	Banker	5	5.0
Education	12	4.18	Education	1	1.0
Medicine	1	0.33	Liquor Indus.	1	1.0

Not Voting		
Occupation	Number	% Of Total
Law	18	45.0
Judge	4	10.0
Gen. Bus.	7	17.50
Newspaper	2	5.0
Farm	4	10.0
Military	-	-
Civil Service	-	-
Politician	1	2.50
Labor Leader	-	-
Banker	3	7.50
Education	1	2.50

Representatives to the 66th Congress Voting Year

Name	Party	State	Occupation	%Urban
Ackerman	R	N.J.	Banker	73.04
Alexander	D	Mo.	Judge	9.81
Almon	D	Ala.	Judge	17.00
Anderson	R	Minn.	Law	30.34
Andrews	R	Nebr.	Education	20.36
Andrews	R	Md.	Law	14.27
Anthony	R	Kans.	Newspaper	41.80
Aswell	D	La.	Education	12.27
Ayres	D	Kans.	Law	52.36
Baer	In.	N. Dak.	Newspaper	21.61
Bankhead	D	Ala.	Law	2.74
Barbour	R	Calf.	Law	35.07
Barkley	D	Ky.	Judge	19.42
Begg	R	Ohio	Education	38.64
Bell	D	Ga.	Bus.	8.34
Benham	R	Ind.	Farm	24.56
Benson	D	Md.	Law	100.00
Bland	D	Va.	Law	21.22
Bland	R	Ind.	Law	30.78
Bland	D	Mo.	Judge	91.36
Blanton	D	Tex.	Judge	27.37
Boies	R	Iowa	Judge	32.52
Bowers	R	W. Va.	Banker	31.54
Box	D	Tex.	Judge	28.96
Brand	D	Ga.	Judge	14.61
Briggs	D	Tex.	Law	31.06
Brinson	D	N.C.	Law	14.51
Brooks	R	Ill.	Banker	23.99
Browning	R	N.J.	Bus.	65.50
Brumbaugh	D	Ohio	Education	83.47
Burroughs	R	N.H.	Law	63.10
Butler	R	Pa.	Law	48.20
Byrnes	D	S.C.	Newspaper	3.47
Byrns	D	Tenn.	Law	52.04
Campbell	R	Kans.	Law	44.81
Candler	D	Miss.	Law	15.35
Cannon	R	Ill.	Law	32.41
Cantrell	D	Ky.	Farm	31.29
Caraway	DD	Ark.	Bus.	15.32
Carss	D	Minn.	Bus.	62.76
Carter	D	Okla.	Farm	15.94
Chindblom	R	Ill.	Law	100.00
Christopherson	R	S. Dak.	Law	15.31
Clark	D	Fla.	Law	12.62
Clark	DD	Mo.	Law	11.10
Classon	R	Wisc.	Judge	37.95
Cole	R	Ohio	Law	44.32
Collier	D	Miss.	Bus.	27.71
Connally	D	Tex.	Law	28.37
Cooper	R	Ohio	Bus.	70.73
Copley	R	Ill.	Law	56.63
Costello	R	Pa.	Bus.	100.00

Name	Party	State	Occupation	%Urban
Cramton	R	Mich	Newspaper	22.70
Crisp	D	Ga.	Judge	14.03
Crowther	R	N.Y.	Medicine	75.19
Currie	R	Mich.	Politician	31.41
Dale	R	Vt.	Judge	28.20
Dallinger	R	Mass.	Law	100.00
Darrow	R	Pa.	Banker	100.00
Davey	D	Ohio	Bus.	76.00
Davis	R	Minn.	Law	25.27
Davis	D	Tenn.	Judge	12.44
Dempsey	R	N.Y.	Law	100.00
Denison	R	Ill.	Law	42.67
Dickenson	D	Mo.	Law	9.07
Dickenson	R	Iowa	Law	21.90
Dominick	D	S.C.	Law	13.33
Doremus	D	Mich	Law	100.00
Dowell	R	Iowa	Law	60.00
Drane	D	Fla.	Bus.	47.30
Dunbar	R	Ind.	Civil S.	29.58
Dunn	R	N.Y.	Civil S.	100.00
Eagle	D	Tex.	Banker	60.66
Elliott	R	Ind.	Law	38.47
Ellsworth	R	Minn.	Law	16.14
Elston	R	Calf.	Law	91.39
Emerson	R	Ohio	Law	100.00
Esch	R	Wisc.	Judge	22.78
Evans	D	Mont.	Judge	57.97
Evans	D	Nev.	Bus.	19.70
Evans	D	Nebr.	Judge	19.76
Ferris	D	Okla.	Law	19.10
Fess	R	Ohio	Education	41.04
Fields	D	Ky.	Bus.	12.05
Fisher	D	Tenn.	Law	53.94
Flood	R	Va.	Law	14.44
Fordney	R	Mich.	Bus.	41.59
Frear	R	Wisc.	Bus.	18.72
French	R	Idaho	Law	22.49
Fuller	R	Ill.	Judge	57.26
Fuller	R	Mass.	Bus.	100.00
Grandy	D	S.Dak.	Newspaper	7.81
Garner	D	Tex.	Judge	27.83
Garrett	D	Tenn.	Law	11.35
Good	R	Iowa	Law	38.48
Goodwin	D	Ark.	Bus.	9.44
Gould	R	N.Y.	Bus.	41.64
Graham	R	Ill.	Law	47.79
Green	R	Iowa	Judge	29.11
Greene	R	Mass.	Bus.	100.00
Hadley	R	Wash.	Law	59.06
Hardy	R	Cole.	Newspaper	31.44
Hastings	D	Okla.	Law	23.34

Name	Party	State	Occupation	%Urban
Haugen	R	Iowa	Banker	24.92
Hawley	R	Ore.	Education	26.36
Hayden	D	Ariz.	Military	35.00
Hays	R	Mo.	Judge	13.62
Heflin	D	Ala.	Law	3.80
Herandez	R	N.Mex.	Farm	18.02
Hersey	R	Me. Calif.	Law Pa.	22.34
Hersman	D	Calif.	Farm	51.09
Hickey	R	Ind. N.Y.	Law	54.43
Hill	R	N.Y.	Politician	49.26
Hoch	R	Kans.	LLaw	10.98
Holland	D	Va.	Law	59.85
Houghton	R	N.Y.	Bus.	52.22
Howard	DD	Okla.	Newspaper	45.44
Huddleston	D	Ala.	Law	66.38
Hudspeth	D	Tex.	Farm	37.03
Hulings	R	Pa.	Law	51.65
Jacoway	D	Ark.	Law	34.72
James	R	Mich.	Bus.	43.47
Johnson	D	Ky.	Politician	2.82
Johnson	D	Miss.	Judge	22.00
Johnson	R	S.Dak.	Law	18.15
Johnson	R	Wash.	Newspaper	47.48
Jones	D	Tex.	Law	14.67
Kearns	R	Ohio	Law	26.15
Kelly	R	Mich.	Law	71.92
Kelly	R	Pa.	Bus.	100.00
Kendall	R	Pa.	Bus.	18.70
Kennedy	R	Iowa	Farm	42.13
Kiess	R	Pa.	Bus.	40.22
Kincheloe	D	Ky.	Law	27.85
Kinkaid	R	Nebr.	Judge	14.58
Kitchin	D	N.C.	Law	14.88
Knutson	R	Minn.	Newspaper	21.01
Kraus	R	Ind. Pa.	Law	45.93
Krieder	R	Pa.	Bus.	56.23
Langley	R	Ky.	Law	4.53
Lanham	D	Tex.	Law	55.07
Lankford	D	Ga.	Judge	19.60
Larsen	D	Ga.	Judge	13.77
Layton	R	Del.	Politician	54.15
Little	R	Kans.	Law	58.38
Luce	R	Mass.	Law	100.00
Lufkin	R	Mass.	Newspaper	100.00
Luhring	R	Ind.	Law	52.94
McCulloch	R	Ohio	Law	57.70
McDuffie	D	Ala.	Law	0.0
McFadden	R	Pa.	Banker	22.59
McKenzie	R	Ill.	Law	32.50
KcKeown	D	Okla.	Judge	20.10

Name	Party	State	Occupation	%Urban
McKinley	R	Ill.	Banker	40.84
McLaughlin	R	Mich.	Bus.	41.95
McLaughlin	R	Nebr.	Education	15.19
McPherson	R	Mo.	Law	32.33
MacGregor	R	N.Y.	Law	100.00
Magee	R	N.Y.	Law	73.83
Major	D	Mo.	Law	45.45
Mansfield	D	Tex.	Judge	9.19
Mapes	R	Mich.	Law	68.06
Mays	D	Utah	Bus.	70.70
Michener	R	Mich.	Law	58.72
Miller	R	Wash.	Law	94.00
Monahan	R	Wisc.	Newspaper	27.00
Mondell	R	Wy.	Bus.	29.49
Montague	D	Va.	Law	65.44
Moores	R	Ind.	Law	90.25
Moore	R	Ohio	Law	30.37
Moore	D	Va.	Law	0.0
Morgan	R	Okla.	Law	24.27
Mott	R	N.Y.	Banker	41.53
Murphey	R	Ohio	Bus.	45.33
Nelson	D	Mo.	Farm	23.18
Nelson	R	Wisc.	Law	32.36
Newton	R	Minn.	Law	100.00
Nicholls	D	S.C.	Law	26.22
Nichols	R	Mich.	Newspaper	100.00
Oldfield	D	Ark.	Law	7.37
Oliver	D	Ala.	Law	7.04
Olney	D	Mass.	Bus.	100.00
Osborne	R	Calf.	Newspaper	100.00
Overstreet	D	Ga.	Judge	34.84
Padgett	D	Tenn.	Law	6.10
Paige	R	Mass.	Bus.	86.00
Park	D	Ga.	Bus.	15.05
Parker	R	N.Y.	Farm	57.87
Parrish	D	Tex.	Judge	33.17
Peters	R	Me.	Law	30.96
Platt	R	N.Y.	Newspaper	53.55
Quin	D	Miss.	Law	12.79
Ragsdale	D	S.C.	Bus.	11.71
Rainey	D	Ill.	Bus.	100.00
Raker	D	Calf.	Law	13.20
Ramseyer	R	Iowa	Education	30.76
Randall	Proh.	Calf.	Newspaper	100.00
Randall	R	Wisc.	Judge	63.23
Rayburn	D	Tex.	Law	27.62
Reavis	R	Nebr.	Law	46.65
Reed	R	N.Y.	Law	49.30
Reed	R	W. Va.	Education	19.37
Rhodes	R	Mo.	Law	11.18
Ricketts	R	Ohio	Law	29.63
Riddick	R	Mont.	Newspaper	19.71

Name	Party	State	Occupation	%Urban
Robinson	D	N.C.	Law	10.88
Rogers	R	Mass.	Law	100.00
Romjue	D	Mo.	Judge	18.66
Rose	R	Pa.	Law	52.29
Rowe	R	N.Y.	Law	100.00
Rubey	D	Mo.	Education	2.84
Rucker	D	Mo.	Judge	24.10
Sanders	R	Ind.	Law	43.64
Sanders	D	La.	Law	20.05
Sanders	R	N.Y.	Civil S.	100.00
Saunders	D	Va.	Judge	12.40
Schall	R	Minn.	Law	100.00
Scott	R	Mich.	Law	36.80
Sears	D	Fla.	Law	59.92
Sells	R	Tenn.	Bus.	14.76
Shreve	R	Pa.	Law	62.12
Sims	D	Tenn.	Law	12.47
Sinclair	R	N.Dak.	Education	8.93
Sinnott	R	Ore.	Law	25.69
Smith	R	Idaho	Law	30.55
Smith	R	Ill.	Banker	33.21
Smith	R	Mich.	Law	51.85
Smithwick	D	Fla.	Law	19.86
Snell	R	N.Y.	Bus.	29.01
Steagall	D	Ala.	Law	15.44
Stedman	D	N.C.	Law	30.36
Steenerson	R	Minn.	Law	12.01
Stephens	D	Miss.	Law	37.90
Stevenson	D	S.C.	Law	14.11
Stiness	R	R.I.	Law	100.00
Strong	R	Kans.	Law	27.68
Strong	R	Pa.	Bus.	23.54
Summers	R	Wash.	Bus.	27.73
Summers	D	Tex.	Bus.	63.36
Sweet	R	Iowa	Law	44.22
Taylor	D	Cole.	Law	20.43
Taylor	R	Tenn.	Law	37.19
Temple	R	Pa.	Education	54.69
Thomas	D	Ky.	Law	9.70
Thompson	R	Ohio	Newspaper	19.94
Thompson	D	Okla.	Bus.	51.09
Tillman	D	Ark.	Judge	8.16
Timberlake	R	Cole.	Farm	29.90
Tincher	R	Kans.	Law	21.27
Towner	R	Iowa	Law	20.02
Treadway	R	Mass.	Politician	84.00
Upshaw	D	Ga.	Bus.	70.87
Vaile	R	Cole.	Law	100.00
Venable	D	Miss.	Judge	11.32
Vestal	R	Ind.	Law	49.53

Name	Party	State	Occupation	% Urban
Vinson	D	Ga.	Judge	26.99
Volstead	R	Minn.	Law	9.58
Walters	R	Pa.	Newspaper	64.19
Wason	R	N.H.	Law	63.10
Weaver	D	N.C.	Law	14.71
Webb	D	N.C.	Law	27.82
Webster	R	Wash.	Judge	53.02
Welty	D	Ohio	Law	41.02
Whaley	D	S.C.	Law	32.75
Wheeler	R	Ill.	Politician	48.58
White	R	Kans.	Farm	4.64
White	R	Me.	Law	41.48
Williams	R	Ill.	Politician	14.54
Wilson	R	Ill.	Law	100.00
Wilson	D	La.	Politician	7.24
Wilson	D	Pa.	Law	39.73
Wingo	D	Ark.	Law	24.44
Winslow	R	Mass.	Bus.	100.00
Wise	D	Ga.	Politician	27.18
Wood	R	Ind.	Law	63.71
Woods	D	Va.	Law	48.58
Woodyard	R	W. Va.	Judge	12.25
Wright	D	Ga.	Law	28.18
Yates	R	Ill.	Politician	67.00
Young	R	N. Dak.	Bus.	7.70
Young	D	Tex.	Law	12.93
Zihlman	R	Md.	Bus.	36.19
Foster	R	Ohio	Law	31.67
Greene	R	Vt.	Politician	34.22
Robson	R	Ky.	Law	7.44
Watkins	D	La.	Judge	24.95
Watson	D	Va.	Judge	16.01
Griest	R.	Pa.	Bus.	44.00
Focht	R	Pa.	Newspaper	23.00
Browne	R	Wisc.	Law	26.00
Ashbrook	D	Ohio	Newspaper	44.00
Taylor	D	Ark.	Law	14.00
Ireland	R	Ill.	Law	46.00
Hutchinson	R	N.J.	Bus.	66.00
Jones	R	Pa.	Law	30.00
Doughton	D	N.C.	Farm	20.00

Representatives to the 66th Congress Voting Nay

Name	Party	State	Occupation	%Urban	%Roman Catholic
Babka	D	Ohio	Law	100.00	69
Bacharach	R	N.J.	Banker	51.00	33
Bee	D	Tex.	Law	54.83	58
Blackmon	D	Ala.	Law	20.56	.7
Britten	R	Ill.	Bus.	100.00	65
Buchanan	D	Tex.	Bus.	24.60	24
Burdick	R	R.I.	Law	100.00	77
Burke	R	Pa.	Labor	64.19	57
Carew	D	N.Y.	Law	100.00	70
Casey	D	Pa.	Civil S.	70.94	66
Cleary	D	N.Y.	Law	100.00	76
Coady	D	Md.	Bus.	100.00	46
Cullen	D	N.Y.	Civil S.	100.00	76
Curry	R	Calf.	Law	56.45	65
Dent	D	Ala.	Law	20.49	15
Dewalt	D	Pa.	Law	64.19	19
Donovan	D	N.Y.	Bus.	100.00	70
Dooling	D	N.Y.	Civil S.	100.00	76
Dupre	D	La.	Law	100.00	75
Dyer	R	Mo.	Banker	100.00	71
Eagan	D	N.J.	Banker	100.00	79
Edmonds	R	Pa.	Bus.	100.00	56
Fitzgerald	D	Mass.	Politician	100.00	72
Freeman	R	Conn.	Military	100.00	62
Gallagher	D	Ill.	Bus.	44.50	65
Gallivan	D	Mass.	Law	100.00	72
Ganly	D	N.Y.	Bus.	100.00	70
Gard	D	Ohio	Judge	100.00	59
Goldfogle	D	N.Y.	Law	69.86	70
Griffen	D	N.Y.	Law	64.19	70
Haskell	R	N.Y.	Law	100.00	76
Hull	R	Iowa	Grain	52.91	43
Humphreys	D	Miss.	Law	7.69	.2
Husted	R	N.Y.	Law	100.00	59
Igoe	D	Mo.	Law	100.00	71
Jefferis	R	Nebr.	Law	85.94	51
Johnstown	D	N.Y.	Law	100.00	76
Juul	R	Ill.	Law	100.00	65
Kahn	R	Calf.	Law	100.00	79
Kennedy	R	R.I.	Law	100.00	77
Klecza	R	Wisc.	Judge	100.00	62
LaGuardia	R	N.Y.	Law	100.00	70
Lampert	R	Wisc.	Bus.	49.31	54
Lazaro	D	La.	Farm	21.30	75
Lea	D	Calf.	Law	26.95	57
Lehlbach	R	N.J.	Law	100.00	60
Linthicum	D	Md.	Law	100.00	46
Longergan	D	Conn.	Law	67.35	64
Longworth	R	Ohio	Law	100.00	59
McAndrews	D	Ill.	Bus.	100.00	65


Name	Party	State	Occupation	%Urban	%Roman Catholic
McArthur	R	Ore.	Farm	93.61	33
McGlennon	D	N.J.	Law	100.00	60
McKinley	D	N.Y.	Bank	100.00	80
McLane	D	Pa.	Bus.	91.16	59
MacGrate	R	N.Y.	Law	100.00	76
Madden	R	Ill.	Bus.	100.00	65
Maher	D	N.Y.	Bus.	100.00	76
Mann	R	Ill.	Law	100.00	65
Martin	D	La.	Judge	18.97	87
Mead	D	N.Y.	Civil S.	100.00	68
Merritt	R	Conn.	Bank	75.00	66
Minahan	D	N.J.	Bus.	100.00	60
Mooney	D	Ohio	Bus.	100.00	69
Moore	R	Pa.	Bank	100.00	56
Morin	R	Pa.	Bus.	100.00	57
Mudd	R	Md.	Law	100.00	46
Newton	R	Mo.	Politician	100.00	71
Nolan	R	Calf.	Bus.	100.00	79
O'Connell	D	N.Y.	Newspaper	100.00	75
O'Connor	D	La.	Judge	100.00	75
Ogden	R	Ky.	Law	84.53	39
Pell	D	N.Y.	Education	100.00	70
Phelan	D	Mass.	Law	100.00	68
Porter	R	Pa.	Law	100.00	57
Pou	D	N.C.	Politician	12.40	.5
Radcliffe	R	N.J.	Bus.	100.00	66
Rainey	D	Ill.	Law	100.00	65
Ramsey	R	N.J.	Judge	63.53	79
Reber	R	Pa.	Law	60.74	64
Riordan	D	N.Y.	Bus.	100.00	70
Rodenberg	R	Ill.	Bus.	56.65	46
Rowan	D	N.Y.	Law	100.00	70
Sabath	D	Ohio	Law	100.00	65
Sanford	R	N.Y.	Judge	100.00	66
Sherwood	D	Ohio	Law	84.01	48
Siegel	R	N.Y.	Military	100.00	70
Small	D	N.C.	Law	8.99	.1
Smith	D	N.Y.	Law	100.00	70
Snyder	R	N.Y.	Law	67.60	62
Steele	D	Pa.	Bus.	60.99	40
Stephens	R	Ohio	Law	100.00	59
Sullivan	D	N.Y.	Law	100.00	70
Tinkham	R	Mass.	Bus.	100.00	72
Vare	R	Pa.	Bus.	100.00	56
Voigt	R	Wisc.	Law	37.71	37
Walsh	R	Mass.	Newspaper	89.00	74
Ward	R	N.Y.	Farm	37.29	32
Watson	R	Pa.	Law	38.85	29
Garland	R	Pa.	Labor	64.19	57
Glynn	R	Conn.	Law	100.00	70

Name	Party	State	Occupation	%Urban	%Roman Catholic
Booher	D	Mo.	Law	46.00	21
Leshner	D	Pa.	Law	37.00	38
Welling	D	Utah	Politician	26.00	2
Merritt	R	Conn.	Bus.	75.00	66
Caldwell	D	N.Y.	Law	100.00	75
Hamill	D	N.J.	Law	100.00	79
Scully	D	N.J.	Bus.	54.00	54
Crage	R	Pa.	Judge	64.00	44
Hardy	D	Tex.	Judge	14.00	7

Percentage of Roman Catholics
In Urban America


County	City	Percentage of Roman Catholics
Albany	Albany	66
Alleghany	Pittsburg	57
-	Baltimore	46
Bronx	New York	80
Cook	Chicago	65
Essex	Newark	60
Hamilton	Cincinnati	59
Hennepin	Minneapolis	43
Hudson	Jersey City	79
Milwaukee	Milwaukee	62
New Haven	New Haven	72
New York	New York	76
Orleans	New Orleans	75
Philadelphia	Philadelphia	56
Queens	New York	74
-	Saint Louis, Mo.	71
San Francisco	San Francisco	79
Suffolk	Boston	72
Los Angeles	Los Angeles	34

A Correlation Between Those Congressmen Voting Nay and The Percentage of Urban Voters in Their Constituencies



$r = 0.866$
 $r^2 = 0.749$

A Correlation Between Those Congressmen Voting Nay and The Percentage of Roman Catholics in Their Constituencies



$r = 0.53$
 $r^2 = 0.28$

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